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Abstract
A stall recovery guidance system was designed to help pilots improve their stall
recovery performance when the current aircraft state may be unrecognized under
various complicating operational factors. Candidate guidance algorithms were con-
nected to the split-cue pitch and roll flight directors that are standard on large
transport commercial aircraft. A new thrust guidance algorithm and cue was also
developed to help pilots prevent the combination of excessive thrust and nose-up
stabilizer trim. The overall system was designed to reinforce the current FAA rec-
ommended stall recovery procedure. A general transport aircraft model, similar to
a Boeing 757, with an extended aerodynamic database for improved stall dynam-
ics simulation fidelity was integrated into the Vertical Motion Simulator at NASA
Ames Research Center. A detailed study of the guidance system was then conducted
across four stall scenarios with 30 commercial and 10 research test pilots, and the
results are reported.
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Executive Summary
Despite stall warning systems in most all commercial aircraft, full stalls do still
sometimes occur. In several such cases, the pilots applied control in a direction op-
posite to that required to recover the aircraft after it had stalled. After performing
a detailed analysis of representative Loss-of-Control accident cases, including some
that involved stall, an international Commercial Aviation Safety Team of govern-
ment and industry experts recommended numerous safety enhancements to address
the primary issues identified. Among these was a recommendation to conduct re-
search into algorithms and display strategies to provide guidance for recovery from
approach-to-stall and stall.
The study detailed in this report examines one such stall recovery guidance
system that has been designed to help pilots improve their stall recovery performance
when the current aircraft state may be unrecognized in the presence of complicating
operational factors. The focus of the study was on two candidate pitch guidance
algorithms, in addition to a new thrust guidance system. The thrust guidance
system was developed to help pilots avoid the loss of nose-down elevator authority
caused by the application of too much thrust and nose-up stabilizer trim on aircraft
with low mounted engines. A basic roll guidance strategy was also implemented to
complete the pitch-roll-thrust guidance system. The outputs of the pitch and roll
guidance computation were connected to split-cue pitch and roll flight directors that
are standard on most large transport commercial aircraft. The overall system was
designed to reinforce the current FAA recommended stall recovery procedure, and
to potentially provide a benefit to that procedure when justified by the guidance
computation.
The objectives of the study were to investigate the degree to which the candidate
stall recovery guidance algorithms and displays could improve pilot stall recovery
performance criteria in four scenarios: a high altitude stall recovery, a low altitude
stall recovery with and without a misaligned stabilizer, and an approach stall re-
covery. The scenarios were designed specifically for baselining the potential safety
benefits of the recovery strategy, computation, and display employed by the guid-
ance system.
In total, 30 commercial and 10 research test pilots flew three runs of each sce-
nario, each with and without guidance, in the Vertical Motion Simulator at NASA
Ames Research Center. A general transport aircraft model, similar to a Boeing
757, was implemented for the study. This model contained an important extended
aerodynamic database with improved stall dynamics simulation fidelity. The main
findings of the study were: (1) that aggressive pitch down guidance was effective
at preventing secondary aerodynamic stall during the recovery, especially at high
altitude, (2) pitch and thrust guidance helped prevent excessive altitude loss in the
low altitude scenario, (3) pitch-up guidance had a minor effect on reducing flap
overspeed conditions while recovering with full thrust in the approach scenario, and
(4) the addition of thrust guidance was effective at preventing over thrust in combi-
nation with excessive nose-up trim, but to the detriment of maintaining margin to
secondary aerodynamic stall.
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Nomenclature
α Angle-of-Attack. Angle from the airspeed velocity vector to the
fuselage reference line.
αSR Stall reference angle-of-attack. Exceeding of the stall reference
angle-of-attack quickly leads to full stall. In this report, αSR is
defined as the angle-of-attack that first maximizes CL.
γ Flight path angle. Angle from the horizon to the airspeed ve-
locity vector.
ρ Air density at the current aircraft altitude.
θ Pitch angle. Angle from the horizon to the fuselage reference
line. θ = γ + α.
CD Dimensionless coefficient of drag.
CL Dimensionless coefficient of lift, depends on α and other factors.
D Force of Drag.
g Acceleration due to gravity.
L Force of Lift.
m Aircraft mass.
nLF Load factor, defined as L/W .
S Net wing surface area.
T Net force of thrust generated by the engines.
V True airspeed, i.e., the speed of the airflow over the wings.
VREF Landing reference speed in knots, see Appendix A.
VSW Stall warning airspeed in knots. Corresponds to αSW and trig-
gers the stick-shaker stall warning alert. See Appendix A.
W Aircraft weight, i.e., mg.
FMPC Fast Model Predictive Control. One of the two pitch guidance
algorithms used in the study.
ADI Attitude Direction Indicator. Central portion of the PFD with
the artificial horizon and flight director cues.
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast.
Angle-of-attack See α.
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AoA Angle-of-attack, see α.
ATC Air Traffic Control.
CAS Calibrated Airspeed. Indicated airspeed corrected for position
and instrument error.
CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team.
CFR Code of Federal Regulations.
EBA Energy Based Algorithm. One of the two pitch guidance algo-
rithms used in the study.
EICAS Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System.
FAA Federal Aviation Administration.
FDR Flight Data Recorder.
Full Stall An aerodynamic condition where the angle-of-attack exceeds
the stall reference angle-of-attack αSR. The FAA provides an
operational definition, based on the flight characteristics of stall,
see [1, §1-7, pg. 2].
GTM General Transport Model, the standardized commercial aircraft
simulation model used in this study.
IAS Indicated Airspeed. Airspeed reading on the flight-deck air-
speed indicator. In this report, indicated and calibrated air-
speed are treated as equivalent.
Load Factor See nLF.
LOC-I Loss-of-Control In-flight.
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board.
PF Pilot Flying.
PFD Primary Flight Display.
PIO Pilot Induced Oscillation.
Pitching Moment Rotational moment that produces a change in pitch.
PLI Pitch Limit Indicator.
PM Pilot Monitoring.
PNF Pilot Not Flying.
Secondary Stall Any full stall that occurs after breaking the initial stall in a stall
recovery.
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SRG Stall Recovery Guidance.
Stall Buffet A strong turbulence that sometimes occurs just prior to stall,
caused by local regions of pressure- or shock-induced flow sepa-
ration on the wing.
TAS True Airspeed. Calibrated airspeed corrected for altitude and
non-standard temperature — the speed of the aircraft relative
to the airmass in which it is flying.
VMS Vertical Motion Simulator.
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1 Introduction
Aerodynamic stall is a potentially dangerous condition that occurs when an aircraft’s
angle-of-attack becomes so large that the desired smooth airflow across its wings is
disrupted. An aircraft in this state loses the lift required to support its weight and is
difficult to control. Stall is a condition most pilots train to avoid, and there are stall
warning systems onboard most aircraft to help them prevent stalled flight conditions
before they can occur. Unfortunately, stall related accidents and incidents do still
occur in spite of the existing pilot training and systems for preventing stall. While
the occurrence is rare, the consequences can be dire.
Two accidents in particular, both occurring in 2009, have exemplified the need
for new thinking when it comes to preventing and recovering from aerodynamic
stall. The first was the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident in New York. The second
was the Air France Flight 447 accident, out of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In each case,
there was a different cascade of complicating factors that led to the stalled aircraft
condition. The most striking observation for many, however, was that once the stall
had occurred, the pilots reacted by applying the controls in the direction opposite
to what was necessary to recover the aircraft. Although both crews in their most
recent training cycle had been taught to minimize altitude loss in approach-to-stall
recoveries (a concept now changed in FAA regulations), their in-flight actions made
the situation worse.
Stall related accidents and incidents are formally categorized as Loss-Of-Control
while In-flight (LOC-I). In decadal surveys, the LOC-I accident category has been,
and remains to this day, the most significant fatal accident category for commercial
jet airplane accidents worldwide [2]. Furthermore, LOC-I accidents are widely recog-
nized by aviation safety experts as characteristically complex. Starting in 1999, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been highly engaged in
national and international efforts to reduce loss-of-control accidents in commercial
aircraft [3]. One of the many outcomes of this work, is the recognition that the oc-
currence of stall is, typically, a final aircraft condition that results from the cascade
of multiple safety system failures. The reduction of LOC-I accidents in general, and
of stall related accidents in particular, therefore requires addressing the significant
failures in the cascade. The focus of this report, however, is on the system of last
resort, where a stall has occurred and the aircraft needs to be recovered to a safe
flight condition under complex circumstances that have likely caused the pilot to
lose aircraft state awareness.
In August 2010, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) commissioned a
group of government and industry experts to examine LOC-I accident and incident
events, where the crew lost awareness of their airplane’s state [4].1 This Airplane
State Awareness (ASA) team focused on 18 accident or incident events dating from
1998 to mid 2009. Nine of the 18 events were classified as attitude state awareness re-
lated (pitch or bank angle or rate). The other nine events, including 5 specific events
where stall occurred, were classified as energy state awareness related (combination
of airspeed, altitude, vertical speed, thrust, and airplane configuration). Nearly all
1This CAST activity was a follow-on effort to previous analysis work done on loss-of-control in
2000.
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of the incidents involved issues related to lack of external visual references, distrac-
tion, and ineffective alerting. Though not all of them were stall related, 12 of the
18 events involved inappropriate control inputs. Overall, the analysis showed again,
what has long been known in aviation safety: that LOC-I accidents are complex,
and that reducing their frequency requires a spectrum of safety improvements.
As a result of the CAST process, detailed Airplane State Awareness Safety
Enhancement (SE) plans, numbered SE192–SE211, were developed to address the
significant issued identified in their analysis [5]. The study presented in this report
is focused on the pilot control guidance aspect of the research recommended in
SE207, output 2, with the stated objective to “develop and refine algorithms and
display strategies to provide control guidance for recovery from approach-to-stall or
stall [6].”
To address this output, several guidance algorithms were developed around a
central idea: that by using sensor measurements on-board the aircraft, and the
physics for how aircraft fly, an algorithm can compute the specific trajectory that
an aircraft should fly, to either prevent or recover from a stalled aircraft condition.
The results of the computation were translated to standard pitch and roll flight
directors on the Primary Flight Display (PFD), which the pilots could follow to
effect their recovery. In addition, a new thrust director, and underlying thrust
guidance computation, was added to the display in an effort to help pilots avoid
applying too much thrust in an excessive nose-up trim condition — a condition
which has been observed in multiple stall event reports.
The purpose of the experiment was to conduct a baseline study of the proposed
new stall recovery guidance system, with two candidate underlying pitch recovery
guidance computations. In the experiment, the guidance system was tested by both
commercial line pilots, and research test pilots, across four different stall scenarios
with aspects similar, but not identical, to those of real commercial aircraft accidents
and incidents summarized in Section 1.5. Many of the motivating stall events were
taken from the stall related scenarios studied by the CAST Airplane State Aware-
ness team. The NASA developed General Transport Aircraft model, with extended
aerodynamic envelope for full stall, was implemented in the Vertical Motion Simula-
tor (VMS) facility at NASA Ames Research Center. A total of 40 pilot participants
flew the simulated scenarios over the course of 23 days starting on April 11 and
ending on May 19, 2017.
The objectives of this baseline study were three fold: (1) to obtain pilot vali-
dation of the stall recovery strategy employed by the guidance computation, (2) to
determine if the system creates a benefit without doing harm, and (3) to assess the
system usability with almost no training. The third objective is important from a
technology development perspective. This is because the system would likely see
operational use under adverse piloting conditions, where a stalled aircraft state may
be unexpected or unrecognized. The guidance system should be a simple tool to
help pilots recognize and completely recover the aircraft from stall with minimal
mental workload.
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1.1 Literature Survey
The technology research addressing stall prevention and recovery spans multiple
themes identified in accidents and incidents. These include a lack of aircraft state
awareness due to factors such as poor visibility, sensor failure, automation system
confusion, and pilot distraction [4, 6–10]. In addition, research into improved simu-
lator models with stall characteristics, and pilot training for manual stall prevention
and recovery were recommended by the CAST [11, 12]. In relation to this overall
body of work, the focus of this study is on the development of algorithms and guid-
ance display strategies for helping pilots maximize the effectiveness of their stall
training, on the rare occasion that it needs to be used [6].
Extensive prior research has been conducted under the topic of upset prevention
and recovery to address loss-of-control [3, 13], which is a multifaceted topic, where
the type of stall considered here is often viewed as a simple case. For example,
Gandhi et. al., develops a joint human automated recovery system for more gen-
eralized loss-of-control scenarios, in part by determining maneuver sequences that
optimize loss of altitude subject to load factor and input constraints [14]. In their
approach, a commercial nonlinear program solver was used to precompute recovery
procedures for storage in a lookup table that is accessed during flight operations.
Oﬄine strategies of this nature can suffer if the conditions encountered do not match
at runtime, or in some cases, if there is a high computational cost of matching the
current condition to a large dictionary of stored conditions. Reinforcement learning
strategies for optimal upset recovery were also considered for uav applications [15].
Here, large batches of simulation runs were used to train optimal recovery strategies
for online use. However, the trained optimal recovery strategy is typically not reli-
able if the current aircraft condition is not well covered by the training data set. As
an alternative to the oﬄine training based methods, constrained control approaches
to the stall recovery guidance problem have been investigated. One such approach
uses Pseudo Control Hedging to adapt the system output commands to prevent
control input saturation, for example by reducing the flight path angle to ensure
angle-of-attack limits are not saturated [16].
In recent ongoing work, Richards and Ghandhi, et. al., developed an upset detec-
tion and recovery system for providing control guidance [17]. The approach included
pilot behavior modeling, along with a combination of both on-, and, off-line upset
recovery computation — in an effort to reap the benefits of both approaches in a
scenario dependent way. In their work, other upset conditions besides stall are also
considered, including runaway pitch trim, hard-over rudder and hard-over aileron
failures. A distinguishing feature of their work is the computation of control in-
ceptor guidance (e.g., where to put the control wheel and column), as opposed to
the fly-to attitude guidance (e.g., the pitch and bank angles to fly) approach that
we have taken in our work. The Richards study showed reduced oscillation in the
inceptor movement and vehicle response during the recovery maneuver, which may
be a characteristic of their inceptor guidance approach. Finally, their system was
flight tested on a specialized variable stability Learjet 25B, by a small sample group
of 5 pilots with encouraging initial results [18].
In general, much of the prior work in stall recovery does not specifically address
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important operational complexities that can arise in real scenarios, such as an exces-
sive nose-up pitching moment when too much thrust is applied, or the potential for
a secondary stall to occur due to the coupled dynamics between pitch and the angle-
of-attack during the pull-up phase of the recovery. The novel aspect of the approach
presented in this report is that it specifically addresses these important operational
issues, using fundamental physical principles with well defined operational limits.
1.2 Basic Flight Dynamics of Stall and Stall Recovery
Several flight dynamics concepts are referred to throughout this report. These con-
cepts are important for understanding the key issues addressed by the recovery
guidance technology presented in this report. The descriptions here are only de-
tailed enough to impart a basic understanding. Appropriate references should be
consulted for more detailed discussion, see for example [19–21].
Aerodynamic Forces
Fundamentally, airplanes fly because their wings generate a net upward force, called
lift (L), by bending the passing airflow downward, as shown at the top of Figure
1. The production of lift is controlled by the angle-of-attack (α) that the wing
makes with respect to the direction of airflow, shown in Figure 1. Increasing α
increases the lift. But this effect only works up to a point. After α exceeds a
critical value αSR, the airflow starts to separate from the wing and is no longer
adequately deflected downward, as depicted at the bottom of Figure 1.2 Just prior
to the separation of flow, most aircraft experience a pre-stall buffet that may feel
like a strong oscillatory shaking or turbulence.3 After the separation of flow, the lift
generated by the wing diminishes with further increase in the angle-of-attack. As
the lift becomes insufficient to counteract the downward pull of gravity, the aircraft
begins to lose altitude in a manner that is not typically intended by the pilot.
The controllability of the aircraft is also reduced at high angle-of-attack, and small
asymmetries in the angular moments can produce large upsets. For more discussion
on flight at high angle-of-attack, see [20, §7.4].
Besides the lift, there are three other forces important to our study of stall
recovery. Two of these are shown at the top of Figure 1. The first is the force of
drag (D) acting in the direction of the airflow across the wing, and opposite to the
wind-relative velocity vector of the aircraft. The second force is the weight of the
aircraft (W ) acting in the direction of gravity, and the third force is the net thrust
(T ) generated by the engines (not shown in the figure, but primarily acting along
the body axis of the aircraft). The lift and drag forces are both proportional to the
air density (ρ), net wing surface area (S), and the square of the airspeed over the
2In this study, we set αSR to the angle-of-attack that corresponds to maximum of CL(α), some-
times denoted as αCLmax .
3Buffet in the pre-stall region can be heavy enough to make reading the panel instruments or
performing precision tracking difficult. Furthermore, differential pressure- or shock-induced flow
separation across the wings can lead to wing drop or wing rock [20, §7.4, pg. 750].
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↵L 
D 
W 
STALL when α > αSR 
Figure 1. Notional airflow over a wing vs. angle-of-attack (α).
wing (V ).4 Therefore, the lift and drag forces are described by the equations
L = ρSV 2CL(α)/2 (1)
D = ρSV 2CD(α)/2 (2)
where the dimensionless coefficients of lift and drag, CL(α) and CD(α), respectively,
are functions that depend on the angle-of-attack, as well as the geometrical design
(and orientation) of the aircraft’s wings. These coefficients also depend on the
aircraft’s configuration (e.g., flap, gear, and speed-brake setting), in addition to the
Mach number and Reynolds number.
Definition of Stall
In this report we define stall for simplicity, as any aircraft state with an angle-of-
attack greater than αSR. We can do this however, only because the underlying
aerodynamic model for the simulation is known, and this is where we assume the
separation of flow occurs.
On a real aircraft the precise angle-of-attack where the separation of flow occurs
is difficult to predict or accurately observe. In fact, the flow separation does not
4The airspeed over the wing V , is also referred to as the true airspeed. With this definition of
V , the mean effect of the wind (across the time-scale of interest) is included, and the true airspeed
can then be viewed as equal to the aircraft velocity in the mean wind-relative inertial coordinate
frame.
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occur all at once. Rather, it manifests from localized regions along the wing through
time until it includes the whole wing. This is due to a variety of complicating factors
beyond the level of detail we can explain here.5 However, because of the uncertainty
in the angle-of-attack where stall might occur, it is more practical to define stall by
the aircraft behavior a pilot would observe during stall. From part of the FAA’s
definition of Full Stall “any one, or combination of, the following characteristics are
observed: (a) an uncommanded nose-down pitch that cannot be readily arrested,
which may be accompanied by an uncommanded rolling motion; (b) buffeting of a
magnitude and severity that is a strong and effective deterrent to further increase
in AoA; (c) no further increase in pitch occurs when the pitch control is held at the
full aft stop for 2 seconds, leading to an inability to arrest descent rate [1, §1-7].” In
addition to these, the roll damping is also usually degraded near stall, making the
aircraft bank angle more difficult to control just prior to, and after stall.
Load Factor
The load factor (nLF) is defined as the aircraft’s lift-to-weight ratio
nLF =
L
W
=
ρSV 2CL(α)
2mg
, (3)
where m is the current aircraft mass (which changes with fuel usage), and g is the
acceleration due to gravity. The load factor is related to the force, and consequent
acceleration, experienced by a passengers sitting close to the aircraft’s center of
mass. For example, when flying straight-and-level, the lift-to-weight ratio is one,
and that passenger (along with all the others) experiences a 1 g load factor. If the
aircraft accelerates upward to initiate a climb, the passenger experiences a load fac-
tor greater than 1 g. If the aircraft accelerates downward fast enough, the passenger
may experience the weightless feeling of a 0 g load factor. If the aircraft is accel-
erated downward even faster, the passenger (who we hope is wearing a seatbelt)
may experience a negative load factor. Sustained negative load factors are undesir-
able because anything not strapped down will strike the aircraft ceiling (think of
the drink carts, flight attendants, and toilet water). The aircraft structure itself is
also engineered to withstand maximum positive and negative load factors before its
integrity is compromised. Typically, for large transport class commercial aircraft
the limiting positive load factor is around 2.5 g with a clean aircraft configuration
(flaps and gear up), and 2 g otherwise.
The load factor limits come into play during stall recoveries for three reasons.
The first reason is that any stall recovery involves pitching the aircraft nose-down
to get α ≤ αSR. This may require a forward column input, which when applied
too abruptly will produce a negative load factor that puts the passengers at risk for
injury, as noted above. The second reason is because, once the aircraft has pitched
down, the pilot will naturally want to pitch the aircraft nose-up and recover to level
or climbing flight. This requires pulling the column aft, but this action must also
be taken appropriately. Otherwise, the increased angle-of-attack required to reduce
5Some of these factors include: Mach number, Reynolds number, turbulence, and icing.
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the descent rate can cause a secondary aerodynamic stall (any full stall that occurs
after the initial stall is broken). The central issue that relates the load factor to stall,
is that getting the aircraft to move upwards requires upward force, and therefore,
increasing the angle-of-attack, and the load factor to greater than 1 g. Therefore, a
stall is produced by attempting to pull more g’s than the aircraft can support with
an α < αSR, and this can happen at any airspeed. At high altitude, the pull-up
maneuver may be further complicated by the significantly reduced air density that
degrades the aerodynamic damping and causes a pitch sensitive aircraft response.6
This makes it easy to inadvertently exceed αSR. Finally, the third reason is that the
pull-up maneuver may cause a load factor that exceeds the maximum limit that the
aircraft structure was designed to withstand.
Back Side of the Power Curve
In order to hold steady level flight at slower airspeed, an aircraft must fly at higher
angle-of-attack. Unfortunately, as the angle-of-attack is increased there comes a
point where an associated increase in drag requires more thrust to hold the airspeed
constant. When more thrust is required to fly slower, the aircraft is said to be on
the back side of the power curve. Furthermore, in situations at higher altitudes, it is
even possible that the thrust required exceeds the maximum thrust available. This
means that even with full throttle, the aircraft can decelerate and stall if the pilot
attempts to hold level flight.
For these reasons, it is important to end up on the front side of the power curve
at the end of a high altitude stall recovery. This means recovering with sufficient
airspeed so that the aircraft can accelerate without the need for additional altitude
loss.
Loss of Nose-Down Pitch Authority
For many commercial aircraft, with engines mounted below the wings, there is yet
another dynamic effect important to stall recovery. In order to recover from stall, the
aircraft has to reduce its angle-of-attack (to get α < αSR) and increase its airspeed,
as one might expect from Equation (1). Decreasing the angle-of-attack requires a
nose-down pitch input, while increasing airspeed is significantly aided through the
application of full engine thrust. However, when the engines are mounted below the
wings, the application of full thrust creates an upward pitch tendency, or pitching
moment, that counteracts the ability of the aircraft to pitch nose-down.
This nose-up pitching moment is significant at lower altitude where, because of
the increased air density, the thrust available from the engines is at its greatest.
In addition, the effect can be exacerbated by the position of the stabilizer trim, to
the point where the pilot no longer has elevator authority to pitch the aircraft nose-
down. In this situation, the aircraft pitches nose-up uncontrollably, possibly putting
the aircraft into an even deeper stall. This issue appears in a surprising number of
6In addition to reduced pitch damping, CL(αSR) generally decreases with increasing Mach in
the transonic regime. So as the aircraft flies faster, CL(αSR) is decreased.
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stall related accidents and incidents (see Section 1.5), and is well recognized in the
current FAA guidance on stall recovery.
At high altitude the engine thrust effect on the pitching moment is significantly
diminished. Aircraft still exhibit a more sensitive pitch response at high altitude,
but this is primarily caused by the reduced aerodynamic damping that occurs at
high altitude. An additional nose-up pitching moment from the engines may make
this increased pitch sensitivity feel a little worse to a pilot, but it should have almost
no effect on the elevator authority to pitch down.
Summary of Stall Recovery
In summary, a successful stall recovery can be divided into two phases, which are
referred to throughout this report. The first phase of the recovery is the push
phase, where the objective is to push the control column forward to reduce the
angle-of-attack and restore smooth airflow across the wings. During this phase of
the recovery, a deliberate and smooth pitch down action is required. The goals are to
avoid a negative load factor, and to not overcorrect by pitching down so much that
it takes more altitude and time to recover to level flight in the second phase of the
recovery. The second phase of the maneuver is the pull-up phase, where the objective
is to level the wings and gently pull-up out of the nose-down condition, usually to
re-establish level or climbing flight, while also avoiding secondary aerodynamic stall,
and any positive load factor in excess of the aircraft’s structural limit.
1.3 A Brief History of Stall Simulator Training
Flight simulators have been used for commercial pilot training and checking since the
mid-1950s [22]. Since then, simulation technology has grown significantly to include
advanced vision and motion cueing systems that can recreate a realistic in-flight
experience and deliver a very high transfer of learning and behavior to the airplane
[23]. Furthermore, pilot training by flight simulator is less expensive than in-flight
training by almost any measure including pilot and instructor time, safety risk,
fuel use, pollution, and noise [23]. However, there is also risk. Simulation beyond
appropriate limits can exhibit false aircraft behavior that then causes incorrect or
negative training to occur.
In 2002, NASA and The Boeing Company established that current aircraft sim-
ulators were generally limited to normal flight conditions not representative of most
LOC flight conditions including stall [3, §III.A.1]. One consequence was that the
simulation fidelity required to train pilots for full stall recovery was missing [24].
Recent updates to simulator qualification guidelines have acknowledged that the
simulators used for pilot training “did not always provide the necessary cues and
associated performance degradation needed to train the recognition of an impending
stall or techniques needed to recover from a stalled flight condition [25].”
Furthermore, the FAA training regulations at the time only required pilots to
train for stall prevention by initiating the recovery at, or prior to, the stall warning,
which occurs before full stall [1]. Prior to full aerodynamic stall at low altitude,
a recovery strategy that prioritizes the minimization of altitude loss is viable, and
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this seemed to become a general policy with many air-carriers. An unintended
consequence of this policy, however, is a reluctance to pitch the aircraft nose-down
in an effort to avoid altitude loss. This reluctance can impede the reduction of
angle-of-attack required for a full stall recovery at any altitude. At high altitude, a
reluctance to pitch down also impedes the recovery from even an approach-to-stall,
or stall warning, because significant altitude loss is actually required to recover the
aircraft on the front side of the power curve. Furthermore, the lack of pitch damping
at high altitude makes it easy to over control the pitch. This makes it easy to exceed
the aircraft’s angle-of-attack limitations, creating secondary stall warnings, and the
potential to fully stall the aircraft again.
Fortunately, extraordinary progress has been made towards solving the pilot
stall recovery training issue, world-wide. A recent summary of the advanced vehi-
cle dynamics modeling work for loss-of-control prevention, mitigation, and recovery
is presented in [3]. At NASA Langley Research Center, and in collaboration with
The Boeing Company, a much needed high angle-of-attack aerodynamic database
was fused together from wind tunnel and flight testing for one general commer-
cial transport aircraft type [26]. From this database, proper aerodynamic models
were developed for stall related research of large transport aircraft [26]. The Interna-
tional Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) has made
recommendations to effectively train pilots for stall awareness, recognition, and re-
covery [27]. Implementation plans developed by the CAST also targeted research
into the aerodynamic modeling required to improve pilot performance at stall recov-
ery [12]. In 2014, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) developed
new standards and recommended practices to address LOC-I training concerns [28].
In Europe, the Simulation of Upset Recovery in Aviation (SUPRA) project has in-
vestigated the use of enhanced aerodynamic models and motion cueing to conclude
that conventional hexapod motion cueing can be improved for the purpose of up-
set simulation, including stall [29, 30]. Still a careful approach is required, since a
follow-on study with 12 airline pilots also showed that improved g-load simulation —
beyond typical hexapod-type motion capability — deteriorated pilot recovery per-
formance [31]. Work by the FAA was conducted to delineate simplified approaches
for stall simulation specifically for pilot training [32], and the effects on training
transfer were explored in [33]. For turbo-prop aircraft, unique stall simulation mod-
eling requirements are identified in [34]. In a collaborative project with the FAA,
further reduced cost methods for post-stall modeling from certification flight-test
and wind-tunnel data were developed at the University of Toronto [35].
While the research community has supported stall related technology advance-
ment for some time, it was the tragic Colgan 3407 accident that prompted the NTSB
to recommend that all pilots in part 121, 135, and 91K operations receive training
that incorporates fully developed stalls [36, §4.1]. As a result, the United States
congress passed Public Law 111-216 in 2010, which mandated the recommended
training for all part 121 air-carriers by March 12, 2019 [1]. The FAA subsequently
updated the training requirements to reflect this law (14 CFR §121.423(c) and Ap-
pendices E and F). In 2015, the updated Advisory Circular AC120-109A on stall
prevention and recovery training was published to emphasize the reduction in angle-
of-attack for both stall prevention and stall recovery [1]. Finally, in 2016 the FAA
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published changes to the requirements for level C and D simulators to include high
angle-of-attack modeling and qualification for full stall maneuvers (see 14 CFR Part
60) [25].
Over just the past couple years, FlightSafety International, and Alaska Airlines
have become some of the first training providers to gain FAA National Simulator
Program validation for the use of extended stall-capable aerodynamic envelopes in
Gulfstream G550, and Boeing 737-800 full-motion simulators [37]. Thanks to all
of these efforts, and no-doubt many others, the world-wide aviation community has
made important strides towards establishing more effective simulation based training
for recovery from approach-to-stall and stall.
1.4 The FAA’s Revised Recovery Guidance
Once an aircraft has stalled, a particular recovery procedure is required to restore
smooth airflow across the surface of the wings. The FAA recommends a stall recovery
procedure to which all pilots should be trained [1]. A slightly abbreviated version of
this procedure is reproduced in Table 1. This well considered stall recovery template
emphasizes reducing the angle-of-attack at the first indication of stall, while also
being general enough to apply in a multitude of operational conditions including
complications introduced by autopilot-induced excessive nose-up trim, and the need
to avoid secondary stalls in the pull-up phase of the recovery. Though this procedure
appears as a sequence of steps, many pilots commented that in practice, they view
the steps as a prioritization of tasks to be simultaneously completed.
Within the FAA Stall Recovery Template, there are important aircraft and sit-
uational dependent details that could be provided by a computational recovery
guidance routine. These include the magnitude of the initial pitch down maneuver,
the specific amount of airspeed and thrust needed before pulling out of the recovery
dive, as well as the maximum pitch-up rate that can be sustained without causing
a secondary stall. An algorithm can also compute the maximum amount of thrust
that can be safely added to the system when the aircraft is in an excessive nose-up
pitch trim condition. Together, these elements affect how quickly the aircraft is
returned to safe flight, and the loss of altitude required by the recovery maneuver.
The purpose of the present study was to test candidate recovery guidance algorithms
developed to provide these missing details.
1.5 Motivating Accidents and Incidents
To facilitate a better understanding for the context under which aerodynamic stall
occurs in commercial aviation, we provide a detailed summary of the primary recent
accidents that motivated this work. Appreciation for the complexities inherent
to LOC-I accidents is only gained by considering the complicating details in each
scenario, which make evident the primary issues: distraction, poor crew resource
management, insufficient training, automation confusion, ineffective alerting, invalid
source data, and several others [4].
Colgan Air: The accident involving a twin-engine turboprop Bombardier Dash
8 Q400, occurred on February 12, 2009 shortly after the flight was cleared for an
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Table 1. Abbreviated FAA Stall Recovery Template
1 Disconnect autopilot and autothrottle/autothrust
Rationale: Leaving the autopilot or autothrottle/autothrust connected may result
in inadvertent changes or adjustments that may not be easily recognized
or appropriate, especially during high workload situations.
2 (a) nose-down pitch control until impending stall indications are eliminated.
(b) nose-down pitch trim as needed.
Rationale: Reducing the angle-of-attack is crucial for recovery. This will also address
autopilot-induced excessive nose-up trim. If the control column does not provide sufficient
response, pitch trim may be necessary.
3 Bank wings level.
Rationale: This orients the lift vector for recovery.
4 Apply thrust as needed.
Rationale: Amount of thrust depends on aircraft configuration and in some cases applying
maximum thrust may create a strong nose-up pitching moment if airspeed is low.
5 Retract speed-brakes/spoilers.
Rationale: This will improve lift and stall margin.
6 Return to the desired flightpath.
Rationale: Apply gentle action for recovery to avoid secondary stalls then return to
desired flightpath.
instrument landing at Buffalo Niagara International Airport, New York. During the
flight, the First Officer reported not feeling well. The flight data recorder (FDR)
showed that, during the climb to altitude, the airplane de-icing equipment was
turned on. At this time, the captain would have turned the ref speeds switch
to the increase position. With the switch in this position, the stall warning system
would be triggered at an increased airspeed [36, §2.2.1]. The climb and cruise phase
of the flight were otherwise uneventful. Prior to beginning their descent, the first
officer briefed a landing reference speed of 118 knots for landing with flaps at 15
degrees. The 118 knot landing reference speed was not appropriate for an airplane
configured for flight in icing conditions, and did not account for the position of
the ref speeds switch noted earlier. The captain acknowledged the information,
and later repeated it in the approach briefing. After descending through 10,000
feet, the Captain and First Officer began a conversation unrelated to their flying
duties, violating the sterile cockpit rule. The FDR showed the auto-pilot had applied
additional pitch trim in the nose-up direction and that an “ice detected” message
appeared on the engine display. Shortly thereafter, a stick-shaker occurred and the
autopilot disconnected sounding a horn. The control column was moved aft and
thrust was increased to about 75% torque. While engine power was increasing the
airplane pitched up, and rolled 45 degrees left wing down. The stick pusher activated
as the wings were rolled level. The flaps were fully retracted, and the aircraft
vacillated through a series of extreme roll angles. The Captain called for gear up,
as the aircraft pitched 25 degrees nose-down before crashing into a home. While the
crew observed ice on the windshield and leading edges of the wings during the flight,
the NTSB found that: “the minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting
from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the
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airplane.” During post-accident interviews the NTSB learned that company training
instructed pilots to complete the approach-to-stall recovery without deviating more
than 100 feet above or below the assigned altitude, and some check airmen indicated
any deviation outside that limit would result in a failed check-ride. Other check
airmen considered this altitude limitation to be the minimal loss of altitude (which
was consistent with practical test standards). [36]
Air France: The accident involving an Airbus A330-203, occurred on June 1, 2009
in route from Rio de Janeiro Galeo and Paris Charles de Gaulle with a 3 person flight
crew — two Copilots and a Captain. After flying through some slight turbulence
the plane was flying at 35,000 ft, Mach 0.82, at about 2 hours into the flight and the
Captain left the cockpit. The pitch attitude was 2.5 degrees. Presumably due to
weather, the crew decided to reduce the speed to Mach 0.8 and turn on the engine
de-icing system. A few minutes later the autopilot and auto-thrust are disconnected
and the pilot-flying (PF) has the controls. The airplane began to roll to the right and
the PF made a nose-up and left input. The stall warning triggered briefly twice in a
row and the recorded airspeed showed an abrupt change from 275 knots to 65 knots
on the primary flight display, and later on the integrated standby instrument system
(ISIS).7 The flight control law reconfigured from normal to alternate mode. The
flight directors were not disconnected by the crew, but the crossbars disappeared.
The pilot-not-flying (PNF) acknowledges the loss of airspeed and alternate mode,
and the PF then made rapid and high amplitude roll control inputs, more or less from
stop to stop. He also made a nose-up input that increased the pitch attitude to 11
degrees in ten seconds. After reading the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring
(ECAM) message in a disorganized manner, the PNF called out and turned on
the wing anti-icing. The PNF also called out that the aircraft was climbing and
repeatedly asked the PF to descend. The PF made several nose-down inputs that
resulted in reduced pitch attitude and vertical speed; the plane was now at about
37,000 ft and continued to climb. At 2 hours and 10 minutes into the flight the
speed displayed on the left side became valid again (it was incorrect for 29 seconds),
showing 223 knots, but the ISIS speed was still erroneous. A few seconds later
the thrust controls were pulled back to 85% N1, and the pitch attitude increased
to greater than 6 degrees. The angle-of-attack was just under 5 degrees and roll
was controlled. The PNF called the Captain back to the cockpit several times, and
the stall warning triggered again, in a continuous manner. The thrust levers were
positioned to TO/GA (max available) and the PF made nose-up inputs. The AoA
was at 6 degrees and increasing. The horizontal stabilizer began trimming from
3 to 13 degrees pitch-up over the course of a minute and remained there. About
15 seconds later all indicated airspeeds became valid, showing 185 knots. The PF
continued making nose-up inputs and the plane climbed to its maximum height of
38,000 ft; its pitch attitude and AoA were 16 degrees. The PNF and PF rapidly
traded piloting priority without any callout. The Captain entered the cockpit at
2 hours and 11.5 minutes into the flight, and during the following seconds all of
the recorded airspeeds became invalid. The stall warning stopped, the altitude was
7The likely cause of this was icing in the pitot-static air-data system.
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35, 000 ft, the AoA exceeded 40 degrees and the vertical speed was −10, 000 ft/min.
The airplane’s pitch attitude was not in excess of 15 degrees, and the engine N1
was close to 100%. Roll oscillations to the right occurred, sometimes reaching 40
degrees. The PF made a side-stick input to the left stop and nose-up, which lasted
30 seconds. The PF and PNF verbally call out invalid displays and indications. The
thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and engine at 55% N1. The PF made pitch
down inputs, the AoA decreased, the speeds became valid, and the stall warning
triggered again. At one point simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the side-sticks
were recorded and the PF said “go ahead you have the controls.” When it was valid
the AoA always remained above 35 degrees. The flight recordings stopped after 2
hours, 14 minutes, and 28 seconds into the flight. The last recorded values were:
vertical speed −10, 912 ft/min, ground speed 107 knots, pitch attitude 16.2 degrees
nose-up, roll angle 5.3 degrees left, heading 270 degrees. No emergency message was
transmitted by the crew. The wreckage was found almost two years later, on April
2, 2011. The only practical simulator stall training available to the two Copilots
was for stall warning, and it would have occurred at low altitude (10,000 ft) during
their basic training and during their initial A320 type rating. [38]
Icelandair: The incident involving a Boeing 757-200, occurred on October 19, 2002
in route from Orlando, Florida, to Keflavik, Iceland. During takeoff, the Captain (as
the non-flying pilot) noticed an approximate 20 knot discrepancy between his air-
speed reading and that of the First Officer, which agreed with the standby airspeed
indicators. Shortly after takeoff the pilots indicated that the lateral and vertical
flight director (FD) bars on the Captain’s display, and the lateral FD bar on the
First Officer’s display disappeared, as well as multiple advisory messages on the
Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). The Captain instructed the
First Officer to continue the climb with the intent to deal with the EICAS messages
later. However, after trimming the airplane and retracting the flaps the messages
disappeared and the FD bars returned with all airspeed readings consistent. After
climbing through 10,000 feet the airspeed discrepancy (this time a 10 knot discrep-
ancy was noted) and the same EICAS messages appeared and then disappeared a
few minutes later. The same event repeated itself again as the airplane reached
33,000 feet. A little over an hour into the flight, air traffic control (ATC) authorized
a climb to 37,000 feet, which was made at normal climb power with the auto-throttle
and autopilot engaged. During the climb, the Captain’s airspeed began increasing
to a maximum between 320 and 350 knots, which caused an overspeed warning.
The flight management computer used the Captain’s (left) air data reading, so it
would have provided continuous airplane-nose-up elevator and horizontal stabilizer
commands sensing that the airplane was flying faster than the target airspeed — an
action that would cause the airplane to decelerate. The First Officer then noticed
a decrease from about 250 to 220 knots on both his airspeed indicator and on the
standby airspeed indicator. Now doubting his reading, the First Officer transferred
control of the plane to the Captain. When asked why control was transferred, de-
spite the acknowledged airspeed anomalies on the Captain’s side, the First Officer
indicated that he doubted his instruments because the airplane’s pitch was unusu-
ally high and the airspeed had substantially deceased. These observations, however,
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were consistent with the aforementioned autopilot reaction to the erroneous airspeed
reading. Soon after the Captain assumed control, the stick-shaker activated and a
heavy stall buffet occurred.8 The Captain stated that he initiated the stall recovery
by reducing the power to idle and lowering the nose to about 5 degrees below the
horizon. The flight data recorder showed that the control column was maintained
aft of the neutral position for approximately 20 seconds after the autopilot was
disengaged, and that the stick-shaker continued for about 45 seconds. During the
recovery over 7,000, feet would be lost. The First Officer advised ATC that they
were unable to maintain altitude and were descending out of their cleared flight
level. Immediate clearance was issued, at first to 30,000 feet, and then to 29,000
feet. The Captain noted that during the descent his airspeed indication was 40 to
70 knots lower than the First Officer and the standby airspeed indicators. The First
Officer took control of the airplane and reengaged the autopilot. They landed
safely at Baltimore-Washington International Airport in Maryland. The cause of
the airspeed malfunction was not definitively determined, though blockage debris
in the Captain’s airspeed system was suspected.9 In 1996, a B757 crashed under
similar circumstances during takeoff from the Dominican Republic including: in-
termittent erroneous airspeed behavior on the Captain’s side (first noted during
takeoff), and the same EICAS warning indications. The investigation of that ac-
cident determined that the erroneous airspeed indications were consistent with a
blocked pitot tube. [39]
Midwest Express: The incident involving a Boeing 717-200, occurred on May 12,
2005, while climbing to cruise altitude over Union Star, Missouri. Prior to takeoff,
significant weather was reported and the Captain elected to delay the takeoff until
the weather had passed to the east. As the airplane climbed to 27,000 feet under
autopilot control, the closest weather cell was about 20 to 25 miles away, and the
crew felt that the outside temperature was too warm to require the use of the man-
ually operated anti-icing system. At the location and altitude where the incident
occurred, the National Weather Service indicated a 40% probability of severe clear
icing conditions. Convective activity present in the area also increased the prob-
ability of icing conditions, and night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)
prevailed for the flight. While climbing through about 19,000 feet, the Captain no-
ticed the master caution light was illuminated, and then noted a rudder lim fail
alert on the engine and alert display unit. While the Captain attempted to deal
with the alert, the airplane suddenly pitched down, in excess of 20 degrees. The
Captain recalled hearing the aural alert for the autopilot disconnect. The flight data
showed that just prior to autopilot disconnect, the Captain and First Officer’s com-
puted airspeed values began to diverge and continued to split during phases of the
recovery. The data also showed that the autopilot disconnect switch was activated
8The Captain stated that “there was a lot of vibration” during the stall encounter, and both
pilots acknowledged that they had never experienced anything like it before. The First Officer
indicated that the stall buffet felt a little bit different than what he had experienced during simulator
training but that it felt the same in strength.
9Dusty particles were expelled when the pitot probe and pressure lines were flushed. The material
was not captured. A subsequent pitot-static test on the Captain’s airspeed indicator showed that
the airspeed was still not indicating correctly.
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on one of the control yokes. The Captain was still the pilot flying, but the First
Officer was assisting him on the controls. There was apparent confusion as to who
was controlling the airplane, as both crew members applied conflicting forces on the
control columns.10 Due to the opposing column forces, a breakout occurred,11 and
the two elevators would have been operated independently of each other. During
the recovery the Captain recalled that the flight controls felt very heavy, with lit-
tle response from the elevator controls inputs that would rapidly become “a lot”
of response — unlike any training scenario or airplane flight characteristics he had
previously experienced. The airplane went through a series of altitude excursions
over the next 8 minutes, during which the airspeed values fluctuated between 52
knots and 460 knots, though, the recorded values may have been inaccurate do to
the nature of the event. The altitudes during the pitch up and pitch down cycles
varied between a minimum altitude of 10,600 feet and 23,300 feet. The Captain ul-
timately relinquished control to the First Officer, who then recovered the airplane.
After declaring an emergency, the crew safely diverted to Kirksville Regional Airport
(IRK), Kirksville, Missouri. [40]
Provincial Airlines: The incident involving a de Havilland Canada DCH-8, oc-
curred on May 27, 2005, while climbing after takeoff from St. John’s, Newfoundland,
Canada. Shortly after takeoff, the Captain engaged the autopilot to hold the rate
of climb at 1,190 ft/min. During this time, the airspeed fluctuated slowly between
160 and 170 knots. At around 7,000 ft, the crew selected the engine anti-ice systems
on, but they elected to leave the pneumatic manually operated de-ice system off.12
The outside temperature was 5 degrees Celsius and decreasing to below freezing at
about 11,000 ft. After crossing about 8,000 ft, the aircraft began decelerating from
170 knots for a period of 5 minutes. During this time, the aircraft continued to climb
at 1190 ft/min. The First Officer noticed the decreased airspeed and notified the
Captain, who subsequently, rotated the pitch control wheel on the flight guidance
controller in the nose-down direction. While attempting the adjustment, at 14,800
ft and 104 knots, the Captain saw the stall warning stick-shaker activate causing
the autopilot to disengage. Within the next second, the aircraft began to roll right
and pitch down. Ice was then observed on the left engine inlet. The roll angle in-
creased to 64 degrees while the pitch angle decreased from 15 to 5 degrees nose-up.
The aircraft’s vertical acceleration dropped to about 0.5 g. The aircraft pitch then
increased to 30 degrees nose-up, and then to 40 degrees nose-down. These were all
indications that the aircraft wing had stalled. The flight data showed that the air-
craft underwent three distinct stalls during the event. The control column position
cycled rapidly back and forth as the stall developed, but was moved generally aft,
10During post-incident interviews, both pilots stated that there was no formal transfer of control
during the event.
11A post-incident test of the column breakout mechanism showed that a disconnect occurred
when pulling the Captain’s control column aft, from neutral, with 124 pounds of force, and when
pushing forward, from neutral, with 110 pounds of force.
12The aircraft was not equipped with an electronic ice detector. Crews detect ice visually, looking
for evidence of ice accumulation on the wing leading edges and on an ice probe located in front of
the cockpit window. The Flight Safety Canada standard operating procedure advises that, even if
ice is not detected visually, ice may be present on portions of the aircraft that cannot be seen.
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and remained aft during all three stalls. The power remained unchanged, and the
control column was pulled aft of its pre-stall position for about 22 seconds. There
were significant aileron and rudder pedal movements during the recovery, but they
were ineffective in recovering control. During the recovery, there was severe buffet-
ing, and heavy control column forces. The aircraft descended rapidly and lost 4200
ft. The maximum airspeed reached 240 knots, and the load factor peaked at 2.24
g. The minimum airspeed recored was 0 knots, which likely occurred during phases
of high angle-of-attack and sideslip that would have disrupted the airflow over the
pitot tubes. Only after recovering control did the crew observe that ice had built
up on the aircraft fuselage, which likely caused the aircraft to stall at higher than
expected airspeed. The stall airspeed for the aircraft condition and weight was 94.5
knots, but in this event the stall occurred just after stick-shaker at 103 knots. The
de-icing system was switched on and functioned properly. The crew requested a
lower altitude to avoid further icing and continued on to Deer Lake. After landing,
the pilot only reported a severe turbulence encounter to company personnel. The
crew had received the typical stall recovery training, which did not familiarize pilots
with natural stall indicators, such as the aerodynamic buffet that occurs just prior
to stall (which can be mistaken for turbulence). It also did not allow any practice
in recovering from full aerodynamic stall. [41]
Thompson Fly: The incident involving a Boeing 737-300, occurred on September
23, 2007, during a go-around after an unstable approach, at Bournemouth Airport,
UK. At 11 nautical miles from the airport, in clear airspace, the airplane was level at
2500 feet, 180 knots, flaps 5, and autothrottle engaged at approximately 60% N1. At
7 nautical miles, the autopilot captured the glideslope and the pilots began working
through the landing checklist. The PF selected a lower speed on the mode control
panel and, as expected, the auto-throttle retarded to idle to slow the aircraft to
the selected speed. After about 20 seconds the autothrottle disconnect warning was
triggered and the autothrottle disengaged. The disconnect was not recognized by the
flight crew and no manual disconnect was recorded in the flight data. The thrust
levers remained at idle throughout the remainder of the approach. The aircraft
decelerated at about 1 knot/sec in agreement with the Captain’s expectations as
flaps were deployed. As the flaps reached the flap 40 position, the aircraft was at 130
knots and decelerating at about 1.5 knots/sec — though 135 knots had been selected
on the Mode Control Panel (MCP). As the commander stowed the checklist, he
noticed the slow airspeed and called “speed,” followed by “I have control.” The flight
data showed that at 110 knots and an altitude of 1,540 feet, the autothrottle manual
disconnect button was pressed and the thrust levers moved forward slightly. Within
1.5 seconds the stick-shaker activated and the thrust levers were advanced to the
full forward position. The autopilot mode changed from localizer and glideslope to
Control Wheel Steer (CWS) pitch and CWS roll. In this mode the autopilot controls
the aircraft in response to manually applied pressure on either control column. The
commander moved the control column forward to counteract the expected pitch-up
moment from the increased thrust. The stick-shaker operation stopped and the
minimum airspeed was 101 knots. Four seconds after the thrust levers reached full
forward, with airspeed increasing and N1 increasing through 81%, the toga mode
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became active. The autopilot disengaged. The pitch attitude began increasing and
the stick-shaker activated again. A corrective roll input brought the wings level.
With the control column full forward, the aircraft pitched nose-up to 22 degrees and
appeared to stabilize. The First Officer then selected flaps 15 (from flaps 40). As the
flaps retracted through the flap 25 position, the nose of the aircraft began to pitch up
through 27 degrees with a roll now increasing through 7 degrees. The stick-shaker
reactivated. The pilots continued to apply full nose-down elevator while the airspeed
further decayed. As the pitch increased above 36 degrees nose-up, the toga mode
disengaged. A small sharp right rudder input recovered the roll from a maximum of
22 degrees left wing down, to wings level. The aircraft stalled with a peak pitch of 44
degrees nose-up. With no change in elevator position, the pitch rate reversed from
positive to negative, but the angle-of-attack continued to increase while the airspeed
decreased for another 5 seconds. The airspeed reached its minimum recorded value
of 82 knots, with a 33 degree nose-up pitch attitude. Five seconds after the minimum
recorded speed, the thrust was reduced to 86%. The pitch down rate then increased
and the pitch was quickly reduced (within 2 seconds) to 5 degrees nose-up. The
airspeed increased and the commander regained control of the aircraft, ultimately
landing it safely at Bournemouth Airport. Both pilots were current on training
for recovery from approach-to-stall and unusual attitudes. The operator’s Quick
Reference Handbook (QRH) for approach-to-stall recovery referenced a drill that
required the pilot to select maximum thrust, but not to change configuration (flaps
or landing gear). The drill did not mention the use of pitch trim. [42]
West Caribbean: The accident involving an MD-82, occurred on August 16, 2005,
during cruise over Venezuela, while flying through weather en-route to Martinique
International Airport. As the aircraft reached 31,000 feet, the Engine Pressure Ratio
(EPR) indicated that both the airfoil and engine anti-ice systems were probably in
operation. To avoid a storm formation, the crew requested clearance to 33,000 feet.
As the aircraft began its climb, the Mach speed started dropping from 0.75. The
climb was interrupted twice, and the autopilot was switched to vertical speed mode
to maintain a constant rate of climb. The auto-throttle mode was switched to mach
epr limit a mode where the speed would have been limited to a lower airspeed than
the one selected. The aircraft had also reached the maximum permissible thrust that
guaranteed the protection of the engines. The Captain asked the First Officer to
disconnect the engine anti-ice system, and an increase in EPR was recorded. The
aircraft reached 33,000 feet and accelerated to the target speed of Mach 0.75 with
an angle-of-attack of 2.6 degrees. During this time the Captain stated twice, that
he could not accelerate. A few seconds later, the auto-throttle reduced thrust and
changed mode to maintain Mach speed. Variation in the EPR at this point suggested
that the anti-ice system was switched back on. The aircraft was unable to maintain
Mach 0.75 at 33,000 feet. The speed continued to decrease while the autopilot
compensated with the stabilizer trim to maintain altitude. After 7 minutes and
some discussion regarding the airfoil anti-ice system, the airspeed had decelerated to
Mach 0.62. The Copilot requested clearance to 31,000 feet, the Captain disengaged
the auto-pilot as the speed reached Mach 0.6 with an angle-of-attack of 7.7 degrees
and horizontal stab position of −4.05 degrees. An aural warning sounded indicating
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the selected airspeed was not being maintained, and the aircraft descended to 31,700
feet. The engine EPR fell sharply from about 2 to 1.8. The stall warning system
(stick-shaker and aural alerts) activated, and stayed activated for the remainder of
the flight. The aircraft was losing altitude at 2500 feet/min. The stab trim was
gradually trimmed nose-up to the maximum limit. At the current angle-of-attack,
the wings disrupted airflow to the engines. At the request of the Captain, the
First Officer informed air traffic control that the crew was continuing the descent to
29,000 feet. The aircraft’s rate of descent was approaching 5,000 feet/min at Mach
0.5. The EPR values dropped sharply again, this time to 1.06. Without reporting
an emergency the Copilot told the air traffic controller that they were continuing the
descent to 24,000 feet. Air traffic control asked the crew if there was any problem on
board, and the Copilot, at the request of the Captain, replied that they had suffered a
flame-out in both engines. At this point, the rate of descent was approaching 7,000
feet/min with engine EPR between 1.04 and 1.1. As the rate of descent further
increased through 12,000 feet/min the Copilot (at the request of the Captain) asked
the air traffic controller for the minimum en-route altitude. Over the course of about
40 seconds, the auto-throttle system was disengaged, and the EPR rapidly increased
to 1.8. At the request of the Captain, the Copilot reported that the aircraft was
out of control with an altitude of 12,400 feet. The position of the elevator trim
increased through 12.5 degrees nose-up as the ground proximity warning system
engaged “sink rate, whoop whoop, pull-up.” Shortly thereafter, the recordings
stopped as the aircraft crashed into the ground. The crew training provided by West
Caribbean did not cover recognition of stall buffeting, or procedures for recovering
an MD-80 aircraft from stall at high altitude. [43]
1.6 The Benefit of Stall Recovery Guidance
The stall related accidents and incidents summarized above should make one thing
clear: that aerodynamic stall in commercial flight is typically proceeded by a se-
ries of complicating issues, starting with distraction (caused by automation system
confusion, sensor issues producing mismatches in airspeed readings, etc.), poor com-
munication and crew resource management, and typically, ending with inappropriate
control action. While each of these factors can be treated individually through im-
provements to training, it is perhaps more difficult to adequately train for their
compounding effects and rare occurrence in operational practice. Pilots that get
into aerodynamic stall often seem to be operating with a momentary incorrect men-
tal model for the expected aircraft behavior — one that is brought on by a failure
to recognize the stall. In addition to improvements to training, guidance cues might
also help remedy these conditions by aiding the stall recovery process in two im-
portant ways: first, by providing a simple, easy to execute, method for effecting a
recovery, and second, by contradicting an incorrect mental model for the aircraft
behavior if it exists. In other words, recovery guidance can help pilots in the ex-
ecution of the correct procedure while operating under high workload. While it is
imperative that pilots train stall recognition and recovery without guidance, having
a guidance system in a complex real-world stall event may reduce the likelihood
of a catastrophic result. Furthermore, stall recovery guidance may also serve as a
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useful support tool for pilot training, for example, by enabling the definition of pilot
performance metrics relative to the guidance computation.
Recovery guidance can also provide a benefit that goes beyond what pilots might
be easily trained to accomplish on their own. This benefit is the specific computa-
tion of the scenario and aircraft configuration dependent recovery objectives. For
example, how far to pitch the nose of the aircraft over in a high altitude recovery,
versus, a low altitude recovery where the engines have more authority to increase
airspeed. Another example, studied in the present system, is the maximum amount
of throttle a pilot can add before saturating the elevator when an aircraft (with
engines mounted below the wings) is operating under an excessive nose-up trim
condition. In this case, the guidance computation may enable a pilot to be less cau-
tious, and therefore faster, with the application of thrust than is recommended in
the FAA stall recovery template. This information can be critical, especially for low
altitude stalls. Yet another example, not examined in this study, is the potential to
coordinate with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) information
to avoid collision with other aircraft during the recovery maneuver.
1.7 Guidance System Design Criteria
Considering the complex circumstances surrounding the occurrence of stall, it is
critical to have a recovery guidance system that is easy to use. For our study, the goal
was to maximize the use of existing standard guidance cues, in an effort to minimize
any training that would be required to learn new aspects of the system. It was
expected that following the guidance system should reduce the recovery workload
by focusing pilot attention on guidance cues in the center of the PFD, rather than
splitting that attention to monitor the airspeed and rate of climb indicators on
opposite sides of the PFD. A primary objective of the stall recovery experiment was
to test how readily pilots were able to accept and use the system with no additional
training, beyond the initial pilot briefing discussed in Section 5.
The system was also explicitly designed without requiring any prediction or
knowledge of pilot intent during the recovery — though we hope the pilot at least
intends to recover the aircraft. To deal with the uncertainty inherent to this philos-
ophy, along with the uncertainty inherent to how well any particular pilot follows
the guidance, the implementation requires the online re-computation of the recov-
ery action always from the current aircraft state. In addition, the recovery guidance
should generally agree with the recommended manual recovery procedure that pilots
are trained to follow for their particular aircraft.
Feedback from pilot subject matter experts was used to tune the guidance system
for appropriate manual tracking characteristics. All tuning and algorithm parame-
ters were fixed prior to beginning the experiment, and no changes were made during
the execution of the experiment.
2 Recovery Guidance Algorithms
The recovery guidance system for this study was designed using one of two can-
didate pitch guidance algorithms, a thrust guidance algorithm, and a simple roll
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guidance algorithm. This section provides a detailed summary of the stall recovery
strategy, and the underlying computational algorithms used to implement it. The
approach is targeted at commercial transport class aircraft with engines mounted
below the wings. As such, it does not explicitly consider some aspects of stall that
are important for many smaller transport, turbo-prop, general aviation, unmanned
aerial system, and military aircraft. In particular stall induced spin [44], and high
angle-of-attack maneuvers for T-tail type aircraft are not specifically addressed. In
addition, the guidance system we developed for this study would not properly han-
dle sensor faults. The potential for sensor failure is an important aspect that must
be addressed prior to any operational use of the system.
2.1 Stall Recovery Strategy
The stall recovery guidance (srg) implemented for this experiment adopted the fol-
lowing strategy based on the FAA stall recovery template. First, the srg mode
activated when the angle-of-attack exceeded a particular critical value. For the ex-
periment only, the critical angle-of-attack was scenario dependent.13 During actual
operational use, the srg mode should trigger in concert with the stall warning sys-
tem. Several pilots commented that the display and operation of the srg mode
was analogous to the wind shear warning systems currently in operational use on
commercial aircraft.
When the srg mode triggered, the autopilot and auto-throttle systems were
automatically disconnected, placing the aircraft in manual open-loop control with
yaw damper. The horizontal pitch flight director bar provided nose-down guidance,
while the vertical roll director bar held the bank angle fixed to the bank angle
latched on srg mode entry. As the nose of the aircraft dropped below the Pitch
Limit Indicator (PLI, see Section 3.3), the roll guidance engaged to level the wings,
while the pitch guidance continued to control pitch to recover a target airspeed. For
the lower altitude scenarios below 30,000 feet, the target airspeed was set to VREF
(flap dependent); for the high altitude scenario the target recovery speed was set to
230 knots, in a deliberate effort to recover the aircraft on the front side of the power
curve.
At srg mode entry, the thrust guidance cue was programmed to command the
maximum available thrust that would maintain at least some elevator authority to
pitch nose-down at the target recovery airspeed and angle-of-attack. The computa-
tion of this thrust limit relied on the knowledge of the pitching moment coefficients
representative of the aircraft in its current configuration, and on the mapping be-
tween throttle position and the force generated by the engines (after transient engine
effects).
Based on expert pilot feedback obtained during the guidance system develop-
ment, we also deliberately chose not to implement an automated srg mode exit.
The rationale was that the system should not automatically transition to another
13For all the lower altitude scenarios, the critical AoA that triggered the srg mode was α = 16
degrees. This value corresponded to aerodynamic stall onset for the particular aircraft model used
in the study. For the high altitude stall scenario, the srg mode triggered at α = 25 degrees to force
the recovery from a fully developed stall.
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mode, since it may take some time for the pilot to recover mentally after surviving
an unexpected stall, and an automated mode transition may produce more confu-
sion if the pilot was not yet ready to continue. Therefore, the operational concept
was for the pilot to manually transition out of the srg mode at a safe flight path
and airspeed when ready.
Pilot Feedback on the Strategy
The pilots provided informative feedback on the recovery strategy. Many pilots
liked the strategy and felt is was consistent with their training. Others felt that
the roll and pitch guidance should begin simultaneously, rather than waiting for the
pitch to drop below the PLI before rolling wings-level. This roll recovery strategy
was adopted to agree with the FAA recovery template shown in Table 1. However,
an implication of this strategy, was that the roll guidance would command a roll
direction away from wings-level if the pilot attempted to roll wings-level before
getting the nose below the PLI. This was a counter-intuitive behavior for those
pilots who observed it.
A few of the experiment participants attempted to recover the aircraft using the
rudder. These pilots ended up significantly exacerbating the roll upset, and in the
process exceeded the simulator’s lateral motion limits causing a hard stop before
completing the run. The roll upset was caused by a strong coupling between the
effect of side-slip on rolling moment with high angle-of-attack [20, §7.4, pg. 748].
Though this effect was realistic for the particular aircraft model, those pilots who
attempted recoveries with rudder input felt that the resulting roll upset was an
unrealistic characteristic of the simulation. Their rationale was that the rudder is a
more reliable control surface when the wings are potentially stalled. In particular,
with the airflow disrupted across the wing during stall, an unpredictable aileron
response (or roll reversal) may occur. This rationale, however, does not consider that
the coupling between side-slip and rolling moment can also be unpredictable, or at
least, unexpected at high angle-of-attack. The overuse of rudder can have significant
impact on the airplanes stability and control, which can lead to sudden loss of control
[45,46]. Excess use of rudder in a recovery attempt can also produce structural loads
that exceed the design strength of the associated airframe components [45].
2.2 Pitch Guidance Targets
There were two pitch guidance algorithms studied in this report. Both of them used
the aircraft pitch to control the airspeed at the current thrust and roll angle. In
this way, the pitch guidance system is decoupled from the roll and throttle guidance
systems. The idea is to make the integrated guidance system easier for humans to
follow, since with this approach, the guidance system does not require simultaneous
coordinated tracking of the three separate cues for pitch, roll, and thrust.
Both of the pitch guidance algorithms employed in this study, drive the aircraft
to the same target state. The target state is determined first by selecting a target
recovery airspeed. This target airspeed is then used to derive the corresponding
targets for angle-of-attack and pitch that would trim the aircraft at the current
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thrust setting and bank angle. As noted above, in this study the target airspeed is
VREF if the aircraft is below 30,000 feet (so for all of the scenarios except the high
altitude scenario), or 230 knots if the aircraft is above 30,000 feet (so for the high
altitude scenario). The reason for the altitude discrepancy in the airspeed target,
was that at high altitude, the computation for VREF was not on the front side of
the power curve for the aircraft. Essentially, this means that at level flight and full
thrust, the aircraft would not be able to accelerate to cruise airspeed without losing
additional altitude. The computation of VREF is discussed further in Appendix A.
With the recovery airspeed determined, and a basic linearized model for the
dependency between angle-of-attack and the coefficient of lift, we solved for the
angle-of-attack that achieves a load factor of 1 g at the target airspeed using Equa-
tion (3). With this target angle-of-attack, we then solved for the drag required to
hold the aircraft at the target airspeed using a quadratic drag model.14 With the
required drag, we then solved for the target flight path angle and corresponding
pitch angle at the current thrust and roll setting, simply by balancing the forces in
the vertical plane of the aircraft using Newton’s second law. At this point, good
approximations were obtained for the angle-of-attack, flight path angle, and pitch
angle that will trim the aircraft at the target airspeed, and at the current thrust
setting and bank angle. Together these values determine the target aircraft state
to which the pitch guidance control algorithm will try to recover the aircraft. The
underlying model dependencies used for this computation are discussed in Appendix
B.
2.3 Fast Model Predictive Control Algorithm
Model predictive control (MPC) is an advanced optimal control method that lends
itself to the determination of scenario specific stall recovery guidance. The first
step in the approach is to linearize and discretize the aircraft equations of motion
around the current aircraft state of interest, defined as the airspeed, angle-of-attack,
and pitch. This linear discrete model then approximately predicts the aircraft state
trajectory from the current state, given a sequence of pitch rate control inputs. An
optimal pitch recovery maneuver that returns the aircraft to the target state, is
then found by solving a linearly constrained optimization problem with quadratic
cost function (i.e., a quadratic program). In our formulation for stall recovery,
the solution to the optimization problem determines the input pitch rate sequence
required to recover the aircraft across a 30 second time horizon, discretized to 0.5
second increments.15 In the classical model predictive control approach, only the
most immediate control input from the solution is used, and the entire computation
is repeated in the next computational cycle (or simulator frame). To determine the
guidance cue input, however, we found that a blended combination of the near-term
pitch and pitch-rate error was easier to track, as judged by a test pilot subject
14Both the linear and quadratic models used for the dependency between angle-of-attack and the
coefficient of lift and drag, respectively, were fitted to the aircraft’s current configuration to pick
up the dependencies on flap, gear, and speed-brake setting.
15The 30 second time horizon was about the shortest time required to cover the important
duration of the push and pull-up phases of the longest stall recoveries at high altitude.
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matter expert.
The actual online computation of the maneuver ultimately requires solving a
quadratic program, which is accomplished using the Fast Model Predictive Control
(FMPC) interior point algorithm developed in [47]. This algorithm has important
features that help to ensure fast and reliable convergence of the optimal solutions
at relatively low computational cost suitable for online implementations. The more
advanced computational details covering the application of the FMPC algorithm to
stall recovery guidance are documented in [48].
There are two important features to the FMPC approach. The first is that
the optimal recovery input is recomputed from the current aircraft state in each
simulator frame (or computational cycle). This means that the pilot is always pro-
vided with optimal guidance from the current aircraft state (with respect to the
quadratic cost function), independent of how well he or she follows that guidance.
The second important feature is that constraints on the state variables (airspeed,
angle-of-attack, pitch angle and rate) can be specified directly. In particular, con-
straints on the pitch rate were used to prevent exceeding load factor limits, while
the angle-of-attack corresponding to stall warning was used as the maximum angle-
of-attack constraint in the formulation. The optimal solution with the predictive
model then intelligently includes consideration for protecting the load factors and
angle-of-attack during the full pull-up phase of the recovery maneuver.
Figure 2 illustrates these important features, by showing the predictive guidance
maneuvers, as well as the discretized aircraft trajectory flown by one of the pilot
participants in the study. In this scenario, the autopilot flies the aircraft into a
fully developed aerodynamic stall, at 40,000 feet. At t = 0 seconds, the manual
piloted recovery begins with the model predictive guidance. The gray trajectories
show the computed predictive recoveries at each time step.16 Initially, while the
angle-of-attack exceeds the stall warning angle-of-attack, the default guidance is
to pitch the aircraft nose-down at 5 degrees per second — because the linearized
model used for the FMPC computation is invalid in the stalled dynamics regime.
In the plots, the pilot follows the default pitch guidance below the PLI position,
and therefore reduces the angle-of-attack below the stall warning threshold. At this
point, around 4 seconds into the recovery the model predictive guidance becomes
valid and initially finds a pitch input plan that puts the aircraft pitch to 30 degrees
nose-down. The pilot lags the guidance, following it only to about 15 degrees nose-
down, at which point the pilot follows the guidance to pull the nose of the aircraft
back up. At each time instance, the predictive guidance intelligently re-schedules the
pull-up maneuver to efficiently use the full angle-of-attack margin, just grazing the
stall warning limit around 20 seconds into the recovery, and ending up at the target
airspeed. The results of this study show, that the aggressive guidance computed
by this algorithm significantly improves the safety of the piloted recoveries with
respect to secondary aerodynamic stalls in the high altitude scenario highlighted in
this example. Essentially, the guidance uses the aircraft flight dynamics to compute
how far to pitch nose-down in the initial recovery, at what airspeed to begin pitching
16Actually, only a small sub-sample of the computed trajectories are shown. The actual predictive
guidance computation completes with each simulator frame, at 50 frames per second.
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Figure 2. Model predictive control stall recovery.
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up, and the pitch up rate that smoothly returns the aircraft to the target airspeed,
all in one smooth maneuver.
In this initial study we sought to keep the FMPC problem formulation as simple
as possible. This was done in effort to achieve the rapid and reliable convergence
needed to run the algorithm well within the 50 Hz simulator loop on the Vertical
Motion Simulator (VMS) computer. One of the benefits of the overall approach,
however, is that it readily supports additional constraints on pitch angle and air-
speed, and more sophisticated equations of motion can also be incorporated into
future implementations. To a large extent, the FMPC algorithm can also be con-
figured to work within computational time limits. The algorithm can split the full
convergence computational cost across multiple simulator frames if needed, and it
can provide a sub-optimal, but feasible, guidance solution if it needs to be stopped
before the full convergence objective is achieved.
2.4 Energy Based Algorithm
Another approach for computing stall recovery guidance uses a physically motivated
energy tradeoff analysis to derive the control guidance, while maintaining load fac-
tor limits and protecting against secondary stall [49]. The benefits of this approach
are that the computational cost is minimal (especially when compared to an op-
timal control method), that it does not necessarily require any estimated model
information, and that it is, therefore, easily implemented for online use.
The main purpose of the stall recovery strategy advised by the FAA for flight
crew training, as discussed in Section 1.4, is to reduce the angle-of-attack and in-
crease the airspeed. This can be accomplished most rapidly by trading potential
energy (altitude) for kinetic energy (speed), as efficiently as possible. The only com-
plicating factors are that, during the trade-off process, energy is dissipated through
drag D, which requires the application of thrust T over time. The FAA recov-
ery template implicitly uses these factors when it advises a pitch down to reduce
the angle-of-attack (and the drag), beginning the trade-off between altitude and
airspeed, and adding thrust carefully to avoid pitch trim related upsets.
The total amount of energy at any moment during the flight consists of the
combination of kinetic energy Ekin and potential energy Epot, where the total change
in kinetic and potential energy over the entire recovery maneuver can be defined as:
∆Ekin =
1
2
m∆V 2 =
1
2
m
(
V 2end − V 2begin
)
∆Epot = mg∆h = mg (hend − hbegin)
where V is the speed, h is the altitude, m is the aircraft mass, and g is acceleration
due to gravity. For stall recovery maneuvers, it can be stated that the trade off
between both types of energy results in hend < hbegin and Vend > Vbegin. In this
expression, we assume that g and m do not change significantly during the course
of the recovery maneuver. From the related expression for the total instantaneous
energy Etot = mgh+mV
2/2, one determines the specific total energy rate
E˙s =
d
dt
Etot
m
= gh˙+ V V˙ = gV sin γ + V V˙ = V
(
g sin γ + V˙
)
. (4)
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Here the vertical speed has been written as: h˙ = V sin γ, where γ is the flight path
angle defined in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Acting forces on the aircraft model
The energy that is dissipated through drag and accumulated from thrust can be
incorporated from the basic equations of motion. From the balance of the forces lift
L, drag D, thrust T , and weight W in Figure 3, along with Newton’s second law,
applied to the direction of the velocity vector, one finds:
mV˙ = T cosα−D −mg sin γ, (5)
where α is the angle-of-attack. It follows that
V˙ + g sin γ =
T cosα−D
m
, (6)
and combining Equations (4) and (6) then results in
E˙s = V
(
V˙ + g sin γ
)
= V
(
T cosα−D
m
)
. (7)
The physical intuition behind Equation (7) is illustrated by the reservoir analogy
shown in Figure 4. Here, a direct exchange between potential (altitude) and kinetic
energy (speed) is possible by controlling the flight path angle γ. Figure 4 shows that
the throttles add to the total energy of the aircraft system, while drag causes some
of the total aircraft energy to dissipate. The flight path angle (as controlled by the
elevator) then regulates the net influx of total energy into the kinetic and potential
energy reservoirs or vice versa.
As a consequence, stall recovery is most efficient when one simultaneously dives,
driving γ < 0, and increases the thrust. As soon as enough speed has been gained, a
pull-up maneuver should be performed in order to establish level flight. During this
pull-up maneuver, secondary stall and load factor limits should be avoided. This
drives the constraints for angle of attack: α < αstall and load factor: nLFmin < nLF <
nLFmax .
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Figure 4. Energy reservoir analogy
The EBA guidance law is derived essentially by solving Equation (6) for the
flight path angle required to achieve a desired acceleration
γguidance = arcsin
(
−1
g
[
V˙required − T cosα−D
m
])
(8)
(6)
= arcsin
(
−1
g
[
V˙required −
(
V˙ + g sin γ
)])
(9)
where the required speed rate V˙required is defined as:
V˙required =
1
τV
∆Vrequired =
1
τV
(Vtarget − Vcurrent) . (10)
In this expression, Vtarget is the airspeed target defined in Section 2.2, and τV is an
associated speed control time constant. The time constant τV determines the re-
sponsiveness of the speed guidance: the smaller the value for τV , the more aggressive
the dive will be in order to pick up speed.
Equations (8) and (9) provide the energy based guidance strategy calculation in
two equivalent ways, depending on the prevailing conditions. Equation (9) does not
require any aircraft model information, which makes the guidance independent of
the aircraft model and can thus be applied on different aircraft types in a relatively
straightforward way. It does, however, require sensor values for the acceleration V˙ ,
which is especially sensitive to turbulence, and needs additional filtering. As an
alternative, Equation (8) can be used, which includes values for the thrust T and
drag D. Thrust can be approximated based on the engine RPM N1, but aircraft
model information is needed for the drag D. For the study detailed in this report,
the model based Equation (8) was used.
Finally, constraints on γguidance and γ˙guidance can be enforced to protect against
secondary stalls and load factor limit exceedance, respectively. Furthermore, in
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order to achieve a smooth guidance signal in the presence of turbulence, additional
first order filtering is needed for the calibrated airspeed (filtering frequency ωV = 2
rad/s) and its time derivative (filtering frequency ωV˙ = 4 rad/s). Additionally, a
limit of 10 deg for the maximum deviation of the guidance signal compared to the
current state has been included, since this deviation is the primary driver of the
steering aggressiveness of the pilots.
More details about this algorithm can be found in [49].
2.5 Computational Performance
The Vertical Motion Simulator platform selected for the study used a DEC-Alpha
computer running a Real-Time Operating System at 1.25GHz. The frame rate of
the simulation was 50 Hz, i.e. 20 ms per frame. For this study, it was a requirement
for both algorithms to complete the guidance computation along with the simulator
model calculations within this 20 ms limit.
The two guidance algorithms in this study fall on opposite ends of the compu-
tational cost spectrum. The Energy Based Algorithm uses an analytical calculation
that only requires a few lines of code to evaluate (with no loops or potential conver-
gence issues). As such, it is probably about the least expensive guidance algorithm
possible. The Fast Model Predictive Control algorithm, on the other hand, is closer
to the most computationally expensive algorithm that can be evaluated on the target
platform and frame time limit.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the longest model execution time for each
simulation run in the experiment.17 The plot on the left shows that the EBA
algorithm adds negligible cost to the no guidance case. The plot on the right shows
the FMPC performance, which takes from 3 to 10 times as long as the baseline model
evaluation with no guidance. The FMPC algorithm also has significantly increased
variation in evaluation time. This is caused by the difference in computation time
to solve the FMPC optimization problem, through an iterative solver, from varying
initial aircraft states. Still, the FMPC algorithm ran reliably without producing
any frame overruns for the entire simulation experiment. Overall, this is good
performance for an optimal control algorithm, especially since such algorithms are
often not fast or reliable enough to work under the operating conditions required
for this experiment.
2.6 Thrust Guidance Algorithm
As just discussed, effecting a stall recovery essentially involves increasing the kinetic
energy of the aircraft (and reducing α). This happens by converting fuel into thrust,
and by sacrificing altitude. To a first-order approximation, minimizing the altitude
loss, therefore requires as much fuel to thrust conversion as possible, and this in turn
means applying all available thrust as early as possible. The primary reason to limit
17There are thousands of model evaluations per run (e.g., 3000 model evaluations in a 60 second
run). Each of the time measurements used to create Figure 5 was the worst-case model evaluation
time that occurred during a run. There were 240 runs in the EBA and FMPC distributions, and
480 runs in the no guidance distribution.
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Figure 5. Distribution of maximum model execution time across all recovery runs
in the experiment.
the thrust in a stall recovery then, is to maintain elevator pitch down authority for
aircraft with engines and pitch trim state that are also causing an excessive nose-up
pitching moment.18
In our implementation, we used a linear regression model for the pitching moment
response to the current stabilizer, flap, and speed-brake setting, with dependencies
on the elevator position δe, δ
2
e , α, α
2, T , pitch rate q, and a constant off-set value.
Using this model we were able to solve analytically for the maximum thrust T elevmax
that could be balanced, at the current stab position, by the maximum pitch-down
elevator authority (with −3 degrees of margin for the implementation in this study).
The thrust guidance signal was then driven as Tg = min(Tmax, T
elev
max), i.e., the lesser
of the maximum available thrust, or the maximum thrust that the elevator authority
will allow. The thrust guidance, computed in units of force, was converted to a
throttle position through the use of a look-up table that determined the maximum
engine thrust at the current airspeed and altitude. The pitching moment model,
coefficients, and engine thrust lookup tables are reproduced in Appendix B.
2.7 Roll Guidance Algorithm
Any standard roll guidance computation could, in principle, be adapted to support
the roll guidance strategy discussed in Section 2.1. For this study, the roll guidance
signal was driven simply by a filtered proportional error between the current aircraft
roll angle and the commanded roll angle. On srg mode entry from aerodynamic
stall, the commanded roll angle was initialized to the current aircraft bank angle.
When the aircraft pitched below the PLI the commanded roll angle was transitioned
to zero degrees to guide the level-off phase of the maneuver in accordance with the
FAA recommended procedure (see Step 3 in Table 1).
18An important secondary reason, not considered in this study, is that the thrust demand on
the engine should be limited at high angle-of-attack due to increased risk of compressor stall and
engine flameout.
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3 Experiment Design
3.1 Research Hypotheses
Primary: Guidance improves pilot stall recovery performance, specifically, by pro-
moting
• appropriate application of pitch down to quickly eliminate aerodynamic stall,
but not in excess of that needed to effectively recover.
• gentle pitch-up maneuvers to avoid secondary stalls during pull-up
• recovery at sufficient airspeed on the front side of the power curve
• reduced tendency to observe pilot induced oscillations in the recovery
• prevention of elevator saturation caused by excessive nose-up stab trim
• protection of the load factor from exceeding safety limits
Secondary: Unguided stall recovery performance is improved after training with
stall recovery guidance.
The experiment contained two independent variables: guidance algorithm and
stall recovery scenario.
3.2 Simulator Facility
Aircraft recovery from stall is a more dynamic maneuver than typically encountered
in normal aircraft flight. For this reason, motion cueing may play a significant role in
how pilots recognize and recover from stall [33]. To include as many of these effects
as possible in our study, the Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS) facility at NASA
Ames Research Center was selected. Historically, this facility was used, among
other things, for Astronaut pilot training on Space Shuttle landing and rollout [50].
A schematic diagram of the VMS is shown in Figure 6, along with a listing of its
motion capability in Table 2. The VMS can move the simulator cab with more force
and extent than traditional hexapod motion simulators. This creates significantly
better motion cues than a conventional simulator, and the VMS is the highest motion
fidelity simulation platform currently available at NASA.
3.3 Flight Deck
A research flight deck was used with a layout similar to commercial transport aircraft
cab, but without many features that would ordinarily be present in a full aircraft
cockpit. As shown in Figure 7, the cockpit included rudder pedals, back-driven wheel
and column, as well as a back-driven throttle quadrant with pitch trim indicator,
flap, and speed-brake controls. The aircraft model selected for the experiment was
representative of a two engine Boeing 757, so the 4 throttle levers on the quadrant
were paired and bolted together as labeled in the figure. The speed-brake lever was
not used in the experiment. The flat screen displays, from left to right, showed the
recovery performance metrics (not shown while flying), the Primary Flight Display
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Figure 6. Vertical Motion Simulator Facility
Table 2. VMS Nominal Operational Motion Limits
axis displacement velocity acceleration
vertical ±30 ft 16 ft/sec 24 ft/sec2
lateral ±20 ft 8 ft/sec 16 ft/sec2
longitudinal ±4 ft 4 ft/sec 10 ft/sec2
roll ±18 deg 40 deg/sec 115 deg/sec2
pitch ±18 deg 40 deg/sec 115 deg/sec2
yaw ±24 deg 46 deg/sec 115 deg/sec2
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(PFD), Navigation Display, and Engine N1 indicators. The gear handle was directly
above the left N1 indicator. The yoke had a trim hat for adjusting pitch trim only
(lateral trim was inactive), an index finger emergency stop button, and two other
buttons that were not used. A master warning light was provided above the left
PFD.
The Primary Flight Display and stall warning system were meant to be accurate
representations for a Boeing flight deck, most similar in style to a B777. The basic
PFD format without guidance is shown in Figure 8. The airspeed tape included the
magenta Mode Control Panel (MCP) selected airspeed and marker (though there
was no physical MCP), green VREF marker, amber maneuvering speed band with
corresponding caution-level quadruple beep aural alert, and the red stick-shaker
activation band and corresponding warning-level stick-shaker consistent with com-
mercial aircraft equipage.19 The stick-shaker activation airspeed was load factor
dependent, and computed in accordance with FAA regulation. The Attitude Direc-
tion Indicator (central portion of the PFD) was of a standard format with aircraft
reference symbol (white outlined black aircraft wing and nose markings), as well
as the amber Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI) — often referred to by pilots as the
“whiskers.” The distance between the PLI and the aircraft reference symbol is the
margin between the current angle-of-attack and the angle-of-attack at stick-shaker
activation. Therefore, as the airspeed crosses into the red stick-shaker activation
band, the PLI “whiskers” cross the top white outline of the aircraft reference sym-
bol. Even though many transport category aircraft are equipped with stick pushers,
one was not included in this study because it would have complicated the manual
control required to track the recovery guidance cues being studied in this experi-
ment. The calculations for the minimum maneuvering speed, stall warning airspeed,
and PLI are explained in Appendix A.
3.4 Aircraft Model
Pilot simulator training facilities traditionally used aircraft math models that were
invalid for full aerodynamic stall. With this limitation, commercial pilot training
programs could only correctly train stick-shaker and stick pusher prevention (which
by regulation occurs before aerodynamic stall). Proper recovery training from aero-
dynamic stall however requires a simulator model that includes the appropriate full
stall aircraft dynamics.
In this study, the General Transport Model (GTM) was integrated into the Ver-
tical Motion Simulator facility. This model is representative of a generic transport
class aircraft most similar to a Boeing 757. The GTM model included more realistic
stalled flight characteristics, derived from a 5.5% sub-scale polynomial aerodynamic
database built from wind-tunnel and spin-tunnel testing. The sub-scale model was
then developed into a full-scale model, by applying appropriate Reynolds Number
corrections [51].
All of the scenarios in the experiment were flown with the “light” turbulence com-
puted in accordance with the Dryden turbulence model military specification [52,53].
19The noise created by the motor shaking the columns provides an aural cue, while the physical
shaking of the column provides a tactile cue.
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Figure 7. Research flight deck used for the SRG Experiment.
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Figure 8. Primary Flight Display without guidance.
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A light stall buffet effect was also added, initiating at the angle-of-attack correspond-
ing to aerodynamic stall onset (typically, 16 degrees for the GTM model).20 Several
pilots commented that the buffet effect was not nearly as strong as what might be
experienced in a real aircraft by more than a factor of two.
3.5 Guidance Cues
The split-cue (cross bar) flight director was selected to provide the pitch and roll
recovery guidance because of its familiarity to commercial pilots. Figure 9 shows the
guidance cues just after the stall recovery guidance mode was engaged. The stall
recovery guidance mode is annunciated as srg in red across the top of the PFD21,
along with the recover directive below the PFD. The split magenta vertical and
horizontal bars provide the roll and pitch guidance, respectively. The piloting task is
to fly the aircraft reference symbol (black wing and nose markers outlined in white)
to the magenta pitch and roll indicators as they are accustomed to during normal
flight operations. Typically, pilots are trained to follow these directors by trying
to get them to cross precisely through the center of the aircraft nose marker. In
Figure 9, the roll director is commanding zero bank input, while the pitch director
is indicating moderate pitch down input to get the nose of the aircraft below the
PLI. In the particular scenario shown, the roll director will engage to level the wings
only after the nose drops below the PLI, as explained in Section 2.1.
A new throttle director cue was developed to provide thrust guidance. The
design was based on a previously studied concept for guiding control of the collective
on helecopters [54, 55]. The throttle cue adapted for this study is depicted on the
PFD shown in Figure 9 as the magenta cutout on the right wing indicator, and
the two white cues directly below it. The white cues are meant to resemble the
throttle handles, which should be placed on the magenta cutout. The philosophy is
consistent with the other “fly to” directors used for pitch and roll. As depicted in
Figure 9, the throttle cue is requesting increased thrust, in this case, from idle to
maximum power (i.e., the full deflection is shown in the figure).
Alternative guidance cue concepts were considered for use in the study. These
are discussed in Appendix C.
4 Scenarios
Each participant flew the four stall recovery scenarios described in this section. All
of the scenarios took place in and around the San Francisco International Airport
terminal area. In each scenario, the visibility was clouded to obscure the horizon,
and, the automation system controlled the aircraft from its initial state into aero-
dynamic stall. When the desired stall condition occurred, the mode annunciators
on the primary flight display (PFD) switched to “srg” in red, and “recover” was
indicated in red on the bottom of the attitude director indicator (ADI), as shown
20We define the angle-of-attack corresponding to aerodynamic stall onset as α = argmaxCL(α).
21Several pilot participants recommended simply annunciating stall, instead of srg, to avoid
any additional workload that may be required to mentally decode the srg acronym (that would
only rarely, if ever, be seen).
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Figure 9. Primary Flight Display in Stall Recovery Guidance Mode.
in Figure 9. At this point, an alarm sounded with “Stall, Stall, Stall,” and, si-
multaneously, the autopilot and auto-throttle systems automatically disconnected.
The participants were then instructed to manually fly the stall recovery maneuver.
Scenarios were flown with and without guidance in randomized order. When the
guidance was available, the pilots were instructed to follow the flight director and
thrust guidance cues. Each scenario was concluded by the simulation engineer when
the pilot flying achieved roughly unaccelerated level or climbing flight.
4.1 High Altitude Stall
This scenario was motivated the Icelandair, Air France, and West Caribbean acci-
dents. The aircraft was initialized at its altitude ceiling on the back side of the power
curve at 170 knots. In this state, attempting to hold level flight at cruise thrust (95%
N1) causes the aircraft to decelerate. The automation system was setup to hold alti-
tude and cruise thrust until the angle-of-attack exceeded 25 degrees. From this fully
developed stall attitude, the aircraft has a strong natural pitch down tendency when
the auto-pilot disconnects (in part because the autopilot can not trim nose-up fast
enough). The aircraft also exhibits very sensitive pitch control during the pull-up
phase of the recovery, with a tendency towards pitching the aircraft nose-up into the
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(a) PFD on initialization. (b) PFD at start of stall recovery.
Figure 10. High altitude stall scenario PFDs.
PLI, inducing a secondary stick-shaker stall warning, and possibly even a secondary
aerodynamic stall. This pitch control sensitivity is realistic and caused by the fact
that aircraft at high altitude experience less aerodynamic damping [56, pg. 4].
The high altitude stall scenario was designed to examine:
• if negative g loading occurred during the pitch down phase of the recovery,
• the number of stick-shaker stall warnings that occurred,
• whether secondary aerodynamic stall occurred,
• recovery to an airspeed comfortably on the front side of the power curve.
The scenario setup parameters and performance standards are summarized in Table
3. The PFD at the beginning of the scenario is shown in Figure 10(a). From this
initial state, the autopilot flies the airplane into the deep aerodynamic stall condition
with PFD shown in Figure 10(b). For this scenario, the airspeed is deep into the
red stick-shaker band and, correspondingly, the PLI is far below the current aircraft
pitch. From this condition, participants began the manual recovery maneuver flying
either with or without guidance (the case with guidance is shown in the figure).
4.2 Approach Stall
This scenario was intended to test the recovery guidance system on an approach
stall at very low altitude. In this scenario, the aircraft is initialized at 1,100 ft on
the glide slope to San Francisco International Airport. The autopilot stalled the
aircraft at 680 feet, after the throttle was back driven to idle.
The approach stall scenario was designed to examine:
• performance with full flaps, gear down, and ground proximity,
• tendency to over correct especially on pitch down,
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Table 3. High Altitude Stall Scenario
Initial State
Clean aircraft, 170 knots, 40,000 feet (altitude ceiling), −2.5
degree flight path angle, cruise thrust (95% N1, 2/3 throttle),
and light turbulence. Weather set for 8 mile visibility.
Stall Entry
Autopilot set to altitude hold, causing aircraft to level off at
current thrust and the airspeed to decrease. Autopilot flies
aircraft beyond stick-shaker into fully developed stall.
Start Recovery
When angle-of-attack exceeds 25 degrees. Indicated to pilot
when “recover” appears in red on the PFD.
End Recovery When unaccelerated level or climbing flight is achieved.
Recovery Standards Desired Adequate
Max. speed exceedance 0 0
Secondary stall warnings ≤ 1 ≤ 2
Min. load factor 0 g −1 g
Max. load factor 2.4 g 2.5 g
Min. altitude 35,000 ft 30,000 ft
Tracking Standards Desired Adequate
Pitch director capture time < 3 sec. < 6 sec.
Max. pitch tracking error 2.5 deg. 5 deg.
Throttle tracking error > 25% < 3 sec. < 6 sec.
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• tendency to exceed flap limit airspeed after pulling into climb out,
• whether the guidance reduces the tendency to recover with pitch attitude
above the PLI, or, equivalently, with angle-of-attack in the margin between
stall warning and full stall.
The scenario setup parameters and performance standards are summarized in Table
4. The PFD at the beginning of the scenario is shown in Figure 11(a). From
this initial state, the autopilot flies the airplane into the aerodynamic stall onset
condition with PFD shown in Figure 11(b). From this condition, participants began
the manual recovery maneuver flying either with or without guidance (the case with
guidance is shown in the figure). At the onset of the recovery, the thrust guidance
requests full thrust from its current idle setting, while the pitch guidance requests
a nose-down pitch input to just below the PLI. Notice, also, the relatively limited
set of safe airspeeds between 130 knots, and the flap overspeed limit at 160 knots.
Table 4. Approach Scenario
Initial State
Full flaps, gear down, 140 knots, 1,100 feet, wings level,
700 ft/min descent, thrust set to trim attitude (51% N1,
1/4 throttle), and light turbulence. Weather set for 38 mile
visibility, with cloud layer at 1500 ft and 500 ft visibility in
cloud.
Stall Entry
Autopilot set to hold −3 degree glide slope. Auto-throttle
commands throttle to idle 4 seconds after start. Aircraft
decelerates.
Start Recovery
At aerodynamic stall onset, when angle-of-attack exceeds 16
degrees. Indicated to pilot when “recover” appears in red
on the PFD.
End Recovery When unaccelerated level or climbing flight is achieved.
Recovery Standards Desired Adequate
Max. speed exceedance 0 0
Secondary stall warnings ≤ 1 ≤ 2
Min. load factor 0 g −1 g
Max. load factor 1.9 g 2.0 g
Min. altitude 500 ft 200 ft
Tracking Standards Desired Adequate
Pitch director capture time < 3 sec. < 6 sec.
Max. pitch tracking error 2.5 deg. 5 deg.
Throttle tracking error > 25% < 3 sec. < 6 sec.
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(a) PFD on initialization. (b) PFD at start of stall recovery.
Figure 11. Approach stall scenario PFDs.
4.3 Low Altitude Stall
This baseline scenario was included to study whether the guidance contradicted pilot
expectations while flying a straightforward stall recovery.
The low altitude stall scenario was designed to examine:
• a standard recovery requiring pitch, roll, and thrust inputs,
– especially with roll instability at low airspeed,
• whether the guidance supports pilot expectations, and the fundamental as-
pects of the FAA stall recovery template.
The scenario setup parameters and performance standards are summarized in Table
5. The PFD at the beginning of the scenario is shown in Figure 12(a). From
this initial state, the autopilot flies the airplane into the aerodynamic stall onset
condition with PFD shown in Figure 12(b). From this condition, participants began
the manual recovery maneuver flying either with or without guidance (the case with
guidance is shown in the figure). At the onset of the manual recovery in this scenario,
the throttle guidance is requesting full power (from the current idle thrust setting),
and a pitch down input. The roll director is requesting to hold the current bank
angle in accordance with the recovery strategy adopted for the guidance.
4.4 Low Altitude Stall with Excessive Nose-Up Pitch Trim
This scenario was motivated by the Thompson Fly and Colgan Air accidents, where
the autopilot may have commanded excessive nose-up pitch trim that would have
further complicated the recovery maneuver. This scenario is the same as the baseline
low altitude scenario, except that excessive nose-up stab trim to 9 degrees was
commanded while the aircraft decelerated towards stall. For the particular aircraft
model used in the experiment, the 9 degrees nose-up trim was about the minimum
amount required to cause the aircraft to pitch-up, exceeding the elevator authority of
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Table 5. Low Altitude Stall Scenario
Initial State
Clean aircraft, 180 knots, 5,000 feet, thrust set to trim level
flight (56% N1, 1/4 throttle) and light turbulence. Weather
set for 8 mile visibility.
Stall Entry
Autopilot set to altitude hold and commands 25 degree bank
left. Auto-throttle commands throttle to idle six seconds
after start. Aircraft decelerates.
Start Recovery
At aerodynamic stall onset, when angle-of-attack exceeds 16
degrees. Indicated to pilot when “recover” appears in red
on the PFD.
End Recovery When unaccelerated level or climbing flight is achieved.
Recovery Standards Desired Adequate
Max. speed exceedance 0 0
Secondary stall warnings ≤ 1 ≤ 2
Min. load factor 0 g −1 g
Max. load factor 2.4 g 2.5 g
Min. altitude 4,000 ft 3,000 ft
Tracking Standards Desired Adequate
Pitch director capture time < 3 sec. < 6 sec.
Max. pitch tracking error 2.5 deg. 5 deg.
Throttle tracking error > 25% < 3 sec. < 6 sec.
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(a) PFD on initialization. (b) PFD at start of stall recovery.
Figure 12. Low altitude stall scenario PFDs.
the column to pitch down when full thrust was also applied for a significant duration
of time. For comparison, in the baseline low altitude scenario, the autopilot normally
commanded only 2 degrees nose-up stab trim. In this scenario, if the pilot did not
manually adjust the pitch trim nose-down before applying full thrust, a pitch up
moment would build with airspeed to the point where it exceeded the full elevator
authority to pitch down. As the aircraft then pitched up uncontrollably, it would
rapidly decelerate back towards stall.
The low altitude stall with excessive nose-up trim scenario was designed to examine:
• a recovery requiring pitch, roll, thrust, and nose-down stab trim inputs,
– with a comparison to recovery in the baseline low altitude scenario,
• margin to pitch down elevator saturation,
• effectiveness of throttle guidance to reduce thrust.
The scenario setup parameters and performance standards are summarized in Table
6. The PFD at the beginning of the scenario is shown in Figure 13(a). From
this initial state, the autopilot flies the airplane into the aerodynamic stall onset
condition, while applying excessive nose-up trim. The PFD at the beginning of
the recovery maneuver is shown in Figure 13(b). From this condition, participants
began the manual recovery maneuver flying either with or without guidance (the
case with guidance is shown in the figure). The PFD at the beginning of the stall
recovery is nearly identical to the PFD for the low altitude scenario, with the notable
exception that the thrust guidance cue requests no additional thrust input because
the airplane is in an excessive nose-up stab trim condition.
4.5 Performance Standards
Each of the above scenario tables specified two sets of standards for categorizing
desired and adequate performance. The first set of recovery standards defines the
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Table 6. Low Altitude Stall with Excessive Nose-Up Trim Scenario
Initial State
Clean aircraft, 180 knots, 5,000 feet, thrust set to trim level
flight (56% N1, 1/4 throttle) and light turbulence. Weather
set for 8 mile visibility.
Stall Entry
Autopilot set to altitude hold and commands 25 degree bank
left. Auto-throttle commands throttle to idle six seconds
after start. Aircraft decelerates. Stab trim position com-
manded to 9 degrees nose-up at 0.5 deg/sec.
Start Recovery
At aerodynamic stall onset, when angle-of-attack exceeds 16
degrees. Indicated to pilot when “recover” appears in red
on the PFD.
End Recovery When unaccelerated level or climbing flight is achieved.
Recovery Standards Desired Adequate
Max. speed exceedance 0 0
Secondary stall warnings ≤ 1 ≤ 2
Min. load factor 0 g −1 g
Max. load factor 2.4 g 2.5 g
Min. altitude 4,000 ft 3,000 ft
Tracking Standards Desired Adequate
Pitch director capture time < 3 sec. < 6 sec.
Max. pitch tracking error 2.5 deg. 5 deg.
Throttle tracking error > 25% < 5 sec. < 10 sec.
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(a) PFD on initialization. (b) PFD at start of stall recovery.
Figure 13. Low altitude excessive nose-up trim scenario PFDs.
safety related performance measures, while the second set of tracking standards
defines the measures for categorizing how well the participants were able to track
the guidance cues.
The recovery standards apply to all scenario runs, both with and without guid-
ance. They are meant serve as aircraft performance metrics for each recovery. The
commercial pilots were shown the recovery standards after flying each scenario, and
were asked to use them to complete post-run surveys.
• The max. speed exceedance metric was meant to ensure no over speed
condition occurred during the recovery (of either vmo, or max flap speeds).
• The secondary stall warning metric established the number of times the
pilot exceeded the stick-shaker warning airspeed. Multiple stick-shaker warn-
ings are prone to occur when the aircraft exhibits a sensitive pitch response,
especially at high altitude, or when the pilot wishes to recover with minimum
altitude loss by recovering near the stick-shaker angle-of-attack (indicated by
the PLI). Since there is some margin between the angle-of-attack where the
stick-shaker occurs and where aerodynamic stall occurs, a stick-shaker event
may be within the margin of error for a particular recovery. It is, however,
important that secondary stall does not occur. With pilot feedback, it was
subjectively decided for this experiment that the performance is desirable with
up to one stick-shaker, adequate with 2, and inadequate otherwise.
• The min./max. load factor metrics are meant to ensure recoveries were
executed within the safety load factor limitations for the aircraft. A load
factor of less than 0 g will cause any passengers or objects not secured to
strike the aircraft ceiling significantly increasing the potential for injury. The
maximum structural load for a typical commercial aircraft is 2.5 g for a clean
configuration, and 2.0 g if flaps have been deployed. The desired and adequate
load factor metrics for this study were based only on maintaining passenger
safety (with 0.1 g margin for the desired metric), not comfort.
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• The min. altitude metric is the minimum absolute altitude registered for the
recovery. Altitude loss minimization is no longer a performance consideration
for pilot stall recovery training. This is because it contributes to a reluctance
to arrest an impending stall, or full stall, by pitching down to reduce the angle-
of-attack. However, it is still an important metric for assessing stall recovery
guidance technology. In particular, while following the guidance, the altitude
loss should not be excessive. The minimum altitude performance metrics were
decided from an assessment for each scenario to determine appropriate values,
with the objectives of the experiment in mind.
In addition to the recovery performance standards listed above, the following
three guidance tracking metrics were also defined:
• The pitch director capture time is the amount of time to reduce the pitch
guidance error to less than 2.5 degrees.
• The max. pitch tracking error is the maximum pitch error permitted for
a particular standard after the capture.
• The throttle tracking error was the total amount of time that the throttle
guidance error exceeded 25%.
Values for these tracking metrics were determined subjectively based on a test pilot
evaluation for each of the scenarios. The test pilots who participated in the ex-
periment used the tracking standards to providing a Cooper-Harper rating of the
guidance technology with respect to the pitch and throttle guidance cues. While
the roll guidance strategy was an important element in the study, an assessment of
the tracking performance of the roll director was not of interest.
5 Experiment Procedure
The experiment included a total for 40 pilot participants spread over 23 days. On
each day, one or two pilots participated in a session requiring 24 stall recoveries per
pilot, each recovery lasting 20-60 seconds. There was typically only one session held
each day, with the exception of day 16, during which 2 additional pilots participated
in an afternoon session. At the beginning of each session, the participants were
briefed on the important aspects of the experiment as itemized below:
• Motivation: A very brief summary of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team
motivation for the work was provided. It was noted that the experiment
was focused on a baseline test of new stall recovery guidance algorithms and
displays. The presentation emphasized that in practice stall is typically the
final result of a series of cascading safety issues usually involving distraction,
automation confusion, and ultimately inappropriate control action.
• Experiment Overview A high level description of the experiment was pro-
vided. The experiment objective “to develop guidance technology that helps
pilots efficiently recover from stall” was stated. It was emphasized that the
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recovery guidance was meant to be easy to follow, especially given the typical
issues complicating matters in the cockpit when stall recoveries are required.
Pilots were told they would be flying a B757-like aircraft model developed from
wind tunnel testing, and that each would individually fly the same recovery
algorithm and display cues through four stall recovery scenarios.
• FAA Recovery Template. The participants were shown the abbreviated
Stall Recovery Template provided by the FAA in AC120-109A, as shown in
Table 1. The basic recovery procedure was discussed.
• Technology Benefits. The use of flight dynamics to compute scenario and
aircraft specific recovery guidance was briefly summarized as the primary ben-
efit of stall recovery guidance.
• Cockpit Layout. A picture of the research cockpit layout was shown and
discussed.
• Flight Directors. The stall recovery guidance mode and flight directors
were presented. Since the thrust director was the only new director, two
short videos (with combined duration less than 50 seconds) demonstrating its
operation were shown. The second video specifically covered its operation in
an excessive nose-up pitch trim scenario.
• Scenarios. Each of the four scenarios was briefed in full detail. Participants
were informed that this was a baseline experiment, where their purpose was
to evaluate the recovery guidance technology as a pilot aid in consideration
of the fact that distraction would probably be present during operational use
(even though the experiment included no attempt to distract the participants
while they evaluated the technology).
• Recovery Metrics. For each scenario, the participants were told to recover
from stall to unaccelerated flight, with a flight path angle greater than or
equal to zero, without excessive altitude loss, while avoiding secondary stall
and the tendency to induce oscillation in pitch, roll, or throttle control. It
was explained that following each run, performance metrics would be made
available for use in filling out post-run evaluation surveys. A brief summary
of the performance metrics was provided. Test Pilot participants were also
briefed on the tracking performance metrics and Cooper-Harper rating task
(see Figure 42).
• All participants were told that their primary purpose was to evaluate the
recovery guidance technology in scenarios and conditions that are exceedingly
rare in operational practice. They were also informed that they could take
breaks, or end their participation at any time.
After the briefing, the participants were asked to fill out a short pre-sim survey, and
were then provided with a tour of the simulator safety features and procedures. The
information from the survey was used to assign a recovery guidance algorithm (so
that experience and skill levels would be balanced across the two algorithms). From
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the algorithm assignment, one pilot was selected to go first based on a pre-established
test matrix. The selected pilot was positioned in the cab with an “instructor” pilot,
and permitted to fly the aircraft freely until he or she felt familiar with the controls
and alerting systems.22 Following the familiarization run, the experiment began.
The overall experiment procedure was approved by a Human Research Institu-
tional Review Board. Each scenario was flown three times, both with and without
guidance according to the established test matrix. After each set of three runs, the
participant filled out a post-run survey, which included a Cooper-Harper rating for
the research pilots only. The test session proceeded as follows. The first participant
would fly a cab familiarization run followed by two scenarios. This participant would
then break outside of the cab while the second participant flew the cab familiariza-
tion run and two scenarios. The experiment proceeded in this fashion until the full
test matrix was completed, with one cab familiarization run and the four stall re-
covery scenarios. At all times only one participant flew in the cab, while the resting
participant waited in an area where he could not view the performance of the other
pilot. The sequence of the scenarios, and whether or not guidance was provided, was
semi-randomized across the experiment. The full experiment test matrix is listed
in Appendix E. After completing their respective set of 24 stall recovery runs, each
pilot filled out a post-sim survey, and both pilots (if there were two) participated
together in a debriefing with the researchers.
6 Participants
6.1 Commercial Pilots
Thirty active commercial pilots, a mix of both Captains and First Officers, with
current certification on Boeing transport aircraft with glass cockpit were requested
for the experiment.23 The pilots were recruited by an independent company that
solicited participation using the short experiment description presented below. One
recently retired pilot (within 1 year) that was still current on a Boeing transport
aircraft was admitted into the study. Pilots from multiple companies participated,
including American Airlines, Delta, Southwest, United, United Parcel Service, Fed-
eral Express, Cathay Pacific, and Kaiser Air (a charter airline).
The number of flight hours, self reported by each participant, ranged from 5,000
to over 28,000. Twenty-six of the pilots reported being familiar with the FAA
stall recovery guidelines. Ten of the pilots were trainers (check flight instructors
or other), ten had military aircraft experience and training, and seven reported
experience flying general aviation acrobatic maneuvers.
During each simulation run, the commercial pilots were asked to follow the
guidance when it was provided, or their standard operational practice if guidance
was not provided. After flying a scenario 3 times, they were asked for subjective
ratings, based on the recovery performance metrics listed in Section 4. An overall
22In most cases the instructor pilot was an experienced test pilot. At times when the test pilot
was unavailable, the principle investigator, though not an actual pilot, served as the “instructor
pilot” for the purposes of the research cab familiarization.
23B737, 747, 757, 767, 777, 787.
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assessment of the guidance system was provided on a post simulation run survey,
that was the same for all pilots (including the research test pilots). The surveys are
reproduced in Appendix D.
Participant Invite: Though rare, stall related accidents and incidents
still occur in commercial aircraft. To partially address this concern, the
Stall Recovery Guidance experiment is investigating the degree to which
several candidate algorithms and displays can serve as a pilot aid during
manual stall recovery. In support of this study, participants are needed
to fly simulated stall recovery scenarios in the terminal area around
SFO, and provide subjective feedback on recovery guidance cues. The
experiment will take place in the Vertical Motion Simulator Facility at
NASA Ames Research Center, April-May 2017.
6.2 Research Pilots
Two research pilots from NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC), at Ed-
wards Air-force base in California, participated in shakedown testing and advised
the refinement of the stall recovery guidance strategy and experiment procedure
three months prior to the start of the experiment. The lead pilot for this effort
coordinated the involvement of 8 other research pilots from AFRC in the final ex-
periment. These two pilots also participated in the official study, and we chose keep
the data collected from their runs in the analysis. Since all pilot participants were
briefed on the experiment procedure and stall scenarios, the inclusion of their data
was expected to have negligible impact. Any outlier performance was cross checked
against their participation, and called out in the data analysis where it occurred.
In all, ten pilots from AFRC participated in the study. They self-reported be-
tween 1,800 and 10,000 flight hours. Nine of them reported familiarity with the
FAA stall recovery guidelines, 9 of them were trainers (check flight instructors or
other), 9 had military aircraft and training experience, and 5 reported additional
experience flying general aviation acrobatic maneuvers. Several of them had former
experience developing or testing stall protection systems for both commercial and
military aircraft.
Research test pilots are trained to fly modified aircraft according to a specific
test plan. Part of that training, includes learning to follow a standardized process
for rating handling qualities according to the Cooper-Harper scale (see Figure 42),
which must include quantitative performance measures. For this reason, research
test pilots offer an important capability for assessing aircraft technologies.
The research pilots, followed the same experiment procedure and answered the
same survey questions as the commercial pilots. In addition, they provided Cooper-
Harper ratings on the proposed guidance system, based on the guidance tracking
performance metrics specified in Section 4.
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7 Results
7.1 Outliers
Forty pilots participated in the study. The experiment protocol required each one to
fly 3 iterations of the 4 scenarios, with and without guidance, for a total of 24 runs
per pilot. Of course, the execution of the run sequences were not always perfect, and
in some cases extra runs were collected. Typically, this occurred when either the
pilot accidentally pushed an emergency stop button,24 when an inadvertent auto-
throttle position command error occurred, or when a participant flew a recovery
that activated a safety stop (usually caused by excessive roll leading to over travel
on the lateral axis of the VMS). In total, 979 run data sets were recorded, including
19 runs where a mistake led to a repeat of at least one run.
In a few cases, the participants flew anomalous recoveries. Three of these are
worth mentioning here. In the first case, during an approach scenario run, a pilot
flew the aircraft into the 85 foot minimum altitude that triggered an automatic
simulation stop. In the second case, the participant flew with an excessive amount
of guidance tracking error in a high altitude scenario run, which led to large os-
cillations in angle-of-attack, airspeed, and altitude. In addition, this was one of
the few secondary aerodynamic stalls that occurred with FMPC guidance in the
high altitude scenario. The solid blue line in Figure 14, shows the recovery relative
to all other pilots flying with FMPC guidance in the same scenario (collection of
gray lines). This was the first run of the day flown by this particular pilot, and his
second two attempts were normal with respect to the participant pool. After flying
the second attempt, the pilot commented on how a former instructor used to say
“nail that flight director ... man he used to hammer that.” The dashed blue line in
Figure 14 shows the third case. In this case, a pilot flying the high altitude recovery
scenario without guidance, essentially recovers to the stick-shaker angle-of-attack
and corresponding airspeed on the backside of the power curve. At this airspeed
and angle-of-attack, the plane experiences too much drag to hold level flight and
ends up on a continuously descending trajectory, never quite able to recover level
flight within the time duration of the run.
Much effort went into the experiment design, and the resulting data collected for
this report. In the presentation of the results, we therefore strive to show the raw,
unprocessed, data as much as possible. This means including the outliers, as long
as their inclusion does not lead to a misinterpretation of the results. We also make
frequent use of the histogram to properly convey the spread of the data, instead of
simply reporting the mean and the standard deviation for the quantities of interest.
7.2 Recovery Performance by Scenario
In this section, the quantitative analysis of the flight recovery performance data
with respect to each of the scenarios is presented.
24For safety, the pilots could use a simulation reset button on the control wheel to stop the
simulation.
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Figure 14. Two outlier recoveries from the High Altitude Scenario data.
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7.2.1 High Altitude Stall Scenario
The difference between the EBA and FMPC guidance algorithms was most appar-
ent in the high altitude scenario. The primary factor in the observed difference was
that the FMPC guidance was significantly more aggressive in the initial pitch down
maneuver. In particular, the FMPC algorithm commanded the aircraft to roughly
−20 degrees pitch, before beginning the pull-up maneuver at greater airspeed. The
EBA algorithm, on the other hand, pushed the aircraft down to about −7 degrees
pitch, before beginning a more gentle pull-up maneuver. Figure 15 shows a compar-
ison between the load factors for all high altitude scenario runs with no guidance,
FMPC guidance, and EBA guidance. The stall recovery maneuver begins at zero
seconds in the plot, a convention that we will maintain throughout this report. The
figure confirms the expected more aggressive maneuver commanded by the FMPC
algorithm,25 but in all cases, no pilot risked exceeding any load factor limit. This is
expected due to the lower airspeed at which stall recovery typically occurs.
Figure 15. High altitude stall scenario: Load factors for all runs.
An important aspect of this study was to look at the effectiveness of the stall
recovery guidance system, given that training on such a system may occur somewhat
infrequently, and that it would likely be used under adverse piloting conditions.
More generally though, systems intended to help humans should be easy to use. In
an effort to test the guidance system for ease of use, we did not allow the pilots
to practice using the system prior to data collection. This enabled us to measure
the effectiveness of the system given no experience with it, other than the short 20
minute briefing that covered its basic operation.
Even if a participant flew the guidance system on a different scenario, the high
25The large oscillatory FMPC load factor trace in Figure 15 corresponds to the large tracking
error outlier case discussed in Section 7.1
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Figure 16. High altitude stall scenario: recovery in angle-of-attack for each partici-
pant’s first run.
altitude scenario added a new element. This element was that for pilots not expe-
rienced with it, the large transport class aircraft response at high altitude can be
surprisingly pitch sensitive, especially at high angle-of-attack and low airspeed. In
fact, when flying without guidance, only one pilot in twenty was able to avoid a
secondary stall warning on the first attempt,26 and only five out of twenty were able
to avoid a secondary aerodynamic stall.
Figure 16 shows the recovery in angle-of-attack for each pilot’s first recovery
attempt. By first attempt, we mean either the first attempt at flying a recovery
without guidance (before having flown with any guidance system), or the first at-
tempt at flying a recovery with the guidance system.27 It is clear that when flying
without guidance most pilots attempted to recover near the PLI (as they would
have done for the lower altitude scenarios). However, with the pitch sensitive air-
craft response, the normal tendency was to over correct and exceed the PLI, causing
a secondary stall warning and often an aerodynamic stall as well, typically with a
load factor greater than 1 g.
The distribution of the number of secondary stall warnings and aerodynamic
stalls (sustained for greater than 0.2 seconds to eliminate mis-counts caused by tur-
bulence), across all 20 first recovery attempts for the EBA, FMPC, and No guidance
26This pilot, however, participated in an earlier shakedown of the experiment three months prior
to his participation in the official study.
27Two technical caveats apply: (1) For the EBA or FMPC guidance cases, half of the runs were
from pilots who flew the recovery without guidance first, which might have helped to observe fewer
secondary stall warnings and aerodynamic stalls when the guidance system was turned on; (2) Runs
with no guidance always occurred before the participant flew with the guidance system — so for
the no guidance case, the participants were not made aware of the pitch sensitive aircraft response
on a previous run.
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Figure 17. High altitude stall scenario: number of stick-shaker alerts (stall warn-
ings), and secondary aerodynamic stalls for each participant’s first recovery attempt
(n = 20 for each of the three categories).
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runs, is plotted in Figure 17. This figure shows that the EBA algorithm was some-
what effective at reducing the number secondary stall warnings and aerodynamic
stalls, but the number of cases where at least one secondary aerodynamic stall oc-
curred was the same without guidance. The more aggressive FMPC algorithm was
however, extremely effective. Seventeen out of twenty pilots flew their recoveries
without any secondary stall warning on their first attempt with the FMPC system,
while only one pilot was able to meet this criteria without guidance, as noted earlier.
Looking at the minor angle-of-attack oscillation that occurs in Figure 16, at about
5 seconds into the recovery, one observes that the FMPC guidance also got the
pilots to overcome their instinct to pitch up too early. This result is a major finding
of this study. It shows that aggressive pitch down guidance can significantly help
with high altitude stall recovery. This is in stark contrast with a low altitude stall
recovery where significantly less pitch down input is needed.
Figure 18. High altitude stall scenario: airspeed and altitude recovery vs. time, all
runs (n = 60 for each of the three categories).
Figure 18 shows the altitude and airspeed recovery profiles for all runs of the high
altitude scenario. The more aggressive pitch down action commanded by the FMPC
algorithm brings the airspeed up faster at the expense of more altitude loss over the
EBA algorithm. Typically, the difference in altitude was about 500 ft, as shown in
the distributions of the minimum altitude across all runs, presented in Figure 19.
Internally, both guidance algorithms attempted to control airspeed to a target value
of 230 knots. The FMPC algorithm was more directly able to hit the target, but
also exhibited a small oscillation in airspeed control. The EBA algorithm, on the
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Figure 19. High altitude stall scenario: distribution in minimum altitude across all
runs (n = 60 for each of the three categories).
other hand, had a slower, but smoother, airspeed response that more asymptotically
hit the target airspeed. Because of the slower response, many of the runs with
EBA guidance were stopped before reaching the full target airspeed, and this may
have contributed to some of the better altitude performance observed with that
algorithm. In general, though, both guidance algorithms improved the consistency
of the airspeed recovery over the cases where pilots flew without guidance. As a
consequence, both of the guidance algorithms helped the pilots to recover safely on
the front side of the power curve.
Finally, Figure 20 shows the pitch guidance signal presented to the pilots, in ad-
dition to the tracking error associated with flying the guidance. For both algorithms,
the guidance signals were continuously recomputed from the current aircraft state,
so the overall guidance observed through time depended on how well the pilots were
able to track the guidance. The large discrepancy between the EBA and FMPC
algorithms in pitch down guidance is directly visible in the top plot. Also, in the
bottom tracking error plot, at about 5 seconds, one can observe that the FMPC
algorithm was commanding more pitch down, while the EBA algorithm commanded
pitch up. After the initial pitch down capture, around 7 seconds into the recovery,
the FMPC guidance incurred less overall tracking error. Looking at the top plot,
one can also observe that the EBA algorithm was in good agreement with the re-
coveries flown by pilots without guidance, though, in this scenario the reduced pitch
down tendency lead to more secondary aerodynamic stalls as discussed above.
63
Figure 20. High altitude stall scenario: pitch guidance tracking performance across
all runs (n = 60 for each of the three categories). For recoveries flown without
guidance, the actual pitch recovery is shown on the top plot.
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7.2.2 Approach Stall
For the most part, there were no discernible differences in the piloted recoveries
flown with the FMPC and EBA guidance algorithms. Both algorithms essen-
tially matched most of the recovery maneuver that the pilots flew before seeing any
guidance. This result is shown in Figure 21, which presents the recovery in angle-
of-attack for the first runs of this scenario (in the same manner as Figure 16).28
Figure 23 shows that in all three categories (No guidance, FMPC, and EBA) the
group of pilots achieved about the same minimum altitude, with the mean between
350–400 ft (note the stall recovery started at 680 ft, with some variation due to
turbulence), and essentially the same spread in minimum altitude among each of
the categories, 60–100 ft standard deviation. Though not shown, the load factors for
all of the recoveries in this scenario were well within limits (between 0, and 2 g for
the aircraft in landing configuration). The overall consistency between the guided
and un-guided recoveries occurred because the guidance algorithms were able to
calculate that there was enough thrust authority at the lower altitude, and in land-
ing configuration, to recover the aircraft near the PLI. Furthermore, the guidance
algorithms worked with the PLI as a maximum constraint on the pitch, while pilots
flying without the guidance were sometimes able to improve on the minimum alti-
tude for the maneuver by flying slightly above the PLI. The approach scenario was
also a validation test for the guidance algorithms, essentially showing that neither
algorithm degraded the current pilot recovery procedure, which is already optimized
through the use of the well established PLI.
Figure 21. Approach scenario: first run recovery in angle-of-attack.
28The dataset used for the first recoveries shown in Figure 21, however, does not include the one
pilot that hit the altitude minimum of 80 ft while flying without guidance, or another pilot that
mistakenly hit the simulation reset button (on the yoke), prematurely ending one first run with
FMPC guidance.
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Figure 22. Approach scenario: airspeed and altitude recovery, for all runs (n = 60
for each of the three categories).
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Figure 23. Approach scenario: minimum altitude of the recovery, for all runs (n = 60
for each of the three categories).
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Even though the recovery profiles in angle-of-attack, airspeed, and altitude are
mostly the same, a careful look at the airspeed recovery in Figure 22 reveals that
the margin for overspeed is better with guidance. The extent of this trend can be
observed in Figure 24, which shows a histogram of the maximum speeds obtained
from each of the approach scenario recoveries. In total, the no guidance case had
5 runs where at least one overspeed occurred. The EBA had 4 such occurrences,
while the FMPC algorithm had only 1. This result however, is not statistically
strong enough to conclude that the FMPC algorithm performed better with respect
to protecting against an overspeed condition with 95% confidence.
In addition, Figure 25 shows that while the participants flew similar pitch at-
titude recoveries, there was a notable difference in the pitch tracking performance
between the FMPC and EBA algorithms. In particular, the EBA algorithm pro-
duced a sharper pitch down command in the first few seconds of the recovery, which
the pilots tracked with increased error. It is also worth noting, that while the track-
ing error is generally greater for the EBA algorithm throughout the recovery, the
actual pitch guidance after the first 5 seconds of the recovery is effectively the same
as the FMPC pitch guidance. The “No guidance” traces shown in the top plot of
Figure 25, show the actual pitch recoveries flown by the pilots without guidance.
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Figure 24. Approach scenario: histogram of maximum speed obtained from each
run (n = 60 for each of the three categories).
7.2.3 Low Altitude Stall
The primary purpose of the low altitude stall recovery was to examine the effect
of the guidance on a normal stall recovery scenario. Like the approach scenario,
pilots are trained and expected to use the PLI to minimize their altitude loss during
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Figure 25. Approach scenario: pitch guidance tracking performance across all runs
(n = 60 for each of the three categories). For recoveries flown without guidance, the
actual pitch recovery is shown on the top plot.
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the recovery, sometimes at the expense of hitting multiple stick-shaker warnings.
Multiple stall warnings are acceptable as long as secondary aerodynamic stalls are
avoided. Figure 26, shows the angle-of-attack recovery for the first attempt either
with or without guidance. Other than producing mildly tighter recoveries in angle-
of-attack, the guidance technologies did not have a significant impact on how the
pilots recovered without guidance. This was the expected result, since, both tech-
nologies produced guidance that also recovered near the PLI. It is also an important
result because it indicates the guidance system had no significant adverse affect on
recoveries that pilots should be able to fly without guidance.
Figure 26 shows a few outlier cases, which all occurred on the first attempted
recovery either with or without guidance.29 In one extreme case, without guidance,
a pilot exacerbated that stall by increasing the angle-of-attack to about 20 degrees,
and was then slow to get the nose of the aircraft down, taking about 20 seconds to
do so. In another case, a pilot flying with FMPC guidance, rejected a high pitch
command late in the recovery, and then pulled the throttle back to level out. This
pilot then flew a pitch attitude above the guidance command (which factored in the
reduced throttle setting), ultimately causing the aircraft to stall again (around 40
seconds), and all this after having effected a good recovery up until that point.
Figure 26. Low altitude scenario: all first attempt recoveries in angle-of-attack
(n ≈ 20 for each category, one or two first attempts were dropped due to run
execution issues).
The load factors sustained throughout all recoveries in this scenario were well
within limits, with the EBA algorithm producing slightly larger values this time.
Figure 27 shows the number of stall warnings (stick-shaker alerts), and secondary
stalls encountered with each guidance algorithm, and without guidance. Here the
29While the outlier cases occurred during the first runs, the general trends observed were also
true for all the runs in the low altitude scenario.
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EBA guidance does a better job helping pilots avoid stall warnings, while both
guidance algorithms reduced the number secondary aerodynamic stalls. This result
is expected from the slightly more aggressive initial pitch down guidance provided
by the EBA algorithm, which is observable in the first few seconds of the pitch
guidance plot in Figure 28. This figure also shows that the guidance algorithms,
and the FMPC algorithm in particular, produced greater pitch up commands during
the later stage of the recovery. The reason for this was that pilots tended to fly
below the pitch guidance during the pull-up phase of the recovery. The result
was a tendency to recover above the target airspeed, which the guidance would
compensate for with a higher pitch command. While this strategy helped to avoid
overspeed in the approach scenario, in this scenario, some pilots opted to ignore the
guidance towards the end of the recovery. They had good motivation for doing so,
since by ignoring the guidance the pilots were able to increase their airspeed, and
more importantly, maintain compliance with the current air traffic control altitude
clearance (reasonably assumed to be the scenario starting altitude of 5000 ft). These
effects are observable on speed and altitude recovery plots in Figure 29. Also, Figure
30 shows the minimum altitude achieved for all the recoveries in this scenario. The
recoveries flown with guidance are more tightly controlled in altitude loss, with
significantly more pilots able to recover above 4600 ft while flying with guidance.
7.2.4 Low Altitude Stall with Excessive Nose-Up Trim
The low altitude stall with excessive nose-up trim scenario was the most complex
of the three scenarios. The setup for this scenario was exactly the same as for
the low altitude scenario, except that excessive stab trim to −9 degrees (vs. −2
degrees for the low altitude scenario) was commanded while the aircraft decelerated
towards stall. One initial consequence of the setup, was that the autopilot provided
increasing pitch down elevator deflection to hold an approximately level flight path
as the stabilizer was trimmed nose-up. This nose-down pitch input, however, was
released when the system switched into manual recovery mode, and the result was
an initial pitch up moment that increased the angle-of-attack significantly (usually
to values in excess of 20 degrees). It typically took pilots between 1 and 3 seconds
to arrest this increase. This initial dynamical behavior is shown in the first few
seconds of Figure 31, which shows the angle-of-attack recovery for the first attempt
either with or without guidance. A comparison with the corresponding figure for the
low altitude scenario (Figure 26), reveals overall that the maximum angle-of-attack
is 5–10 degrees greater, and the time to reduce the angle-of-attack below the stall
warning threshold is 5–10 seconds longer than for the basic low altitude scenario.
The load factors, however, for this scenario were all well within the structural limits
for the aircraft.
Figure 31 also shows several outlier recoveries. In one case without guidance,
it took the pilot just over 40 seconds to eliminate aerodynamic stall. In this case,
the pilot added full throttle early on and flew well above the PLI without increasing
airspeed, until he applied nose-down trim shortly before arresting the stall. A second
outlier case without guidance was flown by another pilot on the same day. In this
case, the pilot initially arrested the stall at around 25 seconds, but then got into
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Figure 27. Low altitude scenario: number of stick-shaker alerts (stall warnings),
and secondary aerodynamic stalls across all first recovery attempts (n ≈ 20).
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Figure 28. Low altitude scenario: pitch guidance tracking performance across all
runs (n = 60 for each of the three categories). For recoveries flown without guidance,
the actual pitch recovery is shown on the top plot.
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Figure 29. Low altitude scenario: airspeed and altitude recovery, for all runs (n = 60
for each of the three categories).
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Figure 30. Low altitude scenario: minimum altitude of the recovery, for all runs
(n = 60 for each of the three categories).
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Figure 31. Low altitude stall with excessive nose-up trim scenario: first attempt
recovery in angle-of-attack. (n ≈ 20 for each category, one first attempt was dropped
for the No guidance and FMPC cases do to run execution issues).
two sustained secondary aerodynamic stalls — one beginning at about 49 seconds,
and the other beginning at 59 seconds. A closer look at the throttle input data
(not shown), revealed the pilot initially increased the throttle to about 75%, then
back down to 50% just before arresting the initial stall, then gradually back up
to around 75%. He also gradually applied nose-down trim, but without significant
effect until after 114 seconds into the recovery. Finally, there was also a pilot flying
the FMPC algorithm, where a 15 second sustained secondary stall occurred starting
around 32 seconds. While flying the run, the researcher monitoring gave the pilot
a verbal cue to start trimming the aircraft just after this secondary stall occurred.
After completing the run, the pilot noted difficulty seeing the PFD because it was
obstructed by the simulator wheel and column (this was a common complaint among
the participants), adjusted his seat position, and went on to fly normal recoveries
for this scenario.
Figure 31 also shows that, in general, participants took longer to stabilize their
angle-of-attack below the stick-shaker angle-of-attack, than they did for the basic low
altitude recovery scenario. In addition, they often crossed the secondary stick-shaker
and aerodynamic stall thresholds multiple times during each recovery. Figure 32
shows that this situation was somewhat exacerbated with the guidance technologies.
In particular, 10 out of 19 participants flying without guidance on their first run
for this scenario,30 encountered more than one stick-shaker, but only 3 out of the
10 went on to develop full secondary stalls. When guidance was included, roughly
the same number of stick-shaker warnings occurred, but nearly all them went on
to become secondary stalls. The simple explanation may be that the addition of
30One run out of the 20 was thrown out due to a simulator issue.
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Figure 32. Low altitude stall with excessive nose-up trim scenario: number of
stick-shaker alerts (stall warnings), and secondary aerodynamic stalls across all first
recovery attempts (n ≈ 20).
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thrust guidance pulled the pilots attention away from the PLI (or pitch guidance if
it was included in the run), and increased the likelihood of exceeding the PLI by a
larger degree, and thus, more secondary aerodynamic stalls were observed. This is
however, only one possible hypothesis supported by the data.
Figure 32 also shows that the EBA guidance was better at preventing more than
one secondary aerodynamic stall. Figure 33 shows that this could be because the
EBA algorithm was a little more aggressive in the initial pitch down recovery. The
EBA guidance also presented more pitch error during the initial recovery that would
have been more noticeable, and perhaps, viewed with an increased priority by the
pilots.
Figure 33. Low altitude with excessive nose-up pitch trim scenario: pitch guidance
tracking performance across all runs (n = 60 for each of the three categories). For
recoveries flown without guidance, the actual pitch recovery is shown on the top
plot.
The primary objective of the excessive nose-up trim condition in this scenario,
however, was to see if the addition of thrust guidance could reduce the risk of
saturating the elevator control, and therefore, the risk of an uncontrollable pitch up
tendency for aircraft with engines mounted below the wings. The thrust guidance
system was the same for both pitch guidance algorithms, and it was designed to
compute the maximum permissible thrust, at the current stab position, that would
not saturate the pitch down control. For all of the other scenarios, the application of
full thrust was desirable to minimize the altitude loss of the recovery. Since this was
the only scenario where the guidance requested a reduction in throttle, sometimes
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against the instinct of the pilot flying, the first question is simply whether the
throttle guidance cue was effective with little training.31
Figure 34, shows that the thrust guidance was indeed very effective at getting
the pilots to reduce the application of thrust while the aircraft was in an excessive
nose-up trim condition. The histogram was compiled from the throttle position
traces for all of the runs in this scenario, in a manner such that the height of each
bar includes the amount of time spent at a particular thrust allocation (out of a
maximum of the first 50 seconds of each recovery). Each bar, therefore, represents
the percentage of the total recovery time spent with the throttle position falling into
any particular bin. Overall, the figure shows that the participants flying with thrust
guidance were 3.1 times more likely to keep their thrust at a safer level (below 50%)
while in an excessive nose-up trim condition.
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Figure 34. Low altitude with excessive nose-up pitch trim scenario: comparison of
the applied thrust, both with and without guidance, when the stabilizer was in an
excess nose-up trim condition (stab position < −8 degrees). The histogram was
compiled from the time traces for all 120 runs with guidance, and all 60 runs where
the recovery was flown without guidance first.
Figure 35 compares the corresponding histograms for the elevator positions ob-
tained across all the runs, and in the same manner used for the thrust case just
discussed. The elevator position was saturated, or within 2 degrees of saturation,
at its 20 degree nose-down limit for only a small overall portion of the recovery
time (< 2%). Still, without guidance the participants spent 6.4 times longer with
an elevator deflection greater than 17 degrees (within 3 degrees of saturation), than
they did with guidance.
Finally, Figures 36 and 37 show the airspeed and altitude recoveries flown for
31The throttle guidance was explained during the pilot briefing in about 5 minutes. During this
time two brief videos were shown to demonstrate its operation, but no physical practice runs were
conducted prior to data collection.
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Figure 35. Low altitude with excessive nose-up pitch trim scenario: comparison of
the elevator positions obtained, both with and without guidance. The histogram
was compiled from the time traces for all 120 runs with guidance, and all 60 runs
where the recovery was flown without guidance first.
all of the runs. As one would expect, the airspeed recoveries with guidance are a
little tighter. However, we have just seen that the throttle guidance limited the
amount of throttle the participants would have used without guidance. With less
overall energy put into the system with guidance, one can expect greater altitude
loss. This result shows up directly in Figure 37. One can contrast this with the
corresponding Figure 30 from the low altitude scenario (without excessive trim),
where the guidance actually helped the pilots put more energy into the system to
improve the altitude performance.
In summary, the thrust guidance was effective at limiting thrust while in an
excessive nose-up trim condition, and this improved the safety margins with respect
to saturating the elevator controls. But these gains did not come without tradeoffs.
The additional workload associated with following the thrust guidance may have
increased the risk of secondary aerodynamic stall, due to less precise tracking of the
PLI (or pitch guidance when provided). It also caused a greater loss in altitude,
since the pilots spent a larger percentage of the recovery time at a limited thrust
setting.
7.2.5 Learning Effects
The primary purpose of this study was to determine whether the candidate guidance
system was a helpful piloting tool for stall recovery, and not whether the guidance
system was an effective teaching tool. In particular, the participants in this study
were briefed to assess the guidance technology with respect to this primary purpose
as users, and to a fair degree, as subject matter experts. We expect that a study to
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Figure 36. Low altitude with excessive nose-up pitch trim scenario: airspeed and
altitude recovery, for all runs (n = 60 for each of the three categories).
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Figure 37. Low altitude with excessive nose-up pitch trim scenario: minimum alti-
tude of the recovery, for all runs (n = 60 for each of the three categories).
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assess the guidance technology as a pilot training aid would be designed differently.
Still, it remains a curiosity to assess whether the participants learned anything from
the guidance system with the study designed as it was.
Figure 38. Learning across runs without recovery guidance, and before flying with
guidance, in the high altitude stall scenario (n = 20 for each of the three categories).
The most significant finding of the study was with respect to the high altitude
stall recovery, where we saw that aggressive pitch down guidance had a positive
effect on reducing the number of secondary aerodynamic stalls in the recoveries
flown by the participants. Figure 38 shows that the participants were able, as a
group, to improve their performance across multiple runs without any guidance,
and by the third attempt, to eliminate all occurrences of secondary aerodynamic
stall. However, even after three attempts without guidance, there were still more
secondary stall warnings, and there was significantly less margin to the full stall
angle of attack during the recovery (compare Figure 16) than there was when the
guidance system was on.
The other salient learning consideration, is of course whether the pilots flying
recoveries after having flown 3 recoveries with guidance, improved their performance
at recoveries without guidance in the high altitude stall scenario. The data reveals
the trend shown in Figure 39. The purple traces in the plot show the third (most
practiced) run without guidance, before having flown with FMPC guidance (these
are in correspondence with half of the purple runs shown in the previous Figure
38). The blue traces show the most practiced run with the FMPC guidance. The
orange traces show the first run without guidance, just after having flown three
FMPC guidance runs. The plot shows, that some learning occurred after flying
with the guidance, since the orange runs loosely split the difference between the
practiced recoveries with and without guidance. Also, in all three of the cases shown,
there were no secondary aerodynamic stall occurrences. However, when flying with
guidance, there were no secondary stall warnings, and there was more margin in
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angle-of-attack.
The results from the previous two paragraphs show that the guidance still pro-
vided a benefit, even after pilots had practiced three runs without guidance. Fur-
thermore, this supports the conclusion that an instructor and/or guidance system
may be necessary to improve the robustness of piloted stall recoveries at high al-
titude, an important aspect, considering unlucky pilots do not get multiple stall
recovery attempts.
Figure 39. Learning before and after having flown with guidance in the high altitude
stall scenario (n = 10 for each of the three categories).
The low altitude scenario with excessive nose-up trim, was the other non-standard
recovery where learning may have occurred. Here, the thrust guidance strategy in
particular, was intended to help pilots limit their initial thrust input in an excessive
nose-up trim condition. Figure 40 shows that this was indeed the case. The plot
reveals that the pilots (as a group) put more thrust into the system with excessive
nose-up trim on their third, most practiced, recovery before seeing the guidance
strategy. This result does not necessarily demonstrate any inappropriate or unsafe
use of thrust (with or without guidance). It does, however, display a trend towards
confirming the hypothesis that the pilots internalized the guidance strategy and ap-
plied a more cautious use of thrust on their first run without guidance, after having
flown 3 runs with the thrust guidance system.
7.3 Survey Results
The experiment protocol required each participant to complete 10 surveys: one
before starting the simulation, one after completing each set of 3 runs for a particular
scenario (either with or without guidance for a total of 8 surveys), and one after
completing all the runs. The full surveys are reproduced in appendix D. The key
results from these surveys are collected in this section.
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Figure 40. Learning before and after having flown with guidance in the low altitude
excessive nose-up trim scenario. The histogram was compiled from the time traces
for 20 runs in each of the two categories.
7.3.1 System Usability Scores
The standard System Usability Scale (SUS) was designed in 1996 to be a quick and
easy survey for a global assessment of a given system’s usability [57]. In a SUS survey
participants are asked 5 positively charged, and 5 negatively charged questions, after
performing an initial evaluation of a given product or service. A composite score
on a scale of 0–100 is then produced from the 10 question responses, with higher
scores indicating better usability. After completing all the simulation runs, each
participant was asked to complete a post-simulation questionnaire that included a
modified System Usability Scale survey. The survey was modified slightly to make
some of the questions more relevant for the evaluation of a stall recovery system,
which is typical in the use of SUS surveys for different applications [58, §2.1]. The
specific questions used in our SUS survey are listed on page 109 in Appendix D.3. In
2008, Bangor et. al. analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys from 206 different studies, spanning
multiple user interfaces (e.g., cellular phone, graphical, and web based), and found
a median score of 69.69 with a standard deviation of 11.87 [58].
Of the 40 pilots who participated in our study, two did not complete the SUS
survey (inadvertently, we think). Figure 41 shows the histogram of the composite
SUS rating for the remaining 38 participants. One pilot in the pool gave an outlier
rating of 42, which indicates an indifference with respect to the usability of the
system. In his written feedback, he indicated that the roll and throttle guidance
strategies caused confusion, and may require additional pilot training to improve
acceptance. Still, the mean usability rating was 81.8 (including the outlier case),
which is comparable to the A rating assessment given to other aircraft situation
awareness systems studied in [59]. With the given sample size, no significant dif-
ference was detected between the SUS scores across the two guidance algorithms
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studied in the experiment.
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Figure 41. Histogram of the overall System Usability Scores.
7.3.2 Cooper-Harper Ratings
The Cooper-Harper rating scale, shown in Figure 42, is a standard set of subjective
criteria for evaluating aircraft handling qualities, primarily for use by trained test
pilots and flight test engineers [60, 61]. Each of the 10 research pilots who partici-
pated in the study were asked to provide a Cooper-Harper rating on the post run
survey. This survey was completed after flying each set of 3 runs for a particular
scenario. When flying a run without guidance, the pilots provided their rating based
on the task workload, and corresponding aircraft handling quality for the scenario
at hand. When the guidance was on, the tracking performance standards were used
as the basis for the rating. The scenario specific tracking standards were listed in
Section 4.
The pilots were also asked to rate the thrust and pitch guidance systems sepa-
rately because these systems were developed to meet separate objectives.32 The fact
that the thrust guidance cue was completely new, while the pitch guidance cue was
already part of the standard flight director system, was also a factor in the decision
to use separate ratings for the pitch and thrust guidance systems.
The overall Cooper-Harper ratings for all the scenarios and guidance algorithms
are presented in Figure 43. The bulk of the ratings occur between 2 and 5, indicating
a representative result that splits the system performance between the best “satis-
factory without improvement” rating category, and the next “deficiencies warrant
improvement” rating category. Overall, this result aligned well with the positive
subjective feedback provided by most of the participants, along with the construc-
tive suggestions for improving minor aspects of the system (see Section 8) — with
opinions split between whether making those improvements should be required be-
fore putting the system into operational practice.
The overall ratings, however, blend together the individual ratings for each of
the stall recovery scenarios. Since each scenario focused on testing different aspects
32The thrust guidance technology objective was to minimize altitude loss without exceeding the
elevator authority to pitch down. The pitch guidance objective was to recover a target aircraft state
without exceeding load factors or angle-of-attack limitations (assuming the current thrust setting).
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Figure 42. Cooper-Harper rating scale.
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Figure 43. Overall Cooper-Harper ratings across all guidance algorithms and recov-
ery scenarios. Non-integer ratings were rounded to the nearest integer, and n = 40
for each of the three categories (no guidance, pitch, and thrust).
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Figure 44. Scenario specific Cooper-Harper ratings across all guidance algorithms.
Non-integer ratings were rounded to the nearest integer, and n = 10 for each of the
three categories (no guidance, pitch, and thrust).
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of the recovery guidance system, the scenario specific ratings shown in Figure 44 are
important. The findings for each scenario are summarized below:33
High Altitude Scenario: Nine out of ten pilots agreed that the thrust guidance
system rated “satisfactory without improvement,” mainly because the scenario sim-
ply required full thrust. The one worst outlier rating of 9 was given without further
comment. Six out of ten pilots rated the pitch guidance system the same way. The
two worst pitch guidance ratings came from pilots flying the EBA algorithm who
felt the “pitch guidance exacerbates PIO [Pilot Induced Oscillation] tendency,” and
was “difficult to track in the initial part of the recovery without overshooting into a
secondary stall.” The other poorer ratings were provided by pilots who didn’t quite
meet the tracking performance criteria, but felt the deficiency was negligible and
dependent on familiarity with the aircraft response.
Approach Scenario: A strong majority of the pilots (9 out of 10 and 8 out of
10 pilots) rated the thrust and pitch guidance systems as “satisfactory without
improvement.” The poorest throttle guidance rating came from a pilot that stated
difficulty following the pitch guidance at full thrust in the later half of the recovery
(but the initial pitch guidance was good). The poorest pitch guidance system score
came from a pilot who felt the EBA algorithm produced a fast pitch reversal at one
point during the recovery.
Low Altitude Scenario: This baseline scenario produced another strong majority
of ratings in the “satisfactory without improvement” category for both the pitch
and thrust guidance systems. The poorest pitch guidance score came from a pilot
who felt he had a “tendency to over control during the later stages of the recovery.”
Low Altitude with Excessive Nose-Up Trim Scenario: This high-workload
scenario easily produced the most variation in the ratings provided by the pilots,
the majority of which fell into the “Deficiencies Warrant Improvement” category.
The pilot who provided the poorest thrust guidance rating commented that scale
information would have been nice to have (e.g., an indicator for the range from idle
to maximum available thrust) — and he was not the only participant to make this
comment even though the thrust guidance was always the relative error between
the throttle position and where it needed to be (as opposed to the absolute er-
ror). Another issue that presented itself, was that the combined pitch and throttle
guidance competed for pilot attention, and in some cases pilots were burdened by
pressure to maintain fine tracking of the throttle guidance (even though that was
a consideration in the determination of the tracking metrics, and the design of the
display). Furthermore, we expected pilots would apply nose-down trim as a natural
reaction to forward column pressure. There was, however, a spectrum of comfort
level with forward column pressure and an associated dispersion in the application
of nose-down trim. Several pilots commented that it was not obvious when to apply
nose-down trim, and that an indicator to this effect would be beneficial.
Finally, Figure 45 shows the ratings break down between the FMPC and EBA
pitch guidance technologies. In general, the FMPC algorithm received higher, and
33The same research pilot provided at least one of the poorer ratings in each of the scenarios,
along with excellent constructive feedback.
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more tightly grouped ratings — perhaps with the exception of the excessive nose-up
trim scenario where both algorithms were rated about the same. The pitch guidance
ratings were tied to tracking performance metrics, and they are supported by the
generally observed tighter tracking errors for the FMPC algorithm observed in the
numerical data, see Figures 20, 25, 28, and 33.
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Figure 45. Cooper-Harper ratings breakout by scenario, for the EBA and FMPC
pitch guidance technologies. Non-integer ratings were rounded to the nearest integer,
n = 5 for each algorithm in each scenario.
7.3.3 Counter-Intuitive Aspects
After completing all 24 stall recovery runs, pilots were asked in the post simula-
tion survey whether they found any aspect of the guidance counter-intuitive, or in
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contradiction with their flight line training. A few more than half of them said yes
(22/40), but for a wide variety of reasons that exposed both areas for improvement,
and beneficial aspects of the system. For example, several pilots remarked that it
was counter-intuitive to pull power back on the recoveries where excess nose-up trim
was involved, or that the guidance commanded more pitch down in the high altitude
scenario than expected. These counter-intuitive aspects improved the stall recovery
performance, and this re-enforces the usefulness of the guidance. Several other pilots
commented on the nature of the high pitch angle commanded during the pull-up
phase of some recoveries, or that the roll director had too much gain and a surprise
tendency to level the wings only after pitching the nose of the aircraft below the
PLI. These are aspects that can certainly be improved. Another important comment
was that pilots are currently trained to ignore the flight director when recovering
from stall, so in some sense it was counter-intuitive to follow it in this experiment.
Finally, bear in mind, that just under half of the participants (18/40) did not feel
the guidance was counter-intuitive, or in contradiction with their training.
7.3.4 Learning from the Recovery Guidance
The post simulation survey also asked the participants whether they learned some-
thing from the stall recovery guidance that should be applied to stall recoveries
without recovery guidance. Their response was requested on a continuous scale
ranging from ‘Disagree’ to ‘Indifferent’ to ‘Agree,’ which was mapped to a numeri-
cal score from zero to one, with one representing full agreement. The histogram of
the responses from all 40 participants is shown in Figure 46. The pilots who tended
to disagree, noted that they felt adequately trained to fly the recoveries, or that
the PLI was an adequate tool. However, most of the pilots felt they had learned
something. For the excessive nose-up trim scenario, several noted that they became
more considerate of using less throttle input until the nose trim was corrected. Many
pilots learned from the high altitude scenario, commenting that it got them to be
more aggressive in the initial pitch down maneuver. The quantitative data shown
in Section 7.2.5 supports the pilot comments for these two scenarios. Interestingly,
there were no specific written comments made with regard to the approach and
basic low altitude scenarios, perhaps because these are considered more standard
training cases.
7.3.5 Workload and Usefulness
For each scenario, participants flew 3 stall recoveries both with and without guid-
ance. After flying each set of 3 recoveries, a post-run survey was completed that
asked for the mental demand and time pressure required to complete the recovery
on a scale from zero to one, where, 0, 0.5, and 1, represented low, average, and
high workload, respectively. For this experiment, the time pressure rating was very
closely correlated to the mental demand rating, so only the mental demand rating
is discussed here.
Figure 47 compares the mean workload rating across the pool of 40 pilots for
each of the recovery scenarios, flown with and without guidance. In three of the
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Figure 46. Histogram of response to whether something was learned from the stall
recovery guidance.
four scenarios, the guidance diminished the workload. Several pilots noted one
possible reason for the diminished workload was that the guidance focused their
attention to the center of the PFD. This is in contrast to recoveries flown without
guidance, which required splitting ones attention across the PFD to monitor the
airspeed and vertical speed during the recovery. For the low altitude scenario with
excessive nose-up trim, the guidance increased the average workload rating. Some
of the participants noted that the addition of having to manage trim while also
processing the thrust guidance cue (on top of the pitch and roll cues) contributed to
the increased difficulty in this scenario. Overall, though, the workload assessment for
each scenario was not significantly changed through the addition of the guidance.
This finding is significant, given the participants also found the guidance system
useful.
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Figure 47. Average mental demand by scenario, with and without guidance.
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Participants were also asked to rate the usefulness of the guidance, after flying
3 recovery runs with guidance for each scenario. The rating was provided on a
continuous scale from ‘Unnecessary’ to ‘Highly Useful,’ which was converted to a
percentage usefulness score from 0–100% useful. Each pilot rated the pitch, roll,
and throttle guidance sub-systems, in addition to the overall guidance system. The
usefulness breakdown across the pool of 40 pilots is shown by scenario in Figure 48.
A strong majority of pilots rated the system at least ‘Somewhat Useful’ (50%), with
more than half of the ratings towards the ‘Highly Useful’ category. Lower usefulness
ratings for thrust and roll guidance, were often provided by pilots who observed
that the associated indicators were not necessary to complete the recovery task. For
example, the high altitude and approach scenarios did not involve roll at the stall
onset (which was somewhat unrealistic), and the throttle guidance always indicated
full thrust. Other lower ratings occurred when a participant found the recovery
guidance strategy counter-intuitive. For example, in the low altitude scenario, the
roll guidance would snap to level the wings only after the pitch attitude was reduced
below the PLI (and that was not a universally liked strategy). The lowest rating
for the pitch guidance came from a pilot who felt the EBA pitch guidance tended
to promote pilot induced oscillation, and a tendency for secondary stall. Overall
though, the system received significant positive feedback. For example, one pilot
thought the “pitch guidance will be very helpful [to optimize the] recovery,” and
another felt the system “works well to get us climbing at [reference] speed.”
8 Findings and Lessons Learned
In summary, a stall recovery guidance system was tested across 4 scenarios on 30
commercial pilots, and 10 research test pilots. In all cases the same split-cue flight
director was used to display pitch and roll guidance, while a new thrust director
was developed to provide thrust guidance. Two alternate intelligent algorithms were
tested for generating pitch recovery guidance from flight dynamics principles. As
such, each algorithm was tuned only once, before the experiment started, and it was
able to compute the guidance for all altitude and aircraft configurations. A thrust
guidance algorithm was developed to help prevent uncontrollable combinations of
thrust and excessive nose-up pitch stabilizer trim. A simple roll guidance algorithm
was also developed to level the aircraft wings only after arresting the aerodynamic
stall and the aircraft stall warning system — but roll guidance was not a focus
of this effort. The combined pitch, roll, and thrust guidance recovery system was
designed to be as simple and intuitive to use as possible, since operational use would
likely occur under excessive workload demands and adverse piloting conditions from
external sources. The system was also designed specifically to conform with the FAA
stall recovery template, for general large commercial transport class aircraft with
engines mounted below the wings. Below we itemize the specific findings and lessons
learned for each of the component subsystems for pitch, thrust, and roll guidance.
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Figure 48. Guidance usefulness rating by scenario.
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8.1 Pitch Guidance
Overall the pitch guidance system was quantitatively effective at improving the
safety of the recovery, and qualitatively well liked by the pilots. In the high altitude
stall scenario, the FMPC pitch guidance algorithm generated aggressive pitch down
commands that significantly reduced the likelihood of secondary aerodynamic stall
with very little training on the guidance system. The FMPC algorithm also received
better Cooper-Harper ratings, and produced a little less tracking error across all of
the scenarios than the EBA algorithm. Both algorithms, however, had comparable
performance in all of the remaining scenarios. In the approach and low altitude
scenarios, the pitch guidance often exceeded 20 degrees nose-up, especially if pilots
lagged the guidance in the pull-up phase of the recovery (which was typical). Many
pilots commented that this aspect of the guidance felt excessive. For the approach
scenario, however, several pilots exceeded the maximum flap airspeed during the
pull-up phase of the recovery at full thrust when flying without guidance. The
slightly more aggressive pitch up produced by the FMPC system seemed to help
pilots prevent the overspeed condition (but this result is not statistically significant).
8.2 Thrust Guidance
In the scenarios without excessive nose-up pitch, the thrust guidance immediately
commanded full thrust at the onset of the recovery, somewhat in contradiction
with the FAA stall recovery template. The contradiction, however, was intentional,
because, the guidance system can compute when maximum thrust will not create an
uncontrollable pitch-up moment, while pilots, on the other hand, can not perform
this calculation nearly as fast. Earlier application of thrust reduces the altitude
loss required by the recovery, and in the low altitude scenario pilots flying with
guidance were more consistent in their ability to recovery without losing excessive
altitude. In the approach scenario, however, there was less variability in altitude
loss because pilots likely felt they did not have time to be more cautious with the
application of thrust, and therefore, more consistently applied full thrust at the
onset of the maneuver. Overall, many pilots liked the throttle guidance system,
rating it relatively more useful in some cases than the pitch guidance.
The most interesting case for the thrust guidance was the low altitude stall with
excessive nose-up pitch trim scenario. This was the one scenario where the guidance
commanded idle thrust at the onset of the maneuver. The guidance was effective
at getting pilots to fight their instinct to push excessive thrust in combination with
excessive stabilizer trim. As a result they maintained more elevator margin to
saturation with guidance, though no pilot in the study experienced a sustained
elevator saturation with an uncontrollable pitch up moment. A consequence of
the additional thrust guidance element however, was an increase in the number of
secondary aerodynamic stalls over the case without guidance. The guidance also
increased the amount of time it took some pilots to recover, because it was not
always immediately obvious that the pitch trim state was connected to the throttle
guidance — even though this aspect was briefed at the beginning of the study. The
Cooper-Harper ratings were significantly more scattered for the thrust guidance
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system in this scenario, showing wide disagreement among the research pilots that
participated in the study. A common suggestion for improvement was to include
a mis-trim cue, and possibly an aural alert to better connect the thrust guidance
cue with the mis-trimmed stabilizer. In addition, the quantitative results suggest
that more aggressive pitch down guidance may be needed to help pilots prevent
secondary aerodynamic stalls while also processing the thrust guidance information.
More work is required to refine the thrust guidance system in these respects.
8.3 Roll Guidance
The roll guidance system was not a focal point for this study, but the underlying
strategy used to implement it was important. At the onset of the recovery, the
guidance commanded the roll angle at stall entry until the aircraft pitch angle was
reduced to below the PLI. When the pitch was reduced below the PLI, a roll to level
the aircraft wings was commanded. This approach was meant to reinforce the FAA
stall recovery template. Many pilots, however, commented that it was more natural
to fly the pitch and roll axes simultaneously, and that the employed strategy was
counter-intuitive, especially if a pilot successfully rolled towards wings level before
pitching the aircraft nose-down, since in that case the guidance would command an
increased bank angle. A better strategy might set the guidance command to follow
the current roll angle if it is moved towards wings level. Another artifact of the
roll guidance strategy, though one that is easily fixed, was that at times the roll
guidance appeared to jump towards wings level as the aircraft pitch crossed below
the PLI.
8.4 Training Relevance
Even though all participants in this study were trained to FAA standards current
at the time of the study, they were not trained ahead of time on the specific aircraft
model or the guidance system used in this study. The idea was to evaluate the
effectiveness and usability of the guidance technology with minimal requirements
on training (both with and without guidance). It was also meant to serve as a crude
approximation for having to use the system under high workload, fatigue, and some
elapsed time or poor retention from the last training session on stall recovery.
By not training the pilots to proficiency on the specific aircraft model ahead
of time, we designed the experiment to maximize the benefit we could show for
the guidance system (on pilots fully expecting to fly stall recoveries). An alternative
would have been to train each pilot to proficiency without the guidance system first,
and then to focus the analysis on determining any benefit added by the guidance.
This would be a minimum benefit analysis of sorts. For the participants in this
study, the results presented in the Learning Effects section 7.2.5 show what we might
expected from this analysis. Such results, however, may not reflect the minimum
benefit relative to pilots trained according to new stall recovery procedures that are
currently moving into effect.
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8.5 Other Remarks
The recovery guidance system implemented for this study did not automatically
abide even typical Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearances. In particular, high altitude
recoveries require more than 1,000 ft altitude loss to recover the aircraft. This can
potentially cause a loss of separation with other aircraft flying below. In the lower
altitude scenarios as well, carelessly following the guidance beyond the stall recovery
could quickly cause the aircraft to exceed its altitude clearance during climb-out
at full thrust. To resolve these issues, the guidance system could potentially be
integrated with ADS-B, TCAS, and ATC clearance restrictions.
8.6 Future Work
Overall the system was well liked by the participants. Several pilots acknowledged,
that while not perfect, the present system would have great benefit in today’s com-
mercial aircraft. While most of the areas for improvement were relatively minor
and easily remedied, the primary one pertains the increased likelihood of secondary
aerodynamic stall in the excessive nose-up trim scenario while the thrust guidance
system commands idle thrust. In this one scenario, it seemed that the guidance
system improved the elevator safety margin to uncontrolled nose-up pitch, while
sacrificing some safety margin with respect to angle-of-attack. This is not an ac-
ceptable tradeoff, and the issue should be resolved so that there is a net safety
benefit to the system in this scenario, just as there was for the other scenarios.
An important aspect of the study was also to baseline the recovery guidance
system, before looking at how the addition of more realistic complicating factors such
as distraction will affect it. This step was necessary in order to be able to identify
fundamental issues that are inherent to the guidance system, such as the undesirable
tradeoff between the elevator and angle-of-attack margins in the excessive nose-
up trim case just discussed. While the guidance system was designed to serve as
a support tool to help pilots recover from stall under high demands on mental
workload, its effectiveness in this regard was not directly measured in the study
reported here.
Furthermore, the guidance system in this study was designed specifically for large
transport class aircraft with jet engines mounted below the wings. The guidance
strategy would be different for aircraft with engines mounted either on the wings (as
is the case for some turbo-prop aircraft), or engines mounted at the tail end of the
aircraft. In particular, the thrust guidance strategy would be different, since there is
no longer a risk of creating an uncontrollable pitch-up moment. The roll and pitch
guidance strategies may also need to be more sophisticated for aircraft with T-tail
configurations. This is because for high angle-of-attack stall, the elevator can lie in
the wake of the wings, making it impossible to initially pitch the aircraft nose-down.
The current guidance system should be generalized to handle these other common
commercial transport aircraft types as well.
This study also did not consider the effect of angle-of-attack on engine response.
At high angle-of-attack, the flow at the compressor face becomes distorted and the
risk of compressor stall and engine flameout increases. Commanding full thrust
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before reducing the angle-of-attack may make the situation worse, and the risk is
even more significant for aircraft with aft-mounted engines. This is an important
consideration that can be incorporated into the thrust guidance. The simulation
model used in this study, however, did not include this effect.
Finally, the guidance system has so far been designed assuming valid sensor and
aircraft model information is available. Additional work is required to make the
system more sensor fault tolerant, especially with respect to the airspeed sensors.
This should be possible given that airspeed can be estimated from other information
available on-board the aircraft. For example, both the Global Positioning System
receiver, and the angle-of-attack sensors, can be used to infer airspeed (with some
uncertainty) when the pitot-static system has failed. In addition, the flight-dynamics
model estimation and assumptions do not need to be perfectly accurate to produce
useful guidance, and these can also be developed for robust operation under known
failure modes.
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Appendix A
Stick-Shaker and PLI Warning System
The stall warning airspeed VSW is defined in 14 CFR §1.2 as the speed at which
onset of natural or artificial stall warning occurs. For this study, a working definition
meant to satisfy the more specific requirements of 14 CFR §25.207 was employed.
With this definition, we are able to relate VSW to a stall warning angle-of-attack
αSW, and a corresponding value that defines the location of the Pitch Limit Indicator
(PLI).
First we define the stall reference angle-of-attack αSR, as the angle-of-attack
that first maximizes the underlying nonlinear lift curve CL(α) for the aircraft in
its current configuration. The value of αSR can be determined from representative
aerodynamic coefficient lookup tables, or by flying the particular maneuver defined
in 14 CFR §25.103, while measuring the load factor corrected lift coefficient.
With the value αSR that maximizes CL, and the load-factor defined as,
nLF =
L
W
=
ρSV 2CL(α)
2mg
, (A1)
we can solve for the stall reference speed VSR as a function of the load-factor (for
nLF ≥ 0)
VSR(nLF) =
√
2nLFmg
ρSCL(αSR)
× VCAS
VTAS
knots [CAS], (A2)
where the ratio VCAS/VTAS converts true airspeed to calibrated airspeed. With this
definition, VSR(1) is the level flight airspeed, in knots, that corresponds to αSR.
Finally, in accordance with 14 CFR §25.207, we chose to define
VSW(nLF) = max(1.05VSR(nLF), VSR(nLF) + 5) knots [CAS], (A3)
which has an explicit dependency on the load-factor, such that VSW increases when
the aircraft is “pulling g’s.”
For values of α < αSR, the lift and drag coefficients are approximated by
CD(α) = CD0 + CDαα+ CDα2α
2 (A4)
CL(α) = CL0 + CLαα, (A5)
where the aerodynamic derivatives CD0 , CDα , CDα2 , CL0 , and CLα are functions of
the aircraft configuration, i.e., flap and speed-brake settings, known ahead of time,
either through look-up tables or online system identification methods such as the
one developed in References [62] and [63]. The coefficient values obtained for the
GTM are listed in Table B1 below.
The stall warning angle-of-attack αSW, is found by evaluating VSW(nLF) at nLF =
1, and using (A5) and (A1) to obtain
αSW =
2mg
ρSCLα [VSW(1)× VTAS/VCAS]2
− CL0
CLα
. (A6)
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The use of (A5) is warranted, because the lift curve should be linear in the neigh-
borhood of αSW to a good degree of approximation. Furthermore, by using nˆLF =
max(nLF, 1), the pair VSW(nˆLF) and αSW , can be used to drive the stall warning indi-
cator (stick-shaker), and Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI), such that θPLI−θ = αSW−α,
on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). From 14 CFR §25.125, one also obtains the
definition of the (minimum) landing reference speed VREF = 1.23VSR(1) in knots
CAS. While VREF is typically defined for landing configuration, for the purpose of
this experiment, it was computed for the current aircraft configuration, and was
present on the airspeed tape for all scenarios, including non-landing scenarios.
For this experiment, the minimum maneuvering airspeed (top of the amber band
shown in Figure 8) was set to correspond to a 1.15 g maneuver capability to stall
warning, i.e., at VSW(1.15). When flying at this airspeed, the stall warning would
trigger if the aircraft attempted a level turn at 30 degrees bank.
97
Appendix B
GTM Model Approximation
The stall warning and recovery guidance systems require only an approximation
for the flight dynamics in the nominal flight regime. For the GTM model this
corresponds to α ≤ αSR = 16 deg. Within this regime, suitable approximations for
the non-dimensional drag and lift coefficients are
CD(α) = CD0 + CDαα+ CDα2α
2 + CDδsp δsp+
CDδfl δfl + CDδlg δlg + CDαδflα δfl (B1)
CL(α) = CL0 + CLαα+ CLδsp δsp + CLδfl δfl + CLδlg δlg (B2)
where δsp is the spoiler deflection, δfl is the flap deflection, and δlg ∈ [0, 1] is the gear
setting. The equation for Cm is
Cm = C0 + Cmδe δe + Cmδ2e
δ2e + CmT
T
q¯d2eng
, (B3)
where,
C0(α, q, ih, δsp, δfl, δlg) = Cm0 + Cmαα+ Cmα2α
2 + Cmq
qc¯
V
+
Cmih ih + Cmδsp δsp + Cmδfl δfl + Cmδlg δlg.
In this equation, ih is stabilizer position, δsp is the spoiler position, δfl is the flap
position, δlg is the gear position, c¯ is the mean aerodynamic chord, deng is the engine
diameter, and q¯ = (1/2)ρV 2 is the dynamic pressure.
Equations (A4) and (A5), follow from (B1) and (B2) by fixing the associated
terms for the aircraft configuration, i.e., values for δsp, δfl, and δlg. Representative
values for the required derivatives are presented in Table B1. Typical values used in
the experiment were: aircraft mass m = 83,806 kg (approximately landing weight),
wing surface area S = 181.25 m2, mean aerodynamic chord c¯ = 5.072 m, engine
diameter deng = 2.146 m, and the air density ρ varied with altitude according to the
1976 U.S. Standard Atmosphere [64].
98
Table B1. Approximate GTM Aerodynamic Coefficients (α ≤ 16 deg.)
CD0 CDα CDα2 CDδsp CDδfl CDδlg CDαδfl
0.02 -0.086 2.7 -0.011 0.13 0.037 0.81
CL0 CLα CLδsp CLδfl CLδlg
0.11 4.6 0.88 1.5 -0.027
Cm0 Cmα Cmα2 Cmq Cmδe Cmδ2e
Cmih CmT Cmδsp Cmδfl Cmδlg
0.33 -3.2 6.0 -15 -1.7 -0.54 -3.3 0.0082 -0.12 -0.35 0.013
Table B2. GTM Engines Maximum Thrust (lbf)
CAS (knots)
Alt. (feet) 0 210 250 300 350
10 87260.6172 65623.6954 62191.75 59206.125 57001.3008
1,000 85581.0078 64686.9102 61308.0234 58519.293 56329.2226
5,000 79461.375 60337.3476 57377.8594 55300.9102 53393.5118
10,000 69371.8672 52469.1954 50374.461 48508.6992 46988.3164
12,000 64113.3946 49660.1602 47730.7812 45903.082 44620.1562
20,000 46226.211 36214.6562 34736.3046 33533.2226 32676.4218
25,000 37289.2578 27598.246 26609.9922 25825.1524 25124.7872
30,000 29814.8536 23585.7598 22887.8652 22169.707 21617.211
35,000 23609.0918 19129.07812 19575.1836 18977.72852 18736.76758
39,000 19481.1543 16033.1836 16123.85352 15584.70898 2564.39136
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Appendix C
Alternative Guidance Displays Considered
In our review of candidate recovery guidance display cues, we developed and
performed preliminary testing on several approaches. Two of these alternatives are
presented in Figure C.
Figure C.1(a) shows a standard flight-path symbol based guidance director. The
guidance objective in this case is to center the white flight path symbol on the ma-
genta circle. The location of the white, right-pointing acceleration caret indicates
the current longitudinal acceleration. The location of the magenta caret indicates
the desired acceleration. The flight path guidance in the figure is requesting addi-
tional bank to the right and reduced acceleration, which can be accommodated by
reducing thrust. This approach is more consistent with guidance indicators typi-
cally presented on the Heads Up Display (HUD). If guidance is shown on the HUD,
consistency (and FAA regulation) would dictate that the same guidance be shown
on the heads down displays as well. This approach is perhaps more forward look-
ing, and readily incorporated into new flight deck designs that include HUDs and
synthetic vision, such as the acceleration caret and speed error symbol used on the
Rockwell Collins HGS-3500 [65]. The guidance is also more compact and centrally
located. The drawback is the fine level of detail required to include thrust guidance,
possibly requiring the inclusion of yet another small display component built onto
the flight path symbol. The main reason this approach was not selected for this
experiment, however, was because fewer line pilots would have been familiar with it,
and a primary objective of the experiment was to develop and test a concept that
would require the least amount of additional training.
Figure C.1(b) shows an alternative thrust guidance indicator, along the left
edge of the ADI. This thrust guidance symbology was a modified version of the
display presented in the joint work of NASA Langley Research Center and Barron
Associates [17, 18]. With this concept, the current thrust is shown by the white,
left-pointing triangle, while the recommended thrust is shown by the magenta, right-
pointing triangle. The red band on top of the magenta triangle indicates a restriction
due to an excessive nose-up stab trim condition. The benefit of this approach, is
that the guidance includes the context of the full throttle range. This is in contrast
with the relative thrust director that was actually used in the experiment. The
drawback is that it is a new, somewhat detailed, indicator placed off to the side of
the pilot’s focus. During initial exploratory testing with multiple research pilots, this
display was almost completely ignored; a detriment that is perhaps surmountable
with additional training.
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(a) Flight path director cues, with acceleration
guidance caret.
(b) Alternative thrust guidance indicator cue.
Figure C1. Alternative guidance cues.
Appendix D
Pilot Surveys
The participants in the study provided their subjective feedback on three survey
forms. The pre-sim survey was completed as part of the initial pilot briefing. The
post-run surveys, were completed after each set of 3 runs, one with and one without
guidance for each scenario (so each pilot completed a total of 8 post-run surveys).
For the research pilots only, a Cooper-Harper rating was requested on each of the
post-run surveys. For the runs with guidance, the Cooper-Harper rating was based
on the tracking standards for each of the scenarios (defined in Section 4). For the
runs without guidance, the Cooper-Harper rating was based on the task workload
for the scenario alone. Finally, the post-sim survey was completed as part of the
debrief meeting that concluded each session. The questionnaire for each survey is
reproduced below. The mean participant response and sample standard deviation
are also printed next to each question, when appropriate. Since the main body of this
report focused more on the constructive critical comments, here we have included
some of the more positively charged (or interesting) written comments that the pilots
provided. In these comments, the following abbreviations for the scenarios were
used: High Altitude Stall (HAS), Approach Stall (APS), Low Altitude Stall (LAS),
Low Altitude Nose Up Stall (LANUS). [Notes or other comments not shown to
the participants are enclosed in brackets like this].
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D.1 Pre-sim questionnaire
1. Are you familiar with the FAA stall recovery guidelines? [35/40 pilots said
yes.]  Yes  No
2. Are you a trainer? (CFI or other) [19/40 pilots said yes.]
 Yes  No
3. Have you experienced any stick shakers (or stalls) before, besides simulator
training? [26/40 pilots said yes.]
 Yes  No
If yes, please explain context:
[During flight instruction was the most common reason.]
[Research Pilot Comment: “Lear 25 to shaker as part of stall system calibration.”]
[Research Pilot Comment: “I’ve conducted straight and level stalls in a U-2 aircraft.”]
[Research Pilot Comment: “C17 development testing.”]
[Research Pilot Comment: “As a Boeing production test pilot, checked stick shaker
speeds on new aircraft.”]
4. Have you experienced any stalls as part of simulator training?
[36/40 pilots said yes.]
 Yes  No
If yes, please explain context:
5. What is your flying background?
 transport category (part 25)
[35/40]
 general aviation (part 23)
 normal [25/40]
 utility [11/40]
 acrobatic [12/40]
 commuter [7/40]
 military [19/40]
 other:
 other:
 other:
6. Number of flight hours: [13,855 ± 6,933]
7. Aircraft types flown:
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D.2 Post-run questionnaire
For the stall recovery task you just flew:
1. Were you, at any point during this run, confused about what the stall
recovery guidance signals were doing?
 Yes  No
If yes, please explain:
2. Please rate the following:
• Level of mental demand (mental and perceptual activity):
Low HighAverage
• Level of time pressure (pace):
Low HighAverage
3. If applicable, please rate the usefulness of the:
• Pitch guidance:
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
• Roll guidance:
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
• Throttle guidance:
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
• Guidance system, with all indicators working together:
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
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4. Summary – Good/Bad Features?
[Pilot Comment: [LANUS] “Very useful! Especially the throttle guidance.”]
[Pilot Comment: [APS] “Good if after a long flight and not aware of the situation.”]
5. Did anything happen in this run that we should know about? Do you
have any comments or remarks to share?
[Pilot Comment: [APS] “Guidance makes it easier to recover.”]
6. Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale
• No guidance (task workload only):
1 1092 3 4 5 6 7 8
• Pitch guidance:
1 1092 3 4 5 6 7 8
• Throttle guidance:
1 1092 3 4 5 6 7 8
• Please explain your Cooper-Harper Rating here, more detail is es-
pecially appreciated for higher ratings.
[Note: Question 6 was not shown to the commercial pilots.]
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D.3 Post-sim questionnaire
Considering all of the stall recovery tasks you flew today:
1. How would you grade the overall realism of the stall scenarios, given the
scope of this experiment? [0.80± .30]
Unreal ExcellentAcceptable
Comments or suggestions for improvement?
2. Did you find any aspect of the guidance counter-intuitive, or in contradic-
tion with your flight line training? [22/40 pilots found some aspect
of the system counter-intuitive]
 Yes  No
If yes, please explain:
3. Please rate the overall usefulness of the individual guidance signals:
• Pitch guidance: [0.84± .18]
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
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• Roll guidance: [0.69± .24]
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
• Throttle guidance: [0.69± .29]
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
4. Please put the following new indications in order from the most useful
for you at the top of the list to the least useful at the bottom:
 Pitch recovery guidance [1.25± .44]
 Roll recovery guidance [2.70± .52]
 Throttle guidance [2.0± .72]
Explain if you like:
[Pilot Comment: “All of them are just as useful. But it depends on the scenario. At
low altitude thrust was more useful than at high altitude. Therefore, I still believe
pitch is most useful, the other ones are very valuable as well.”]
5. Were the indicators as used on the PFD clear to you? [0.97± .34]
Very unclear Very clearIndifferent
Comments:
6. Was it clear to you when you were in recovery mode or not? [0.88± .17]
Very unclear Very clearIndifferent
Comments:
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7. Was it always clear what the guidance system was telling you to do?
[0.86± .12]
Very unclear Very clearIndifferent
Comments:
[Pilot Comment: “Yes it was. However, at times it put my brain in competing
priorities, i.e., when attempting to roll out, concentrating on throttle position made
me forget (for a bit) about trimming (nose down).”
8. Was the throttle guidance presented clearly? [0.81± .20]
Very unclear Very clearIndifferent
Do you have any suggestions to improve it?
9. How useful was the entire guidance system, with all guidance signals
working together? [0.85± .16]
Unnecessary Highly usefulSomewhat useful
Any suggestions for improving how the recovery guidance signals and
indicators work together?
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10. Overall, I felt the stall recovery guidance assisted me to refine my recovery
strategy. Agree or Disagree? [0.81± .22]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
Comments:
[Pilot Comment: “The guidance recovery system assisted me during recovery with
guidance. But just as importantly it provided training for what to do when I did not
have guidance.” ]
11. Overall, I learned something from the stall recovery guidance presented
today, which I should use in a stall recovery where guidance is not pro-
vided. Agree or Disagree? [0.73± .30]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
Comments:
[Pilot Comment: “Very much so!!!” ]
12. Is there any additional information that would have been helpful to sup-
port your piloting task? [10/40 Pilots thought additional information
would have been useful.]
 No.  Yes, namely:
[Pilot comment: “A good concept. Would be a great benefit in todays fleet.”]
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13. Please indicate your responses: [System Usability Score ]
• I think that I would like to use this system if I was in a stall situation.
[0.87± .20]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I found the system unnecessarily complex. [0.17± .20]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I thought the system was easy to use. [0.86± .13]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I think that pilots need an extensive briefing to be able to use this
system. [0.41± .30]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
[0.83± .17]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system. [0.12±
.15]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I would imagine that most pilots would use the system with very
little training. [0.78± .22]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I found the system very cumbersome to use. [0.13± .13]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I felt very confident using the system. [0.85± .18]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
• I needed a lot of training before I could get going with this system.
[0.18± .21]
Disagree AgreeIndifferent
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14. Summary – What is your overall impression of the system?
[Pilot Comment: “Very impressed. Easy to understand.”]
[Pilot Comment: “I think it would save lives.”]
[Pilot Comment: “Good for training for crews of various backgrounds. Would be
good in aircraft because stalls are not expected events.”]
[Pilot Comment: “The system is good if you do not know the basics for a stall recovery.
It is also good after or during a long flight when aircraft situational awareness is at a
low.”]
15. Is there anything else you think we should know? Events that you think
we should know about or comments you would like to make?
[Pilot Comment: “Pilots should be trained in basic recovery with the guidance system
as backup.”]
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Appendix E
Experiment Test Matrix
The full experiment test matrix is printed below in chronological order.
The abbreviations used are: Algorithm (Alg.), Scenario (Scn.), Sequence
(Seq.), Iteration (Itr.), Military (Mil.). The two algorithms under test were
the energy based algorithm (eba), and the fast model predictive control (fmpc)
algorithm. There were four scenarios: low altitude stall (las), high altitude stall
(has), approach stall (aps), and the low altitude with nose-up stall (lanus).
The sequence (Seq.) field indicates whether an algorithm, scenario, and
run combination was flown before or after providing guidance. FMPC and
EBA guidance are encoded as 1 and 2, respectively, and the sign is negative
if runs were flown beforehand without guidance for the particular scenario
involved. For example, a −2 indicates a run where no guidance (hence Alg.
none) was flown first, and was then followed by a sequence of EBA runs.
Day Alg. Scn. Pilot Run Seq Itr. Test Pilot Mil. Trained
01 none las 16 1 -2 1 yes yes
01 none las 16 2 -2 2 yes yes
01 none las 16 3 -2 3 yes yes
01 none las 16 4 -2 4 yes yes
01 eba las 16 5 -2 1 yes yes
01 eba las 16 6 -2 2 yes yes
01 eba las 16 7 -2 3 yes yes
01 eba las 16 8 -2 4 yes yes
01 eba has 16 9 2 1 yes yes
01 eba has 16 10 2 2 yes yes
01 eba has 16 11 2 3 yes yes
01 none has 16 12 2 1 yes yes
01 none has 16 13 2 2 yes yes
01 none has 16 14 2 3 yes yes
01 none lanus 16 15 -2 1 yes yes
01 none lanus 16 16 -2 2 yes yes
01 none lanus 16 17 -2 3 yes yes
01 eba lanus 16 18 -2 1 yes yes
01 eba lanus 16 19 -2 2 yes yes
01 eba lanus 16 20 -2 3 yes yes
01 eba lanus 16 21 -2 4 yes yes
01 eba aps 16 22 2 1 yes yes
01 eba aps 16 23 2 2 yes yes
01 eba aps 16 24 2 3 yes yes
01 none aps 16 25 2 1 yes yes
01 none aps 16 26 2 2 yes yes
01 none aps 16 27 2 3 yes yes
02 none las 15 28 -1 1 yes no
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Day Alg. Scn. Pilot Run Seq Itr. Test Pilot Mil. Trained
02 none las 15 29 -1 2 yes no
02 none las 15 30 -1 3 yes no
02 fmpc las 15 31 -1 1 yes no
02 fmpc las 15 32 -1 2 yes no
02 fmpc las 15 33 -1 3 yes no
02 fmpc has 15 34 1 1 yes no
02 fmpc has 15 35 1 2 yes no
02 fmpc has 15 36 1 3 yes no
02 none has 15 37 1 1 yes no
02 none has 15 38 1 2 yes no
02 none has 15 39 1 3 yes no
02 none lanus 15 40 -1 1 yes no
02 none lanus 15 41 -1 2 yes no
02 none lanus 15 42 -1 3 yes no
02 fmpc lanus 15 43 -1 1 yes no
02 fmpc lanus 15 44 -1 2 yes no
02 fmpc lanus 15 45 -1 3 yes no
02 fmpc aps 15 46 1 1 yes no
02 fmpc aps 15 47 1 2 yes no
02 fmpc aps 15 48 1 3 yes no
02 none aps 15 49 1 1 yes no
02 none aps 15 50 1 2 yes no
02 none aps 15 51 1 3 yes no
03 none las 18 52 0 1 no yes
03 none aps 18 53 -2 1 no yes
03 none aps 18 54 -2 2 no yes
03 none aps 18 55 -2 3 no yes
03 eba aps 18 56 -2 1 no yes
03 eba aps 18 57 -2 2 no yes
03 eba aps 18 58 -2 3 no yes
03 none las 17 59 0 1 no no
03 none aps 17 60 -1 1 no no
03 none aps 17 61 -1 2 no no
03 none aps 17 62 -1 3 no no
03 none aps 17 63 -1 4 no no
03 fmpc aps 17 64 -1 1 no no
03 fmpc aps 17 65 -1 2 no no
03 fmpc aps 17 66 -1 3 no no
03 eba has 18 67 2 1 no yes
03 eba has 18 68 2 2 no yes
03 eba has 18 69 2 3 no yes
03 none has 18 70 2 1 no yes
03 none has 18 71 2 2 no yes
03 none has 18 72 2 3 no yes
03 none las 18 73 -2 1 no yes
03 none las 18 74 -2 2 no yes
03 none las 18 75 -2 3 no yes
03 eba las 18 76 -2 1 no yes
03 eba las 18 77 -2 2 no yes
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Day Alg. Scn. Pilot Run Seq Itr. Test Pilot Mil. Trained
03 eba las 18 78 -2 3 no yes
03 fmpc has 17 79 1 1 no no
03 fmpc has 17 80 1 2 no no
03 fmpc has 17 81 1 3 no no
03 none has 17 82 1 1 no no
03 none has 17 83 1 2 no no
03 none has 17 84 1 3 no no
03 none las 17 85 -1 1 no no
03 none las 17 86 -1 2 no no
03 none las 17 87 -1 3 no no
03 fmpc las 17 88 -1 1 no no
03 fmpc las 17 89 -1 2 no no
03 fmpc las 17 90 -1 3 no no
03 eba lanus 18 91 2 1 no yes
03 eba lanus 18 92 2 2 no yes
03 eba lanus 18 93 2 3 no yes
03 none lanus 18 94 2 1 no yes
03 none lanus 18 95 2 2 no yes
03 none lanus 18 96 2 3 no yes
03 fmpc lanus 17 97 1 1 no no
03 fmpc lanus 17 98 1 2 no no
03 fmpc lanus 17 99 1 3 no no
03 fmpc lanus 17 100 1 4 no no
03 none lanus 17 101 1 1 no no
03 none lanus 17 102 1 2 no no
03 none lanus 17 103 1 3 no no
04 none las 19 104 0 1 no no
04 eba has 19 105 2 1 no no
04 eba has 19 106 2 2 no no
04 eba has 19 107 2 3 no no
04 none has 19 108 2 1 no no
04 none has 19 109 2 2 no no
04 none has 19 110 2 3 no no
04 none lanus 19 111 -2 1 no no
04 none lanus 19 112 -2 2 no no
04 none lanus 19 113 -2 3 no no
04 eba lanus 19 114 -2 1 no no
04 eba lanus 19 115 -2 2 no no
04 eba lanus 19 116 -2 3 no no
04 eba aps 19 117 2 1 no no
04 eba aps 19 118 2 2 no no
04 eba aps 19 119 2 3 no no
04 none aps 19 120 2 1 no no
04 none aps 19 121 2 2 no no
04 none aps 19 122 2 3 no no
04 none las 19 123 -2 1 no no
04 none las 19 124 -2 2 no no
04 none las 19 125 -2 3 no no
04 eba las 19 126 -2 1 no no
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Day Alg. Scn. Pilot Run Seq Itr. Test Pilot Mil. Trained
04 eba las 19 127 -2 2 no no
04 eba las 19 128 -2 3 no no
05 none las 21 129 0 1 no no
05 eba aps 21 130 2 1 no no
05 eba aps 21 131 2 2 no no
05 eba aps 21 132 2 3 no no
05 none aps 21 133 2 1 no no
05 none aps 21 134 2 2 no no
05 none aps 21 135 2 3 no no
05 none las 20 136 0 1 no no
05 fmpc aps 20 137 1 1 no no
05 fmpc aps 20 138 1 2 no no
05 fmpc aps 20 139 1 3 no no
05 fmpc aps 20 140 1 4 no no
05 none aps 20 141 1 1 no no
05 none aps 20 142 1 2 no no
05 none aps 20 143 1 3 no no
05 none has 21 144 -2 1 no no
05 none has 21 145 -2 2 no no
05 none has 21 146 -2 3 no no
05 eba has 21 147 -2 1 no no
05 eba has 21 148 -2 2 no no
05 eba has 21 149 -2 3 no no
05 eba las 21 150 2 1 no no
05 eba las 21 151 2 2 no no
05 eba las 21 152 2 3 no no
05 none las 21 153 2 1 no no
05 none las 21 154 2 2 no no
05 none las 21 155 2 3 no no
05 none has 20 156 -1 1 no no
05 none has 20 157 -1 2 no no
05 none has 20 158 -1 3 no no
05 fmpc has 20 159 -1 1 no no
05 fmpc has 20 160 -1 2 no no
05 fmpc has 20 161 -1 3 no no
05 fmpc las 20 162 1 1 no no
05 fmpc las 20 163 1 2 no no
05 fmpc las 20 164 1 3 no no
05 none las 20 165 1 1 no no
05 none las 20 166 1 2 no no
05 none las 20 167 1 3 no no
05 none lanus 21 168 -2 1 no no
05 none lanus 21 169 -2 2 no no
05 none lanus 21 170 -2 3 no no
05 eba lanus 21 171 -2 1 no no
05 eba lanus 21 172 -2 2 no no
05 eba lanus 21 173 -2 3 no no
05 none lanus 20 174 -1 1 no no
05 none lanus 20 175 -1 2 no no
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Day Alg. Scn. Pilot Run Seq Itr. Test Pilot Mil. Trained
05 none lanus 20 176 -1 3 no no
05 fmpc lanus 20 177 -1 1 no no
05 fmpc lanus 20 178 -1 2 no no
05 fmpc lanus 20 179 -1 3 no no
06 eba las 23 181 2 1 yes yes
06 eba las 23 182 2 2 yes yes
06 eba las 23 183 2 3 yes yes
06 none las 23 184 2 1 yes yes
06 none las 23 185 2 2 yes yes
06 none las 23 186 2 3 yes yes
06 none has 23 187 -2 1 yes yes
06 none has 23 188 -2 2 yes yes
06 none has 23 189 -2 3 yes yes
06 eba has 23 190 -2 1 yes yes
06 eba has 23 191 -2 2 yes yes
06 eba has 23 192 -2 3 yes yes
06 fmpc las 22 194 1 1 yes yes
06 fmpc las 22 195 1 2 yes yes
06 fmpc las 22 196 1 3 yes yes
06 none las 22 197 1 1 yes yes
06 none las 22 198 1 2 yes yes
06 none las 22 199 1 3 yes yes
06 none has 22 200 -1 1 yes yes
06 none has 22 201 -1 2 yes yes
06 none has 22 202 -1 3 yes yes
06 fmpc has 22 203 -1 1 yes yes
06 fmpc has 22 204 -1 2 yes yes
06 fmpc has 22 205 -1 3 yes yes
06 eba lanus 23 206 2 1 yes yes
06 eba lanus 23 207 2 2 yes yes
06 eba lanus 23 208 2 3 yes yes
06 none lanus 23 209 2 1 yes yes
06 none lanus 23 210 2 2 yes yes
06 none lanus 23 211 2 3 yes yes
06 none aps 23 212 -2 1 yes yes
06 none aps 23 213 -2 2 yes yes
06 none aps 23 214 -2 3 yes yes
06 eba aps 23 215 -2 1 yes yes
06 eba aps 23 216 -2 2 yes yes
06 eba aps 23 217 -2 3 yes yes
06 fmpc lanus 22 218 1 1 yes yes
06 fmpc lanus 22 219 1 2 yes yes
06 fmpc lanus 22 220 1 3 yes yes
06 none lanus 22 221 1 1 yes yes
06 none lanus 22 222 1 2 yes yes
06 none lanus 22 223 1 3 yes yes
06 none aps 22 224 -1 1 yes yes
06 none aps 22 225 -1 2 yes yes
06 none aps 22 226 -1 3 yes yes
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06 fmpc aps 22 227 -1 1 yes yes
06 fmpc aps 22 228 -1 2 yes yes
06 fmpc aps 22 229 -1 3 yes yes
07 none has 24 231 -1 1 no no
07 none has 24 232 -1 2 no no
07 none has 24 233 -1 3 no no
07 fmpc has 24 234 -1 1 no no
07 fmpc has 24 235 -1 2 no no
07 fmpc has 24 236 -1 3 no no
07 fmpc lanus 24 237 1 1 no no
07 fmpc lanus 24 238 1 2 no no
07 fmpc lanus 24 239 1 3 no no
07 none lanus 24 240 1 1 no no
07 none lanus 24 241 1 2 no no
07 none lanus 24 242 1 3 no no
07 none has 25 244 -2 1 no no
07 none has 25 245 -2 2 no no
07 none has 25 246 -2 3 no no
07 eba has 25 247 -2 1 no no
07 eba has 25 248 -2 2 no no
07 eba has 25 249 -2 3 no no
07 eba lanus 25 250 2 1 no no
07 eba lanus 25 251 2 2 no no
07 eba lanus 25 252 2 3 no no
07 none lanus 25 253 2 1 no no
07 none lanus 25 254 2 2 no no
07 none lanus 25 255 2 3 no no
07 none aps 24 256 -1 1 no no
07 none aps 24 257 -1 2 no no
07 none aps 24 258 -1 3 no no
07 fmpc aps 24 259 -1 1 no no
07 fmpc aps 24 260 -1 2 no no
07 fmpc aps 24 261 -1 3 no no
07 fmpc las 24 262 1 1 no no
07 fmpc las 24 263 1 2 no no
07 fmpc las 24 264 1 3 no no
07 none las 24 265 1 1 no no
07 none las 24 266 1 2 no no
07 none las 24 267 1 3 no no
07 none aps 25 268 -2 1 no no
07 none aps 25 269 -2 2 no no
07 none aps 25 270 -2 3 no no
07 none aps 25 271 -2 4 no no
07 eba aps 25 272 -2 1 no no
07 eba aps 25 273 -2 2 no no
07 eba aps 25 274 -2 3 no no
07 eba las 25 275 2 1 no no
07 eba las 25 276 2 2 no no
07 eba las 25 277 2 3 no no
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07 none las 25 278 2 1 no no
07 none las 25 279 2 2 no no
07 none las 25 280 2 3 no no
08 none las 27 282 -1 1 no yes
08 none las 27 283 -1 2 no yes
08 none las 27 284 -1 3 no yes
08 fmpc las 27 285 -1 1 no yes
08 fmpc las 27 286 -1 2 no yes
08 fmpc las 27 287 -1 3 no yes
08 fmpc lanus 27 288 1 1 no yes
08 fmpc lanus 27 289 1 2 no yes
08 fmpc lanus 27 290 1 3 no yes
08 none lanus 27 291 1 1 no yes
08 none lanus 27 292 1 2 no yes
08 none lanus 27 293 1 3 no yes
08 none lanus 27 294 1 4 no yes
08 none lanus 27 295 1 5 no yes
08 none las 26 297 -2 1 no yes
08 none las 26 298 -2 2 no yes
08 none las 26 299 -2 3 no yes
08 eba las 26 300 -2 1 no yes
08 eba las 26 301 -2 2 no yes
08 eba las 26 302 -2 3 no yes
08 eba lanus 26 303 2 1 no yes
08 eba lanus 26 304 2 2 no yes
08 eba lanus 26 305 2 3 no yes
08 none lanus 26 306 2 1 no yes
08 none lanus 26 307 2 2 no yes
08 none lanus 26 308 2 3 no yes
08 none aps 27 309 -1 1 no yes
08 none aps 27 310 -1 2 no yes
08 none aps 27 311 -1 3 no yes
08 fmpc aps 27 312 -1 1 no yes
08 fmpc aps 27 313 -1 2 no yes
08 fmpc aps 27 314 -1 3 no yes
08 fmpc has 27 315 1 1 no yes
08 fmpc has 27 316 1 2 no yes
08 fmpc has 27 317 1 3 no yes
08 none has 27 318 1 1 no yes
08 none has 27 319 1 2 no yes
08 none has 27 320 1 3 no yes
08 none aps 26 321 -2 1 no yes
08 none aps 26 322 -2 2 no yes
08 none aps 26 323 -2 3 no yes
08 eba aps 26 324 -2 1 no yes
08 eba aps 26 325 -2 2 no yes
08 eba aps 26 326 -2 3 no yes
08 eba has 26 327 2 1 no yes
08 eba has 26 328 2 2 no yes
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08 eba has 26 329 2 3 no yes
08 none has 26 330 2 1 no yes
08 none has 26 331 2 2 no yes
08 none has 26 332 2 3 no yes
09 fmpc has 28 334 1 1 no no
09 fmpc has 28 335 1 2 no no
09 fmpc has 28 336 1 3 no no
09 none has 28 337 1 1 no no
09 none has 28 338 1 2 no no
09 none has 28 339 1 3 no no
09 none lanus 28 340 -1 1 no no
09 none lanus 28 341 -1 2 no no
09 none lanus 28 342 -1 3 no no
09 fmpc lanus 28 343 -1 1 no no
09 fmpc lanus 28 344 -1 2 no no
09 fmpc lanus 28 345 -1 3 no no
09 fmpc aps 28 346 1 1 no no
09 fmpc aps 28 347 1 2 no no
09 fmpc aps 28 348 1 3 no no
09 none aps 28 349 1 1 no no
09 none aps 28 350 1 2 no no
09 none aps 28 351 1 3 no no
09 none las 28 352 -1 1 no no
09 none las 28 353 -1 2 no no
09 none las 28 354 -1 3 no no
09 fmpc las 28 355 -1 1 no no
09 fmpc las 28 356 -1 2 no no
09 fmpc las 28 357 -1 3 no no
10 fmpc aps 10 359 1 1 yes yes
10 fmpc aps 10 360 1 2 yes yes
10 fmpc aps 10 361 1 3 yes yes
10 none aps 10 362 1 1 yes yes
10 none aps 10 363 1 2 yes yes
10 none aps 10 364 1 3 yes yes
10 none has 10 365 -1 1 yes yes
10 none has 10 366 -1 2 yes yes
10 none has 10 367 -1 3 yes yes
10 fmpc has 10 368 -1 1 yes yes
10 fmpc has 10 369 -1 2 yes yes
10 fmpc has 10 370 -1 3 yes yes
10 eba aps 30 372 2 1 yes yes
10 eba aps 30 373 2 2 yes yes
10 eba aps 30 374 2 3 yes yes
10 none aps 30 375 2 1 yes yes
10 none aps 30 376 2 2 yes yes
10 none aps 30 377 2 3 yes yes
10 none has 30 378 -2 1 yes yes
10 none has 30 379 -2 2 yes yes
10 none has 30 380 -2 3 yes yes
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10 eba has 30 381 -2 1 yes yes
10 eba has 30 382 -2 2 yes yes
10 eba has 30 383 -2 3 yes yes
10 fmpc las 10 384 1 1 yes yes
10 fmpc las 10 385 1 2 yes yes
10 fmpc las 10 386 1 3 yes yes
10 none las 10 387 1 1 yes yes
10 none las 10 388 1 2 yes yes
10 none las 10 389 1 3 yes yes
10 none lanus 10 390 -1 1 yes yes
10 none lanus 10 391 -1 2 yes yes
10 none lanus 10 392 -1 3 yes yes
10 fmpc lanus 10 393 -1 1 yes yes
10 fmpc lanus 10 394 -1 2 yes yes
10 fmpc lanus 10 395 -1 3 yes yes
10 eba las 30 396 2 1 yes yes
10 eba las 30 397 2 2 yes yes
10 eba las 30 398 2 3 yes yes
10 none las 30 399 2 1 yes yes
10 none las 30 400 2 2 yes yes
10 none las 30 401 2 3 yes yes
10 none lanus 30 402 -2 1 yes yes
10 none lanus 30 403 -2 2 yes yes
10 none lanus 30 404 -2 3 yes yes
10 eba lanus 30 405 -2 1 yes yes
10 eba lanus 30 406 -2 2 yes yes
10 eba lanus 30 407 -2 3 yes yes
10 none lanus 30 408 0 1 yes yes
11 fmpc las 32 410 1 1 no yes
11 fmpc las 32 411 1 2 no yes
11 fmpc las 32 412 1 3 no yes
11 none las 32 413 1 1 no yes
11 none las 32 414 1 2 no yes
11 none las 32 415 1 3 no yes
11 none lanus 32 416 -1 1 no yes
11 none lanus 32 417 -1 2 no yes
11 none lanus 32 418 -1 3 no yes
11 fmpc lanus 32 419 -1 1 no yes
11 fmpc lanus 32 420 -1 2 no yes
11 fmpc lanus 32 421 -1 3 no yes
11 eba las 31 423 2 1 no no
11 eba las 31 424 2 2 no no
11 eba las 31 425 2 3 no no
11 none las 31 426 2 1 no no
11 none las 31 427 2 2 no no
11 none las 31 428 2 3 no no
11 none lanus 31 429 -2 1 no no
11 none lanus 31 430 -2 2 no no
11 none lanus 31 431 -2 3 no no
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11 eba lanus 31 432 -2 1 no no
11 eba lanus 31 433 -2 2 no no
11 eba lanus 31 434 -2 3 no no
11 eba aps 31 435 2 1 no no
11 eba aps 31 436 2 2 no no
11 eba aps 31 437 2 3 no no
11 none aps 31 438 2 1 no no
11 none aps 31 439 2 2 no no
11 none aps 31 440 2 3 no no
11 none has 31 441 -2 1 no no
11 none has 31 442 -2 2 no no
11 none has 31 443 -2 3 no no
11 eba has 31 444 -2 1 no no
11 eba has 31 445 -2 2 no no
11 eba has 31 446 -2 3 no no
11 eba has 31 447 -2 4 no no
11 fmpc aps 32 448 1 1 no yes
11 fmpc aps 32 449 1 2 no yes
11 fmpc aps 32 450 1 3 no yes
11 none aps 32 451 1 1 no yes
11 none aps 32 452 1 2 no yes
11 none aps 32 453 1 3 no yes
11 none has 32 454 -1 1 no yes
11 none has 32 455 -1 2 no yes
11 none has 32 456 -1 3 no yes
11 fmpc has 32 457 -1 1 no yes
11 fmpc has 32 458 -1 2 no yes
11 fmpc has 32 459 -1 3 no yes
12 eba lanus 33 461 2 1 no yes
12 eba lanus 33 462 2 2 no yes
12 eba lanus 33 463 2 3 no yes
12 none lanus 33 464 2 1 no yes
12 none lanus 33 465 2 2 no yes
12 none lanus 33 466 2 3 no yes
12 none aps 33 467 -2 1 no yes
12 none aps 33 468 -2 2 no yes
12 none aps 33 469 -2 3 no yes
12 eba aps 33 470 -2 1 no yes
12 eba aps 33 471 -2 2 no yes
12 eba aps 33 472 -2 3 no yes
12 eba has 33 473 2 1 no yes
12 eba has 33 474 2 2 no yes
12 eba has 33 475 2 3 no yes
12 none has 33 476 2 1 no yes
12 none has 33 477 2 2 no yes
12 none has 33 478 2 3 no yes
12 none las 33 479 -2 1 no yes
12 none las 33 480 -2 2 no yes
12 none las 33 481 -2 3 no yes
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12 eba las 33 482 -2 1 no yes
12 eba las 33 483 -2 2 no yes
12 eba las 33 484 -2 3 no yes
13 none lanus 34 486 -2 1 no no
13 none lanus 34 487 -2 2 no no
13 none lanus 34 488 -2 3 no no
13 eba lanus 34 489 -2 1 no no
13 eba lanus 34 490 -2 2 no no
13 eba lanus 34 491 -2 3 no no
13 eba aps 34 492 2 1 no no
13 eba aps 34 493 2 2 no no
13 eba aps 34 494 2 3 no no
13 none aps 34 495 2 1 no no
13 none aps 34 496 2 2 no no
13 none aps 34 497 2 3 no no
13 none lanus 36 499 -1 1 no yes
13 none lanus 36 500 -1 2 no yes
13 none lanus 36 501 -1 3 no yes
13 fmpc lanus 36 502 -1 1 no yes
13 fmpc lanus 36 503 -1 2 no yes
13 fmpc lanus 36 504 -1 3 no yes
13 fmpc aps 36 505 1 1 no yes
13 fmpc aps 36 506 1 2 no yes
13 fmpc aps 36 507 1 3 no yes
13 none aps 36 508 1 1 no yes
13 none aps 36 509 1 2 no yes
13 none aps 36 510 1 3 no yes
13 none has 34 511 -2 1 no no
13 none has 34 512 -2 2 no no
13 none has 34 513 -2 3 no no
13 eba has 34 514 -2 1 no no
13 eba has 34 515 -2 2 no no
13 eba has 34 516 -2 3 no no
13 eba las 34 517 2 1 no no
13 eba las 34 518 2 2 no no
13 eba las 34 519 2 3 no no
13 none las 34 520 2 1 no no
13 none las 34 521 2 2 no no
13 none las 34 522 2 3 no no
13 none has 36 523 -1 1 no yes
13 none has 36 524 -1 2 no yes
13 none has 36 525 -1 3 no yes
13 fmpc has 36 526 -1 1 no yes
13 fmpc has 36 527 -1 2 no yes
13 fmpc has 36 528 -1 3 no yes
13 fmpc las 36 529 1 1 no yes
13 fmpc las 36 530 1 2 no yes
13 fmpc las 36 531 1 3 no yes
13 none las 36 532 1 1 no yes
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13 none las 36 533 1 2 no yes
13 none las 36 534 1 3 no yes
14 fmpc lanus 35 536 1 1 no yes
14 fmpc lanus 35 537 1 2 no yes
14 fmpc lanus 35 538 1 3 no yes
14 none lanus 35 539 1 1 no yes
14 none lanus 35 540 1 2 no yes
14 none lanus 35 541 1 3 no yes
14 none aps 35 542 -1 1 no yes
14 none aps 35 543 -1 2 no yes
14 none aps 35 544 -1 3 no yes
14 fmpc aps 35 545 -1 1 no yes
14 fmpc aps 35 546 -1 2 no yes
14 fmpc aps 35 547 -1 3 no yes
14 fmpc has 35 548 1 1 no yes
14 fmpc has 35 549 1 2 no yes
14 fmpc has 35 550 1 3 no yes
14 none has 35 551 1 1 no yes
14 none has 35 552 1 2 no yes
14 none has 35 553 1 3 no yes
14 none las 35 554 -1 1 no yes
14 none las 35 555 -1 2 no yes
14 none las 35 556 -1 3 no yes
14 fmpc las 35 557 -1 1 no yes
14 fmpc las 35 558 -1 2 no yes
14 fmpc las 35 559 -1 3 no yes
14 fmpc las 35 560 -1 4 no yes
15 none aps 37 562 -2 1 yes yes
15 none aps 37 563 -2 2 yes yes
15 none aps 37 564 -2 3 yes yes
15 eba aps 37 565 -2 1 yes yes
15 eba aps 37 566 -2 2 yes yes
15 eba aps 37 567 -2 3 yes yes
15 eba has 37 568 2 1 yes yes
15 eba has 37 569 2 2 yes yes
15 eba has 37 570 2 3 yes yes
15 none has 37 571 2 1 yes yes
15 none has 37 572 2 2 yes yes
15 none has 37 573 2 3 yes yes
15 none aps 38 575 -1 1 yes yes
15 none aps 38 576 -1 2 yes yes
15 none aps 38 577 -1 3 yes yes
15 fmpc aps 38 578 -1 1 yes yes
15 fmpc aps 38 579 -1 2 yes yes
15 fmpc aps 38 580 -1 3 yes yes
15 fmpc has 38 581 1 1 yes yes
15 fmpc has 38 582 1 2 yes yes
15 fmpc has 38 583 1 3 yes yes
15 none has 38 584 1 1 yes yes
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15 none has 38 585 1 2 yes yes
15 none has 38 586 1 3 yes yes
15 none las 37 587 -2 1 yes yes
15 none las 37 588 -2 2 yes yes
15 none las 37 589 -2 3 yes yes
15 eba las 37 590 -2 1 yes yes
15 eba las 37 591 -2 2 yes yes
15 eba las 37 592 -2 3 yes yes
15 eba lanus 37 593 2 1 yes yes
15 eba lanus 37 594 2 2 yes yes
15 eba lanus 37 595 2 3 yes yes
15 none lanus 37 596 2 1 yes yes
15 none lanus 37 597 2 2 yes yes
15 none lanus 37 598 2 3 yes yes
15 none las 38 599 -1 1 yes yes
15 none las 38 600 -1 2 yes yes
15 none las 38 601 -1 3 yes yes
15 fmpc las 38 602 -1 1 yes yes
15 fmpc las 38 603 -1 2 yes yes
15 fmpc las 38 604 -1 3 yes yes
15 fmpc lanus 38 605 1 1 yes yes
15 fmpc lanus 38 606 1 2 yes yes
15 fmpc lanus 38 607 1 3 yes yes
15 none lanus 38 608 1 1 yes yes
15 none lanus 38 609 1 2 yes yes
15 none lanus 38 610 1 3 yes yes
16 none has 40 612 -1 1 no no
16 none has 40 613 -1 2 no no
16 none has 40 614 -1 3 no no
16 fmpc has 40 615 -1 1 no no
16 fmpc has 40 616 -1 2 no no
16 fmpc has 40 617 -1 3 no no
16 fmpc las 40 618 1 1 no no
16 fmpc las 40 619 1 2 no no
16 fmpc las 40 620 1 3 no no
16 none las 40 621 1 1 no no
16 none las 40 622 1 2 no no
16 none las 40 623 1 3 no no
16 none has 39 625 -2 1 no no
16 none has 39 626 -2 2 no no
16 none has 39 627 -2 3 no no
16 eba has 39 628 -2 1 no no
16 eba has 39 629 -2 2 no no
16 eba has 39 630 -2 3 no no
16 eba las 39 631 2 1 no no
16 eba las 39 632 2 2 no no
16 eba las 39 633 2 3 no no
16 eba las 39 634 2 4 no no
16 none las 39 635 2 1 no no
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16 none las 39 636 2 2 no no
16 none las 39 637 2 3 no no
16 none lanus 40 638 -1 1 no no
16 none lanus 40 639 -1 2 no no
16 none lanus 40 640 -1 3 no no
16 fmpc lanus 40 641 -1 1 no no
16 fmpc lanus 40 642 -1 2 no no
16 fmpc lanus 40 643 -1 3 no no
16 fmpc lanus 40 644 -1 4 no no
16 fmpc aps 40 645 1 1 no no
16 fmpc aps 40 646 1 2 no no
16 fmpc aps 40 647 1 3 no no
16 none aps 40 648 1 1 no no
16 none aps 40 649 1 2 no no
16 none aps 40 650 1 3 no no
16 none lanus 39 651 -2 1 no no
16 none lanus 39 652 -2 2 no no
16 none lanus 39 653 -2 3 no no
16 none lanus 39 654 -2 4 no no
16 eba lanus 39 655 -2 1 no no
16 eba lanus 39 656 -2 2 no no
16 eba lanus 39 657 -2 3 no no
16 eba aps 39 658 2 1 no no
16 eba aps 39 659 2 2 no no
16 eba aps 39 660 2 3 no no
16 none aps 39 661 2 1 no no
16 none aps 39 662 2 2 no no
16 none aps 39 663 2 3 no no
16 eba lanus 11 665 2 1 yes yes
16 eba lanus 11 666 2 2 yes yes
16 eba lanus 11 667 2 3 yes yes
16 none lanus 11 668 2 1 yes yes
16 none lanus 11 669 2 2 yes yes
16 none lanus 11 670 2 3 yes yes
16 none lanus 11 671 2 4 yes yes
16 none aps 11 672 -2 1 yes yes
16 none aps 11 673 -2 2 yes yes
16 none aps 11 674 -2 3 yes yes
16 eba aps 11 675 -2 1 yes yes
16 eba aps 11 676 -2 2 yes yes
16 eba aps 11 677 -2 3 yes yes
16 fmpc lanus 43 679 1 1 yes yes
16 fmpc lanus 43 680 1 2 yes yes
16 fmpc lanus 43 681 1 3 yes yes
16 none lanus 43 682 1 1 yes yes
16 none lanus 43 683 1 2 yes yes
16 none lanus 43 684 1 3 yes yes
16 none aps 43 685 -1 1 yes yes
16 none aps 43 686 -1 2 yes yes
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16 none aps 43 687 -1 3 yes yes
16 fmpc aps 43 688 -1 1 yes yes
16 fmpc aps 43 689 -1 2 yes yes
16 fmpc aps 43 690 -1 3 yes yes
16 eba las 11 691 2 1 yes yes
16 eba las 11 692 2 2 yes yes
16 eba las 11 693 2 3 yes yes
16 eba las 11 694 2 4 yes yes
16 none las 11 695 2 1 yes yes
16 none las 11 696 2 2 yes yes
16 none las 11 697 2 3 yes yes
16 none has 11 698 -2 1 yes yes
16 none has 11 699 -2 2 yes yes
16 none has 11 700 -2 3 yes yes
16 eba has 11 701 -2 1 yes yes
16 eba has 11 702 -2 2 yes yes
16 eba has 11 703 -2 3 yes yes
16 fmpc las 43 704 1 1 yes yes
16 fmpc las 43 705 1 2 yes yes
16 fmpc las 43 706 1 3 yes yes
16 none las 43 707 1 1 yes yes
16 none las 43 708 1 2 yes yes
16 none las 43 709 1 3 yes yes
16 none has 43 710 -1 1 yes yes
16 none has 43 711 -1 2 yes yes
16 none has 43 712 -1 3 yes yes
16 fmpc has 43 713 -1 1 yes yes
16 fmpc has 43 714 -1 2 yes yes
16 fmpc has 43 715 -1 3 yes yes
17 eba las 44 717 2 1 no no
17 eba las 44 718 2 2 no no
17 eba las 44 719 2 3 no no
17 none las 44 720 2 1 no no
17 none las 44 721 2 2 no no
17 none las 44 722 2 3 no no
17 none has 44 723 -2 1 no no
17 none has 44 724 -2 2 no no
17 none has 44 725 -2 3 no no
17 eba has 44 726 -2 1 no no
17 eba has 44 727 -2 2 no no
17 eba has 44 728 -2 3 no no
17 eba lanus 44 729 2 1 no no
17 eba lanus 44 730 2 2 no no
17 eba lanus 44 731 2 3 no no
17 none lanus 44 732 2 1 no no
17 none lanus 44 733 2 2 no no
17 none lanus 44 734 2 3 no no
17 none lanus 44 735 2 4 no no
17 none aps 44 736 -2 1 no no
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17 none aps 44 737 -2 2 no no
17 none aps 44 738 -2 3 no no
17 eba aps 44 739 -2 1 no no
17 eba aps 44 740 -2 2 no no
17 eba aps 44 741 -2 3 no no
18 fmpc has 42 743 1 1 no no
18 fmpc has 42 744 1 2 no no
18 fmpc has 42 745 1 3 no no
18 none has 42 746 1 1 no no
18 none has 42 747 1 2 no no
18 none has 42 748 1 3 no no
18 none las 42 749 -1 1 no no
18 none las 42 750 -1 2 no no
18 none las 42 751 -1 3 no no
18 fmpc las 42 752 -1 1 no no
18 fmpc las 42 753 -1 2 no no
18 fmpc las 42 754 -1 3 no no
18 eba has 41 756 2 1 no no
18 eba has 41 757 2 2 no no
18 eba has 41 758 2 3 no no
18 none has 41 759 2 1 no no
18 none has 41 760 2 2 no no
18 none has 41 761 2 3 no no
18 none las 41 762 -2 1 no no
18 none las 41 763 -2 2 no no
18 none las 41 764 -2 3 no no
18 eba las 41 765 -2 1 no no
18 eba las 41 766 -2 2 no no
18 eba las 41 767 -2 3 no no
18 fmpc lanus 42 768 1 1 no no
18 fmpc lanus 42 769 1 2 no no
18 fmpc lanus 42 770 1 3 no no
18 none lanus 42 771 1 1 no no
18 none lanus 42 772 1 2 no no
18 none lanus 42 773 1 3 no no
18 none aps 42 774 -1 1 no no
18 none aps 42 775 -1 2 no no
18 none aps 42 776 -1 3 no no
18 fmpc aps 42 777 -1 1 no no
18 fmpc aps 42 778 -1 2 no no
18 fmpc aps 42 779 -1 3 no no
18 eba lanus 41 780 2 1 no no
18 eba lanus 41 781 2 2 no no
18 eba lanus 41 782 2 3 no no
18 none lanus 41 783 2 1 no no
18 none lanus 41 784 2 2 no no
18 none lanus 41 785 2 3 no no
18 none aps 41 786 -2 1 no no
18 none aps 41 787 -2 2 no no
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18 none aps 41 788 -2 3 no no
18 eba aps 41 789 -2 1 no no
18 eba aps 41 790 -2 2 no no
18 eba aps 41 791 -2 3 no no
19 none las 46 793 -1 1 no no
19 none las 46 794 -1 2 no no
19 none las 46 795 -1 3 no no
19 fmpc las 46 796 -1 1 no no
19 fmpc las 46 797 -1 2 no no
19 fmpc las 46 798 -1 3 no no
19 fmpc has 46 799 1 1 no no
19 fmpc has 46 800 1 2 no no
19 fmpc has 46 801 1 3 no no
19 none has 46 802 1 1 no no
19 none has 46 803 1 2 no no
19 none has 46 804 1 3 no no
19 none las 45 806 -2 1 no no
19 none las 45 807 -2 2 no no
19 none las 45 808 -2 3 no no
19 none las 45 809 -2 4 no no
19 eba las 45 810 -2 1 no no
19 eba las 45 811 -2 2 no no
19 eba las 45 812 -2 3 no no
19 eba has 45 813 2 1 no no
19 eba has 45 814 2 2 no no
19 eba has 45 815 2 3 no no
19 none has 45 816 2 1 no no
19 none has 45 817 2 2 no no
19 none has 45 818 2 3 no no
19 none lanus 46 819 -1 1 no no
19 none lanus 46 820 -1 2 no no
19 none lanus 46 821 -1 3 no no
19 fmpc lanus 46 822 -1 1 no no
19 fmpc lanus 46 823 -1 2 no no
19 fmpc lanus 46 824 -1 3 no no
19 fmpc aps 46 825 1 1 no no
19 fmpc aps 46 826 1 2 no no
19 fmpc aps 46 827 1 3 no no
19 none aps 46 828 1 1 no no
19 none aps 46 829 1 2 no no
19 none aps 46 830 1 3 no no
19 none lanus 45 831 -2 1 no no
19 none lanus 45 832 -2 2 no no
19 none lanus 45 833 -2 3 no no
19 eba lanus 45 834 -2 1 no no
19 eba lanus 45 835 -2 2 no no
19 eba lanus 45 836 -2 3 no no
19 eba aps 45 837 2 1 no no
19 eba aps 45 838 2 2 no no
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19 eba aps 45 839 2 3 no no
19 none aps 45 840 2 1 no no
19 none aps 45 841 2 2 no no
19 none aps 45 842 2 3 no no
20 eba aps 48 844 2 1 no no
20 eba aps 48 845 2 2 no no
20 eba aps 48 846 2 3 no no
20 none aps 48 847 2 1 no no
20 none aps 48 848 2 2 no no
20 none aps 48 849 2 3 no no
20 none las 48 850 -2 1 no no
20 none las 48 851 -2 2 no no
20 none las 48 852 -2 3 no no
20 eba las 48 853 -2 1 no no
20 eba las 48 854 -2 2 no no
20 eba las 48 855 -2 3 no no
20 fmpc aps 47 857 1 1 no yes
20 fmpc aps 47 858 1 2 no yes
20 fmpc aps 47 859 1 3 no yes
20 none aps 47 860 1 1 no yes
20 none aps 47 861 1 2 no yes
20 none aps 47 862 1 3 no yes
20 none las 47 863 -1 1 no yes
20 none las 47 864 -1 2 no yes
20 none las 47 865 -1 3 no yes
20 fmpc las 47 866 -1 1 no yes
20 fmpc las 47 867 -1 2 no yes
20 fmpc las 47 868 -1 3 no yes
20 eba has 48 869 2 1 no no
20 eba has 48 870 2 2 no no
20 eba has 48 871 2 3 no no
20 none has 48 872 2 1 no no
20 none has 48 873 2 2 no no
20 none has 48 874 2 3 no no
20 none lanus 48 875 -2 1 no no
20 none lanus 48 876 -2 2 no no
20 none lanus 48 877 -2 3 no no
20 eba lanus 48 878 -2 1 no no
20 eba lanus 48 879 -2 2 no no
20 eba lanus 48 880 -2 3 no no
20 fmpc has 47 881 1 1 no yes
20 fmpc has 47 882 1 2 no yes
20 fmpc has 47 883 1 3 no yes
20 none has 47 884 1 1 no yes
20 none has 47 885 1 2 no yes
20 none has 47 886 1 3 no yes
20 none lanus 47 887 -1 1 no yes
20 none lanus 47 888 -1 2 no yes
20 none lanus 47 889 -1 3 no yes
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20 fmpc lanus 47 890 -1 1 no yes
20 fmpc lanus 47 891 -1 2 no yes
20 fmpc lanus 47 892 -1 3 no yes
21 fmpc las 53 894 1 1 no no
21 fmpc las 53 895 1 2 no no
21 fmpc las 53 896 1 3 no no
21 none las 53 897 1 1 no no
21 none las 53 898 1 2 no no
21 none las 53 899 1 3 no no
21 none has 53 900 -1 1 no no
21 none has 53 901 -1 2 no no
21 none has 53 902 -1 3 no no
21 fmpc has 53 903 -1 1 no no
21 fmpc has 53 904 -1 2 no no
21 fmpc has 53 905 -1 3 no no
21 none lanus 53 906 -1 1 no no
21 none lanus 53 907 -1 2 no no
21 none lanus 53 908 -1 3 no no
21 fmpc lanus 53 909 -1 1 no no
21 fmpc lanus 53 910 -1 2 no no
21 fmpc lanus 53 911 -1 3 no no
21 none aps 53 912 -1 1 no no
21 none aps 53 913 -1 2 no no
21 none aps 53 914 -1 3 no no
21 fmpc aps 53 915 -1 1 no no
21 fmpc aps 53 916 -1 2 no no
21 fmpc aps 53 917 -1 3 no no
22 none aps 50 919 -2 1 no yes
22 none aps 50 920 -2 2 no yes
22 none aps 50 921 -2 3 no yes
22 eba aps 50 922 -2 1 no yes
22 eba aps 50 923 -2 2 no yes
22 eba aps 50 924 -2 3 no yes
22 eba las 50 925 2 1 no yes
22 eba las 50 926 2 2 no yes
22 eba las 50 927 2 3 no yes
22 none las 50 928 2 1 no yes
22 none las 50 929 2 2 no yes
22 none las 50 930 2 3 no yes
22 none aps 49 932 -1 1 no no
22 none aps 49 933 -1 2 no no
22 none aps 49 934 -1 3 no no
22 fmpc aps 49 935 -1 1 no no
22 fmpc aps 49 936 -1 2 no no
22 fmpc aps 49 937 -1 3 no no
22 fmpc las 49 938 1 1 no no
22 fmpc las 49 939 1 2 no no
22 fmpc las 49 940 1 3 no no
22 none las 49 941 1 1 no no
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22 none las 49 942 1 2 no no
22 none las 49 943 1 3 no no
22 none has 50 944 -2 1 no yes
22 none has 50 945 -2 2 no yes
22 none has 50 946 -2 3 no yes
22 eba has 50 947 -2 1 no yes
22 eba has 50 948 -2 2 no yes
22 eba has 50 949 -2 3 no yes
22 eba lanus 50 950 2 1 no yes
22 eba lanus 50 951 2 2 no yes
22 eba lanus 50 952 2 3 no yes
22 none lanus 50 953 2 1 no yes
22 none lanus 50 954 2 2 no yes
22 none lanus 50 955 2 3 no yes
22 none has 49 956 -1 1 no no
22 none has 49 957 -1 2 no no
22 none has 49 958 -1 3 no no
22 fmpc has 49 959 -1 1 no no
22 fmpc has 49 960 -1 2 no no
22 fmpc has 49 961 -1 3 no no
22 fmpc lanus 49 962 1 1 no no
22 fmpc lanus 49 963 1 2 no no
22 fmpc lanus 49 964 1 3 no no
22 none lanus 49 965 1 1 no no
22 none lanus 49 966 1 2 no no
22 none lanus 49 967 1 3 no no
23 none lanus 51 969 -2 1 no yes
23 none lanus 51 970 -2 2 no yes
23 none lanus 51 971 -2 3 no yes
23 none lanus 51 972 -2 4 no yes
23 eba lanus 51 973 -2 1 no yes
23 eba lanus 51 974 -2 2 no yes
23 eba lanus 51 975 -2 3 no yes
23 eba aps 51 976 2 1 no yes
23 eba aps 51 977 2 2 no yes
23 eba aps 51 978 2 3 no yes
23 none aps 51 979 2 1 no yes
23 none aps 51 980 2 2 no yes
23 none aps 51 981 2 3 no yes
23 fmpc lanus 52 983 1 1 no no
23 fmpc lanus 52 984 1 2 no no
23 fmpc lanus 52 985 1 3 no no
23 none lanus 52 986 1 1 no no
23 none lanus 52 987 1 2 no no
23 none lanus 52 988 1 3 no no
23 fmpc aps 52 989 1 1 no no
23 fmpc aps 52 990 1 2 no no
23 fmpc aps 52 991 1 3 no no
23 none aps 52 992 1 1 no no
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23 none aps 52 993 1 2 no no
23 none aps 52 994 1 3 no no
23 none las 51 995 -2 1 no yes
23 none las 51 996 -2 2 no yes
23 none las 51 997 -2 3 no yes
23 eba las 51 998 -2 1 no yes
23 eba las 51 999 -2 2 no yes
23 eba las 51 1000 -2 3 no yes
23 eba has 51 1001 2 1 no yes
23 eba has 51 1002 2 2 no yes
23 eba has 51 1003 2 3 no yes
23 none has 51 1004 2 1 no yes
23 none has 51 1005 2 2 no yes
23 none has 51 1006 2 3 no yes
23 none las 52 1007 -1 1 no no
23 none las 52 1008 -1 2 no no
23 none las 52 1009 -1 3 no no
23 fmpc las 52 1010 -1 1 no no
23 fmpc las 52 1011 -1 2 no no
23 fmpc las 52 1012 -1 3 no no
23 fmpc has 52 1013 1 1 no no
23 fmpc has 52 1014 1 2 no no
23 fmpc has 52 1015 1 3 no no
23 none has 52 1016 1 1 no no
23 none has 52 1017 1 2 no no
23 none has 52 1018 1 3 no no
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